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I. INTRODUCTION
Confidentiality is presented as an essential element when promoting
mediation to the public.' While some ADR practitioners assume
confidentiality to be of primary importance to parties choosing mediation,2
others question assumptions about the necessity of,3 or the advisability of,4
* Susan Oberman is the Director of Common Ground Negotiation Services (CGNS),
a solo private mediation practice established in Charlottesville, VA in 1999. Ms.
Oberman developed the Sustainable Knowledge Model of Norm-Educating Mediation.
Recognizing that mediation operates "in the shadow of the law," the Norm-Educating
model considers the mediator responsible for ensuring that parties are informed about
their rights throughout the mediation process, thereby meeting the standards of self-
determination. Susan Oberman can be reached at cgns@susanoberman.com.
1 Ellen E. Deason, Predictable Mediation Confidentiality in the U.S. Federal System,
17 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 239, 240 (2002) [hereinafter "Predictable Mediation
Confidentiality"] ("The importance of confidentiality is axiomatic in mediation. Or,
perhaps more accurately, the perception of confidentiality is of central importance."). See
also Joshua P. Rosenberg, Keeping the Lid on Confidentiality: Mediation Privilege and
Conflict ofLaws, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 157 (1994) ("An increasingly important
aspect of alternative dispute resolution is the privilege which attaches to both parties in an
alternative dispute resolution proceeding and the individual(s) presiding over the
proceeding."); Alan Kirtley, The Mediation Privilege & Transition from Theory to
Implementation: Designing a Mediation Privilege Standard to Protect Mediation
Participants, the Process and the Public Interest, 1995 J. DIsP. RESOL. 1, 10 ("A principal
purpose of the mediation privilege is to provide mediation parties protection against th[e]
downside risks of a failed mediation. Participation will diminish if perceptions of
confidentiality are not matched by reality. Another critical purpose of the privilege is to
maintain the public's perception that individual mediators and the mediation process are
neutral and unbiased."); Ellen E. Deason, The Quest for Uniformity in Mediation
Confidentiality: Foolish Consistency or Crucial Predictability?, 85 MARQ. L. REv. 79, 82
(2001), [hereinafter "The Quest for Uniformity"] ("[I]n many mediations, confidentiality
does far more than merely enhance the candid nature of the discussion; between some
adversaries, [it] may be akin to a precondition for any discussion."); Lawrence R.
Freedman & Michael L. Prigoff, Confidentiality in Mediation: The Need for Protection, 2
OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 37, 38 (1986) ("Privacy is an incentive for many to choose
mediation .. . the option presented by the mediator to settle disputes quietly and
informally is often a primary motivator for parties choosing this process.").
2 Jonathan M. Hyman, The Model Mediator Confidentiality Rule: A Commentary, 12
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 17, 29 (1988) ("The parties have two important interests in
preserving confidentiality: to facilitate disclosure by all the parties in order to find the
best resolution, and to avoid the sense of betrayal and unfairness that would follow the
disclosure of information that a party thought was given in confidence.").
3 Eric D. Green, A Heretical View of the Mediation Privilege, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP.
RESOL. 1, 2 (1986) ("[T]he current campaign to obtain a blanket mediation privilege rests
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maintaining confidentiality. The rationale most often given for protection of
confidentiality is that it encourages consensual dispute resolution.5 Yet
confusion persists about the reality of promising confidentiality. There is no
uniformity in confidentiality protections between state and federal laws,
among the states, or even among localities within states.6 In addition, many
on faulty logic, inadequate data, and short-sighted professional self-interest. Neither the
necessity for such a privilege nor the social utility of a general mediation privilege have
been demonstrated."); see also Scott H. Hughes, A Closer Look The case for a mediation
confidentiality privilege still has not been made, DisP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 1998, at 14
("[I]t should be noted that there is almost no empirical support for mediation privileges.
For example, no data exists to show a difference in growth rates or overall use of
mediation services between jurisdictions with privileges and those without such
protections, or from within any jurisdiction before and after the creation of a privilege.").
4 Thomas S. Leatherbury & Mark A. Cover, Keeping Public Mediation Public:
Exploring the Conflict Between Confidential Mediation and Open Government, 46 SMU
L. REv. 2221, 2222 (1993) ("Problems arise when legitimate reasons support both
openness and confidentiality. One such problem involves mediation of public policy
disputes, in which the policy of open government clashes with the policy of facilitating
mediation through confidentiality."); see also Kevin Gibson, Confidentiality in
Mediation: A Moral Reassessment, 1992 J. DisP. RESOL. 25, 27 ("[T]here are
nevertheless two strong reasons why the details of a mediation session should not be kept
completely confidential. First, if the process is allowed to go on without any sort of
review, then it lacks public accountability . . . . Secondly, if there are unrepresented but
concerned parties who have a right to know or a duty to be warned about something
introduced in mediation, then there is a pull towards breaking confidentiality."); Maureen
A. Weston, Checks on Participant Conduct in Compulsory ADR: Reconciling the Tension
in the Need for Good-Faith Participation, Autonomy, and Confidentiality, 76 IND. L.J.
591, 593 (2001) ("Unlike court-mandated ADR, where parties are ordered to ADR but
ultimately retain the right to a judicial trial, parties subject to private mandatory ADR by
contrast are effectively precluded from judicial recourse."); Michael A. Perino, Drafting
Mediation Privileges: Lessons From the Civil Justice Reform Act, 26 SETON HALL L.
REv. 1, 12 (1995) ("Like all privileges, a mediation privilege is an exception to the
principle that the public is entitled to 'every man's evidence."').
5 Wayne D. Brazil, Protecting the Confidentiality of Settlement Negotiations, 39
HASTINGs L.J. 955, 958 (July 1988) (describing the rationale behind drafting Federal
Rule of Evidence 408: "This rationale recognized that it was in the public interest, and in
the interest of individual litigants, to encourage consensual resolution of disputes.").
6 See Deason, The Quest for Uniformity, supra note 1, at 100 ("[B]ecause states
currently use so many different legal frameworks to protect mediation confidentiality,
because these statutory frameworks can be ambiguous to categorize, and because federal
courts use different analytical approaches to choice of law .. .vertical choice of law for
confidentiality is an amazingly complex, multi-factorial analysis.").
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statutes do not refer to the court's authority to override confidentiality.7 Yet
mediators commonly make broad statements claiming that everything in
mediation is confidential. Oversimplification of the offer of confidentiality
fails to support self-determination of the parties in neglecting to give legal
information that is necessary to make informed choices. Informed consent8 in
mediation, as in medicine,9 is the basis for self-determination.' 0 Informed
consent as it applies to both confidentiality and self-determination is an
indication of how profoundly these two basic elements" of mediation
intersect. This article examines the roots of confidentiality in privacy law and
proposes that mediators comply with standards of self-determination by
informing parties about the legal rights and limitations represented in the
choice to maintain or waive confidentiality in mediation.
7 Maureen A. Weston, Confidentiality's Constitutionality: The Incursion on Judicial
Powers to Regulate Party Conduct in Court-Connected Mediation, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L.
REv. 29, 33 (2003) ("Few ... statutes, however, acknowledge the authority of a court to
override the confidentiality privilege to enforce participation orders, address claims of
participant misconduct, or to prevent abuse of process or professional ethics violations.").
8 Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent in Mediation: A Guiding Principle
for Truly Educated Decisionmaking, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 775, 781 (1999)
("Informed consent is the foundational moral and ethical principle that promotes respect
for individual self-determination and honors human dignity.").
9 Joshua B. Murphy, Benefits and Challenges of Informed Consent, 83 MAYO CUN.
PROC. 272, 272 (2008) ("[T]he dialogue with the patient should not be confused with a
mere listing of a string of potential complications. The physician should strive not just to
say all the right words, but to impart information and engender in the patient an
understanding of the risks to which the patient might be exposed.").
10 Scott H. Hughes, The Uniform Mediation Act: To The Spoiled Go The Privileges,
85 MARQ. L. REV. 9, 72 (2001) ("Self-determination, which arises from voluntary and
informed decision-making, represents the cornerstone of all mediation. To this
proposition, there is no debate.").
11 Susan Oberman, Mediation Theory vs. Practice: What Are We Really Doing? Re-
Solving A Professional Conundrum, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 775, 795 (2005)
("[I]t is ... incumbent upon the mediator to explain the basic components of mediation.
Certain elements would ideally be present: (1) self-determination of the parties; (2) the
good faith intention of the parties to negotiate and disclose all relevant information; (3)
impartiality and neutrality of the mediator in relation to the parties and the outcome; (4) a
balance of power and fairness. In addition to these four, a fifth must be discussed fully,
weighed carefully, and mutually decided upon by the parties prior to signing the
agreement to mediate--(5) confidentiality.").
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The impetus for adopting Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)
processes was initiated by the courts. 12 Claiming that society was becoming
excessively litigious,13 proponents of ADR have waged a public relations
campaign since the 1976 Pound Conference1 4 to convince litigants to remove
disputes from the courtroom.15 While advocates of informal justice1 6 would
have us believe that ADR empowers communities,17 implementation of
informal dispute resolution processes 8 through "community justice
centers" 9 may actually increase the potential for state control.20 Coherence
. 12 Susan Oberman, Style vs. Model: Why Quibble? 9 PEPP. DisP. RESOL. L.J. 1, 9-10
(2008) ("Following the Pound Conference, the court program to implement
informalization introduced mediation into neighborhoods and families. Thus, the
'mandate' to provide informal justice was an extension of the courts, endorsed by legal
professionals who recognized the social consequences of denying access to justice.").
13 Susan S. Silbey, The Emperor's New Clothes: Mediation Mythology and Markets,
2002 J. DisP. RESOL. 171, 175 ("For those who thought modem society's reliance of law
was excessive, primarily Chief Justice Warren Burger, insurance companies, the
corporate bar and other members of the legal establishment, mediation represented a way
of clearing court dockets for more important business litigation.").
14 Dorothy J. Della Noce, Mediation Theory and Policy: The Legacy of the Pound
Conference, 17 OHIO ST. J. DisP. RESOL. 545, 546 (2002) ("The Pound Conference was
organized around the premise that society was dissatisfied with the state of the justice
system, and the task of the Conference was to explore the sources of dissatisfaction as
well as the possible remedies. Mediation was offered as one promising remedy for the
particular dissatisfaction that arose from the cost, delay, and inaccessibility of
adjudication attributed to a burgeoning judicial caseload.").
I5 Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward A State Action Theory of Alternative
Dispute Resolution, 85 CAL. L. REV. 577, 580 (1997) ("[M]ore and more cases are
delegated-legislatively, judicially, and contractually-out of public courts and into
private hearings, thanks to the rise of alternative dispute resolution (ADR).").
16 CHRISTINE B. HARRINGTON, SHADOW JUSTICE THE IDEOLOGY AND
INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF ALTERNATIVES To COURT, 2 (1985) ("The ideology of
informalism is structured by its relationship to delegalization movements and order
maintenance concerns . .. . Ostensibly replacing formalism as an ideology, informalism
retains a legalistic core that ties it to conventional practice.").
17 Richard L. Abel, Introduction to THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE, VOLUME 1:
THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE at 9 (Richard L. Abel. Ed., 1982), ("Informal justice claims
to be a 'community' institution, but the residential community it serves is usually just the
figment of some reformer's imagination.").
18 See HARRINGTON, supra note 16, at 12 ("Informal procedures are idealized as
nonadversarial, rehabilitative, and preventative methods for resolving conflict.").
19 RICHARD HOFRICHTER, NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE IN CAPITALIST SOCIETY THE
EXPANSION OF THE INFORMAL STATE, xiv (1987) ("NDR [Neighborhood Dispute
Resolution] falsely affirms the neighborhood as the basis of justice in the community
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in communities is undermined when disputes are framed as individual rather
than social,21 and when the demand for rights previously resolved by
established legal norms22 are "transformed" into needs23 channeled into
informal24 problem solving.25 There is evidence that minority groups are
disadvantaged in informal processes 26 that depart from formal legal
... it presents an idea of community and collective self-help that is contrived, uses
community culture against itself as a form of regulation and, by its presence, distracts
attention from broader community issues.").
20 George Pavlich, The Power of Community Mediation: Government and
Formation of Self-Identity, 30 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 707, 711 (1996) ("Against such
elevated visions, early critics of the alternative dispute resolution proposals have argued
that far from restricting state control over individual lives, of empowering and liberating
individual disputants, community mediation programs actually expand and intensify state
control.").
21 See ABEL, supra note 17, at 9 ("[B]y individualizing conflict and facilitating exit
from relationships, informal institutions undermine community rather than create or
preserve it."
22 Richard Delgado, Chris Dunn, Pamela Brown, Helena Lee, & David Hubbert,
Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1359, 1374 ("[M]odern rules of procedure and evidence
contain numerous provisions that are intended to reduce prejudice in the trial system by
defining the scope of the action, formalizing the presentation of evidence, and reducing
strategic options for litigants and counsel. ADR, to date, has very few such safeguards.").
23 Sara Cobb, The Domestication of Violence in Mediation, 31 LAW & Soc'Y REV.
397, 411-12 (1997) ("[W]hile rights construct the relation between self and community,
their reformulation into needs disintegrates that community, as actions that were
obligated within a normative frame are reframed as actions that please or appease an
individual.").
24 See Weston, supra note 4, at 594 ("It is precisely the informality and private
environment of ADR-perceived benefits of the system-that also raise concerns about
the fairness of the process . . .ADR processes are cloaked with confidentiality privileges,
conducted by private third-party neutrals who are unaccountable to the public or judicial
system and not bound to follow or apply the law.").
25 Deborah R. Hensler, Suppose It's Not True: Challenging Mediation Ideology,
2002 J. DisP. RESOL. 81, 95 ("[T]he assumption that people prefer treating disputes as
problems to be -solved rather than as conflicts to be resolved according to publicly
adopted norms, is central to mediation ideology.").
26 Gary LaFree & Christine Rack, The Effects of Participants'Ethnicity and Gender
on Monetary Outcomes in Mediated and Adjudicated Civil Cases, 30 LAW & SOC'Y REV.
767, 792-93 (1996) ("[E]vidence of disparity in the treatment of minorities and women
was limited mostly to minority male and female claimants in mediated cases. Minority
male and female claimants did worse in cases mediated by at least one Anglo mediator;
minority female claimants did worse in cases mediated by two women.").
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principles.27 Informal processes may deprive parties of the right to due
process 28 and often presume an equality among participants that may not
exist. 29 Naming these processes "alternative" dispute resolution calls into
question the authority of the court to monitor court-referred mediation,30 and
leaves unanswered innumerable questions about regulation of private
mediation.31 Mediation is promoted as a process that gives parties the
authority to make decisions based on their own values and sense of
fairness.32 Although the mediator's role is to uphold neutrality and fairness,
the authority of the court to monitor fairness is in doubt. 33 Mediation
27 See Hensler, supra note 25, at 85 ("[T]he notion that Americans who believe they
have a legal claim prefer to resolve such claims through mediation rather than adversarial
litigation and adjudication seems to be based on questionable assumptions and debatable
extrapolations from other social conflict contexts.").
28 SHEILA HEIM ET AL., CAL. NAT'L ORG. FOR WOMEN, FAMILY COURT REPORT
2002, AT 3 (2002) ("The system leaves decisions which should be made on facts in a
courtroom to extra judicial public and private personnel. The system precludes the
parties, particularly the mother, from her rights to due process, including a trial.").
29 Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1076 (1984) ("By viewing
the lawsuit as a quarrel between two neighbors, the dispute-resolution story that underlies
ADR implicitly asks us to assume a rough equality between the contending parties ....
In truth, however, settlement is also a function of the resources available to each party to
finance the litigation, and those resources are frequently distributed unequally.").
30 See Weston, supra note 7, at 35 ("The strong statutory protection for mediation
confidentiality threatens a court's traditional power to monitor the litigation process and
to sanction parties and attorneys when the offending conduct occurs in a court-connected
mediation context.").
31 Peter N. Thompson, Enforcing Rights Generated In Court-Connected
Mediation-Tension Between The Aspirations of a Private Facilitative Process and the
Reality of Public Adversarial Justice, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 509, 513 (2004)
("The mediation community has been effective in convincing the courts and regulators to
keep their hands off the emerging ADR processes in order to maximize individual choice,
creativity, flexibility, and of course, finality.").
32 Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Court Mediation and the Search for Justice Through
Law, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 47, 56 (1996) ("Instead of law, free-standing normative standards
govern in mediation, and parties actually affected by a dispute decide what factors should
influence the efforts to resolve that dispute. Thus, the moral reference point in mediation
is the self, and individualized notions of fairness, justice, morality, ethics and culture may
trump the values associated with any objective framework provided by law.").
33 See Weston, supra note 7, at 53-54 ("Judicial authority to sanction parties for
conduct or participation violations in a pretrial settlement conference or court-connected
arbitration is rarely challenged on confidentiality grounds. By contrast, courts are divided
as to whether mediation statutory confidentiality privileges prevent judicial consideration
of similar claims in a mediation setting.").
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advocates attempt to assuage fears of ever increasing pressure through the
courts to direct parties into mediation 34 while continuing to contend that the
process is voluntary and belongs to the parties, despite evidence to the
contrary.35
Forty-nine states (the exception is New York where local jurisdictions
provide the rules for mediation) and the District of Columbia have enacted
legislation and/or adopted court rules that protect confidentiality in court-
referred mediation cases. 36 Some statutes offer legal protections of
34 Jennifer Phillips, North Carolina's Child Custody and Visitation Mediation
Program, RESOLUTIONS (Supreme Court of Va., Richmond, Va.), Apr. 2010, at 4 ("The
word 'mandated' causes many people in the mediation community discomfort and a
common misperception is that people are forced to mediate. However, in the NC
'mandated' program, the parties involved are only mandated to appear. Participation and
certainly an agreement are entirely voluntary.").
35 Timothy Hedeen, Coercion and Self-Determination In Court-Connected
Mediation: All Mediations Are Voluntary But Some Are More Voluntary Than Others, 26
JUST. SYS. J. 273, 280, (2005) ("Evidence drawn from recent caselaw and legal education
events suggests that many mediators engage in coercion to keep disputants at the table.
Such coercion may be exercised through acts of commission or omission.").
36 ALA. CODE § 6-6-20 (2011); ALASKA R. CIV. P. 100; ARiz. REV. STAT. § 12-2238
(LexisNexis 1956); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-7-201-207 (1987); CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1115
-1128 (West 2012); COLO. CODE REGS. §§ 13-22-302-308; CONN. GEN. STAT § 52-235c;
id. at § 52-235d (2011); DEL. CT. CH. R. 174; D.C. CODE §§ 16-4201-4213 (2001); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §44.102-108 (West 2012); id. at § 44-1011; id. at 44-201; id. at § 44-401-
406; GA. CODE ANN. § 15-23-1-12 (2010); HAW. R. EVID. §§ 0626-0001-0620-0408;
IDAHO CODE ANN. § § 9-801-814 (West 2011); 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/1-8 (2004); IND.
CODE §§ 4-21.5-3.5-1-4-21.5-3.5-27 (1996); IOWA CODE § 679C.1-5 (2011); KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 5-501-5-516, (West 2011); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 454.011 (West 2011); LA
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 4101-4112 (West 2011); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 4, § 18-B (2011), ME.
R. Civ. P. 16B; MD. R. Civ. P. §§ 17-102-109, MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 3-
2A-06C (West 2011); MASS. GEN. LAW ANN. ch. 233 § 23C (2011), MASS. S. JUD. R.
1:18; MICH. CT. R. §§ 2.41-2.411; MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 572.31-§572.40 (West 2011);
Mississippi Court Annexed Mediation Rules for Civil Litigation, available at
http://courtadr.org/library/view.php?ID=3640 (last visited Mar. 19, 2012); MIsS. S.CT. R.
17.01-17.07; MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-21-7 (West 2011); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-
2901-2911 (West 2011); id. at §§ 25-2930-2943; NEV. REV. STAT. § 48.109 (1991); N.H.
SUPER. CT. R. 170; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:23A-112(2012), N.J. CT. R. 1:40-1-12; N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 44-7B-1-6 (West 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. §7A-38.1 (West 2011); id. at
§150B-23; 1 N.D. S.CT. R. 8.8; OHIO REV. CODE § 2710.01-10 (West 2011); OK. STAT.
§ 1821-25 (West 2011); id. at § 1831-36; OR. REV. STAT. §§ 36.200-238 (West 2012);
42 PENN. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5949 (West 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS. ANN. § 9-19-44 (West
2011); S.C. CT. ADR R. 6-8; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 19-13A-1-15; id. at § 19-13-32
(West 2011); TENN. R. S.CT. 31; TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154 (West 2001);
UTAH JUD. CODE §§ 78-31c-101-1 14; VT. STAT. ANN. §§ 5711-5723 (West 2010); VA.
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confidentiality even more far-reaching than those given for settlement
conferences. 37 As legislation and court regulation of mediation became
widespread, mediators were expected to comply with legal criteria regarding
confidentiality. Standards of ethics and certification requirements for
mediators have been implemented in many states. When offering mediation,
court-certified mediators are required to inform parties of the nature of the
mediation process, to explain the choice to maintain or waive confidentiality,
to assess the capacity of each party to exercise self-determination and good
faith, and to ensure fairness. These mediator functions fall within the doctrine
of state action-a doctrine that differentiates between public actions and
those of private individuals-which holds those who function as extensions
of courts or legislatures to the legal standards required of public servants. 38
Mediation functions within the description of state action 39 regardless of the
claim that parties enter voluntarily. 40 ADR processes are within the realm of
state action not only in the attempt to resolve disputes, but in court
enforcement of agreements made in ADR.41 Thus, the decision to maintain or
waive confidentiality raises questions within the context of a constitutional
debate about what is public and what is private that has been argued for
CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-576.4-12 (West 2011); id. at §8.01-581.21-26; WASH. REV. CODE
7.07 (2006); W.V. TRIAL CT. R. § 25; Wis. STAT. § 904.085 (West 2011); WY. STAT.
§§ 1-43-101-104 (West 2011).
37 See Brazil, supra note 5, at 956 ("[S]tate legislation is significant because it erects
a protective shield around mediations that appears to be more difficult to penetrate than
the shields that Federal Rules of Evidence 408 and 403 erect around settlement
communications.").
38 Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1296, 1301
(1982) ("The doctrine of state action is an attempt to maintain a public/private distinction
by attributing some conduct to the state and some to private actors.").
39 See Reuben, supra note 15, at 589 ("[T]he United States Supreme Court's 'state
action' doctrine can often compel an understanding of ADR providers as 'state actors'
when their services are court-ordered, legislatively mandated, or contractually
compelled.").
40 See id. at 617 ("[Violuntariness has no role in the determination of state action.
Instead, the state action analysis quite properly asks a very different question: To what
degree does private conduct either become so entangled with the action of the state, or
assume a function traditionally performed exclusively by the state, that such conduct
should be deemed attributable to the state for constitutional purposes?").
41 See id. at 621 ("It is this element of state enforcement that distinguishes matters of
constitutional moment from those of purely private concern. The binding resolution of
disputes is, of course, a traditionally exclusive public function.").
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centuries. 42 The debate poses a conflict between natural rights:43 a belief that
certain rights are beyond any government's control44 and are held by all
persons, and positivism; the claim that citizens must relinquish natural rights
to governments who then grant specific individual rights through legal
processes.45
Explaining confidentiality is therefore a prime example of how mediators
function as representatives of the law and the court. In the explanation of
confidentiality, the mediator 1) gives legal information; 2) has a
responsibility to ensure parties understand the information; and 3) must
determine that parties are capable of making a decision in their own best
interest. Some states that offer confidentiality inform parties of the right to
waive it,46 while others do not.47 Those states with no right to waive
42 See Brest, supra note 38, at 1297 ("The tension between positivism and natural
law has been a perennial theme in American constitutional jurisprudence .... The debate
has centered on the extent to which the Justices may protect interests or rights beyond
those mentioned in the document.").
43 Perhaps the clearest contemporary statement of the natural rights position can be
found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which can be found at U.N.,
History, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS,
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/history.shtml (last visited Mar. 18, 2012).
44 See Brest, supra note 38, at 1300 ("[T]he natural rights doctrine posits a sphere of
autonomous private conduct immune from state regulation; the state action doctrine
protects that sphere from certain kinds of governmental interference.").
45 See id. at 1296-97 ("From its inception liberal theory has had two traditions,
originating in the writings of Locke and Hobbes respectively. Under the Lockean or
'natural rights' version, citizens retain certain inalienable rights, held in the
pregovernmental state of nature, that the state may not abridge. Under the Hobbesian or
'positivist' version, citizens entering into civil society relinquish all natural rights and
possess only those rights granted by legislatures and other lawmaking institutions . . . .
The tension between positivism and natural law has been a perennial theme in American
constitutional jurisprudence.").
46 AL. ST. MEDIATION R. 11; ARiz. REv. STAT. § 12-2238 (LexisNexis 1956); CAL.
EVID. CODE §§ 1119-1124 (West 2012); id. at §§ 1126-1128; 13 COLO. CODE REGS.
§ 22-307 (West 2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-235d (b)-(d) (2011); DEL. CT. CH. R.
174; D.C. CODE § 16-4203 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44-405 (West 2012); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 9-804 (West 2011); 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/4 (2004); IND. CODE § 4-21.5-3.5-
18 (1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-512(a) (West 2011); id. at § 5-512(b)(l)-(5); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §4112 (West 2011); ME. R. Civ. P. 16B(k); MICH. CT. R. § 2.411(5); MINN.
ST. GEN. PRAC. R. § 114.08; NEB. REV. STAT §25-2934 (West 2011); NEV. ADR R. 11;
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 44-7B-5 (West 2011); N.D. R.Ct.. 8.8(d)(l)-(3); OHIO REV. CODE
§2710.03 (West 2011); id. at § 2710.07; OREG. REV. STAT. §§ 36.220-226 (West 2012);
S. C. ADR R. 8; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-13A-5 (West 2011); id. at § 19-13A-8; § 19-
13A-32 TEx. CIv. PRAC. AND REM. CODE ANN. § 154.053(b)-(c) (West 2001); UTAH JUD.
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confidentiality, in effect, mandate parties to keep what is said from being
disclosed in future litigation48 at the same time parties are often discouraged
from going to court. 49 In granting mediators exclusion from giving
testimony, many statutes borrow from the privilege granted to other
professionals: attorneys, clergy, and health care providers, 50 allowing them to
maintain confidentiality regarding clients, penitents, and patients. When
granted to mediators,5 ' the privilege both restricts the mediator from
disclosing information and allows the mediator to refuse to give testimony.52
While other professionals protected by a confidentiality privilege are
required to maintain confidentiality, mediation also requires that adversarial
parties agree to maintain one another's confidences. Thus, unlike the
privilege granted to attorneys, clergy, and physicians, in mediation
CODE ANN. § 78-31c-105 (LexisNexis 2008); id at §78-31c-108; VT. STAT. ANN. § 5716
(West 2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.22 (West 2011); id. at §8.01-581.24; id. at
§ 2.2-4119B; WASH. REv. CODE § 7.07.040 (2006); id. at § 7.07.050; id. at § 5.60.070;
W. VA. TRIAL CT. R. § 25.12; WY. STAT. § 1-43-103 (West 2011).
47 States that do not explain the right to waive confidentiality are: Alaska, Arkansas,
Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, New
Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, and Wisconsin.
48 Erin L. Kuester, Confidentiality In Mediation: A Trail Of Broken Promises, 16
HAMLINE J. PuB. L. & POL'Y 573, 574 (1995) ("The unsettled state of the law reflects a
tug-of-war between protecting mediation as a viable alternative to litigation and
preserving fairness in litigation by requiring decisions based upon all of the available
evidence.").
49 Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Movement is Re-Shaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN. ST. L. REv. 165, 195
(2003) ("To encourage people to consider alternatives to litigation, in federal and state
courts nationwide, judges and mediators are telling claimants that legal norms are
antithetical to their interests, that vindicating their legal rights is antithetical to social
harmony, that juries are capricious, that judges cannot be relied upon to apply the law
properly, and that it is better to seek inner peace than social change.").
50 Tyler Baker, Roe and Paris: Does Privacy Have a Principle? 26 STAN. L. REV.
1161, 1179 (1974) ("Priests, physicians, and other professionals are often privy to
confidential information about individuals that those individuals would not want widely
disseminated, creating a strong selective disclosure interest.").
51 See Thompson, supra note 31, at 519 ("Th[e] unique role of the mediator as
trusted confidant is largely responsible for the enhanced concern for confidentiality or
privilege that has been readily accepted by legislators and rule makers.").
52 See Hughes, supra note 10, at 24-25 ("Confidentiality represents, first, a positive
duty not to disclose secret communications and, second, the freedom to refuse to answer
questions in court.").
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confidentiality places constraints on the parties,53 as well as on the mediator
who serves the parties.
Although mediation is advertised as protecting the privacy of the
parties, 54 the exploration of the underpinnings of confidentiality in the right
to privacy is sorely neglected. If most parties prefer keeping everything said
in mediation private,55 then mediation offers a rare opportunity to exercise
the right to privacy. Parties may assert their right to privacy in mediation in
relation to both the government (as embodied in the court), and, within
limits, 56 other citizens. However, as lawmakers have created statutes and
rules to protect privacy57 in ADR processes, there has been ongoing
53 See Deason, The Quest for Uniformity, supra note 1, at 82 ("Because mediation
involves communication with an adversary, the legal structures that promote
confidentiality must do more than function as a restraint on outside parties who seek
disclosure; they must also provide a substitute for trust between those who are
communicating.").
54 Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access in the
Courts, 105 HARv. L. REv. 428, 464 (1991) ("One of the substantive rights that only
confidentiality can protect is the right to privacy. In the discovery context, the privacy
interest is 'the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters."'). See also
Peter N. Thompson, Confidentiality, Competency and Confusion: The Uncertain Promise
of Mediation Privilege in Minnesota, 18 HAMLINE J. OF PUB. LAW & POL'Y 329, 355
(1997) ("One of the promised advantages of mediation as a means of dispute resolution is
that it provides the parties with a private, informal, user-friendly approach to resolving
disputes, free from negative, technical, adversarial procedures.").
55 Richard A. Posner, Privacy, Secrecy and Reputation, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 4-5
(1979) ("The vocal modem demand for privacy has little to do with either a craving for
solitude that arose in the past from a combination of the lack of physical privacy in the
home and the pacification of the surrounding countryside ... What people want more of
today when they decry lack of privacy is mainly something quite different: they want
concealment of information about themselves that others might use to their
disadvantage.").
56 See Kirtley, supra note 1, at 11 ("Agreements between individuals are not
permitted to restrict the court's access to testimony in its pursuit of justice. As a result,
mediation participants are ill advised to rely on contract theory as a means of preserving
mediation confidentiality. Moreover, mediation confidentiality agreements, even if
enforceable as against those signing, are likely not to restrict third-party access to
mediation information.").
57 See Reuben, supra note 15, at 584-85 ("[C]ritics charge that ADR's processes are
secret, not 'private,' and deliver a skewed brand of justice that flouts structural
safeguards, commercializes dispute resolution, exploits inequality of bargaining power,
and ultimately fails to provide adequate remedies for weaker parties, such as women,
minorities, and those with less economic power.").
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controversy about the abandonment of procedural justice in ADR.58 Thus,
while recognition of confidentiality as an application of the right to privacy
would celebrate the choice to maintain it, parties must be made aware of the
limitations of confidentiality within the legal framework, such as rules of
evidence. 59 While acknowledging the enormous complexity of the right to
privacy in U.S. law,60 this article will locate the origins of confidentiality in
mediation in several constitutional amendments, tort law,61 and Supreme
Court decisions, which together make up the complex concept of the right to
privacy. In addition, we recognize that beyond the cloistered debates of legal
scholars, attorneys, and judges, are deeply held beliefs of U.S. residentS62
that our system of government protects us as individuals. 63 Even without
58 See id. at 606 ("The very suggestion, however, that a forum that guarantees such
procedural safeguards as the right to the benefit of public law, the right to a neutral
tribunal, and the rights to present evidence and receive appellate review is the functional
equivalent of a procedure that permits, but does not assure, any such safeguards seems
astonishing on its face.").
59 Charles W. Ehrhardt, Confidentiality, Privilege and Rule 408: The Protection of
Mediation Proceedings in Federal Court, 60 LA. L. REv. 91, 106 (1999) ("When the
question is not the validity or invalidity of the underlying claim, but rather a material
issue of an act which occurred during the negotiations, Rule 408 does not prohibit the
admission of evidence. ... Wrongful acts are not protected simply because they occurred
during settlement discussion. The rule excluding settlement offers and discussions was
not intended to be a shield for the commission of independent wrongs.").
60 Judith Jarvis Thompson, The Right To Privacy, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 295, 295
(1975) ("Perhaps the most striking thing about the right to privacy is that nobody seems
to have any very clear idea what it is.").
61 Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 233 n.3 (1977) ("In
just what sense the tort law right of privacy corresponds to the constitutional right is a
question almost entirely neglected in discussions (and decisions) on privacy. Reviewing
the federal constitutional usage up to and including Griswold, Prosser remarked upon an
aspect of this ambiguity: 'The Court never has made any attempt to define this right [to
privacy guaranteed by the Constitution], or to indicate its limitation, if any; and nothing
in the decisions has referred to tort liability. They suggested nonetheless that the
Constitutional right, thus declared to exist, must have some application to tort
liability."').
6 2 STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICs OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY AND
POLITICAL CHANGE 3, 3 (1974) ("The law is real, but it is also a figment of our
imaginations. Like all fundamental social institutions it casts a shadow of popular belief
that may ultimately be more significant, albeit more difficult to comprehend, than the
authorities, rules, and penalties that we ordinarily associate with law.").
63 Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy As An Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer To
Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962, 973 (1964) ("The fundamental fact is that our
Western culture defines individuality as including the right to be free from certain types
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knowledge of the origin of these beliefs,64 Americans from all walks of life
consider the right to be let alone-the freedom to live our lives as we
choose-basic to our sense of national identity.65
Identifying confidentiality as an application of the right to privacy in the
context of constitutional and tort law and federal and state legislation gives
significance to the decisions parties are making in mediation. Deciding what
is private and what must be disclosed in mediation raises questions about
Fourth Amendment protection of property, as it would in litigation.66
Applying the Fifth Amendment to mediation, granting parties and mediators
immunity from testifying, protects a party's right not to incriminate him or
herself.67 The Fourteenth Amendment protection of liberty to live one's life
and raise one's children as we choose as individuals and families is often the
arena in which parties are making decisions in mediation, particularly family
mediation. 68 In addition to the protections found in the Fourth, Fifth, Ninth,69
of intrusions. This measure of personal isolation and personal control over the conditions
of its abandonment is of the very essence of personal freedom and dignity, is part of what
our culture means by these concepts.").
64 JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAw? 9 (1983) ("[L]aw is our national
religion; lawyers constitute our priesthood; the courtroom is our cathedral, where
contemporary passion plays are enacted.").
65 "[R]ightful liberty is unobstructed action, according to our will, within limits
drawn around us by the equal rights of others." Thomas Jefferson, The Thomas Jefferson
Papers Series 1, General Correspondence. 1651-1827, Thomas Jefferson to Isaac H.
Tiffany, April 4, 1819, available at http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.mss/mtj.mtjbib023463, image
462 (Last visited Mar. 18, 2012). "I believe each individual is naturally entitled to do as
he pleases with himself and the fruits of his labor, so far as it in no wise interferes with
any other men's rights." Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Chicago Illinois, July 10, 1858,
THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 493 (Roy P. Basler, ed. 1956); Pub.
Utilities Comm'n of Dist. Of Columbia v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451, 467 (1952). ("The right
to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom.").
66 See Miller, supra note 54, at 466 ("Litigants do not give up their privacy rights
simply because they have walked, voluntarily or involuntarily, through the courthouse
door.").
67 Kimberlee K. Kovach, Good Faith In Mediation-Requested, Recommended, or
Required? A New Ethic, 38 S. TEx. L. REv. 575, 611 (1997) ("[I]f the parties refuse to
share particular knowledge, they should not be compelled to do so.").
68 See Baker, supra note 50, at 1174 ("[T]he Court has held that the right to privacy
'encompasses and protects personal intimacies of the home, the family, marriage,
motherhood, procreation, and child rearing."') (quoting Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,
413 U.S. 49, 65 (1973)).
69 Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 1335, 1419
(1992) ("[T]here is an assumption that the Bill of Rights is neither all-specific nor
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and Fourteenth Amendments, is the First Amendment protection of "serenity
and reflection" 70-the right not to be invaded by others' speech within the
home and in some public situations.71 In the context of mediation, therefore,
freedom for serenity and reflection would mean that the coercion to mediate
that is often applied72 is not only unacceptable, it is unconstitutional.
This article locates the roots of confidentiality in mediation, in the right
to privacy. While unevenly protected at different periods of history,73 the
right to privacy rests on the foundation of hundreds of years of resistance to
tyranny. Forged in common law, 74 legislation,75 and Supreme Court
exhaustive, leaving room for interpretation and gap-plugging by the courts. This is
precisely what the Ninth Amendment (whether one agrees that it embodies specific rights
or not) was designed to remind future generation reading the Constitution.").
70 See id. at 1380 (quoting Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Kovacs ("Without such
opportunities freedom of thought becomes a mocking phrase, and without freedom of
thought there can be no free society.")).
71 See id. at 1382 ("Justice Douglas, in a vigorous dissent [in Public Utilities
Commission v. Pollack, 343 U.S. at 468] ... argues that: 'The First Amendment in its
respect for the conscience of the individual honors the sanctity of thought and belief. To
think as one chooses, to believe what one wishes are important aspects of the
constitutional right to be let alone."').
72 See Hedeen, supra note 35, at 277 ("Even in States and court systems that have
explicit guidelines to maintain the voluntary nature of mediation participation... implicit
coercion has been documented in both civil and criminal courts. A study conducted for
the Department of Justice found that a number of programs 'use very threatening letters
to compel respondents to appear for mediation with the complainant."').
73 See Gormley, supra note 69, at 1370 ("[T]he existence or non-existence of Fourth
Amendment privacy now appears to be dependent (to some extent) upon the subject-
matter of the case.").
74 See Marks v. Jaffa, 26 N.Y.S. 908 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1893); Mackensie v. Soden
Mineral Springs Co., 18 N.Y.S. 240 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1891); Corliss v. E.W. Walker Co.,
64 F. 280 (C.C. D. Mass. 1894); Munden v. Harris, 134 S.W. 1076 (Mo. Ct. App. 1911);
Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn, 120 S.W. 364 (Ky. 1909); Edison v. Edison Mfg. Co., 73
N.J. Eq. 136 (N.J. 1907); Moser v. Press Publishing Co., 109 N.Y.S. 963 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1908); Jeffries v. New York Evening Journal Publishing Co., 124 N.Y.S. 780 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. (1910); Pavesich v. New England Life Ins., Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905); Henry v.
Cherry and Webb, 73 A. 97 (R.I. 1909); Peed v. Washington Times Co., 55 Wash. L.
Rep. 182 (D.C. 1927); Martin v. New Metropolitan Fiction, 248 N.Y.S. 359 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1931); Murphy v. Pocatello School Dist., 480 P.2d 878 (Idaho 1971); Moe v.
Secretary of Administration, 417 N.E.2d 387 (Mass. 1981); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647
(N.J. 1976); In Re B, 394 A.2d 419 (Pa. 1978); Texas State Employees Union v. Texas
Dept. of Mental Health, 746 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. 1987).
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decisions,76 the right to privacy provides the basis for offering confidentiality
in mediation, as mediation sits squarely within the legal system.77 Ongoing
confusion about the role of mediation as an option within the law, rather than
an alternative to it,7 8 obscures important legal and social values embodied in
the right to privacy.79 This article seeks to bring recognition to both the value
and precariousness of confidentiality as an application of the right to privacy,
and also explores some complexities surrounding the decision to maintain it.
Section II looks at confidentiality in mediation in the historical context of
constitutional and tort law. Section III presents an overview of current state
regulations regarding confidentiality in mediation. Section IV addresses the
limitations of the protection of confidentiality in the event of litigation. In
conclusion, Section V calls upon mediators and courts to recognize
confidentiality as an application of the right to privacy and recommends that
75 Frederick S. Lane, American Privacy 61 (2009) ("[N]early a third of the states
have added a privacy provision to their constitutions, and even more recognize a right to
privacy in some form or other in their statutes.").
76 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-29 (1886); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Nardone v. United
States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Breard v. City of
Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967);
Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969);
Rowan v. United States Post Office, 397 U.S. 728 (1970); United States v. United States
Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Planned
Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United
States, 429 U.S. 338 (1977); Mancusi v. De Forte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984); Frisby v.
Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
77 See Weston, supra note 7, at 79 ("In turning to mediation in order to escape the
pitfalls of litigation, the legislature desires to treat mediation as a completely separate and
private process. Mediation offers a promising and productive means for parties to achieve
understanding and resolution of their differences, but it is not immune from the rule of
law. Particularly where mediation is a component of the public political system, the
authority and responsibility of the court cannot be completely divested.").
78 See Oberman, supra note 12, at 48 ("The conception of mediation as an
alternative to the legal system, rather than an option within it ... creates an obstacle to a
discourse about mediation that would include the law as a resource for individuals and
oppressed groups seeking equality.").
79 See Reuben, supra note 15, at 639 ("The social contract supporting our
constitutional order has been breached, and the democratic process that allowed for the
creation and the application of the rule of law subverted, by order of the court.").
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mediation training and courses provide clarity about the relationship of
mediation to the law, particularly regarding confidentiality. The ability to
explain the legal underpinnings of confidentiality would bring mediators into
compliance with the standard of self-determination that requires parties to
make informed decisions.
II. MEDIATION IN IHE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF PRIVACY LAW
A. What is Public and What is Private?
In order to establish confidentiality in mediation as an application8 o of
the right to privacy,81 we must revisit the battle to define and protect some
areas of life as private. Justice Marshall's frequently cited opinion that there
exists "a sphere of private autonomy which government is bound to
respect," 82 refers to a long struggle in England and other parts of Europe 83 to
establish rights that a monarch or state could not deny or destroy.84 The
quintessential statement of American democracy, the Declaration of
Independence, 85 declares that: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that
all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
80 See Gerety, supra note 61, at 234 ("A properly legal concept must be a principle
that translates into a rule; and the rule, in turn, must translate into a set of applications.").
81 See Miller, supra note 54, at 464 ("One of the substantive rights that only
confidentiality can protect is the right to privacy.").
82 Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 93 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
83 James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus
Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1183 (2004) ("Rather than talking about ill-defined social
norms, German jurists accordingly embarked on an impressive reinterpretation of ... the
ancient ... law of insult, which they combined with the law of artistic property to create a
new body of personality law .. . it exercised an important influence on American scholars
like Warren and Brandeis.").
84 PETER LINEBAUGH, THE MAGNA CARTA MANIFESTO, 82 (2008) ("The goal of the
Levellers was 'the right, freedome, safety, and well-being of every particular man,
woman, and child in England.' Magna Carta became 'the Englishman's legal birthright
and inheritance.' Lilburne said, 'the liberty of the whole English nation' is in Chapter
39."').
85 Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1414 (1974)
("Inalienable rights, cited in the Declaration of Independence, were presumably 'natural
rights' to which all are entitled under any form of government and do not necessarily
depend on the principle of popular sovereignty.").
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unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of
Happiness-."
The European colonists may have embraced ideas considered
revolutionary in 1776, but they did not invent them.86 They were referencing
hundreds of years of European class antagonism codified in the Magna Carta
and Charta de Foresta.87 English history is rife with uprisings in protest
against the monarchy's attempts to return to its pre-Magna Carta and Charter
of The Forest powers.88 Those truths that were self-evident to the early
colonists-then applicable only to white male property owners- 89are today
often seen as dispensable for the sake of security and safety,90 luxuries we
86 Herbert A. Johnson, The English Revolution and the Rule ofLaw In Revolutionary
New York: Jay, Livingston, Morris, and Hamilton, Paper delivered at a conference:
Columbia's Legacy: Friends and Enemies in the New Nation, Columbia University and
the New-York Historical Society, (December 10, 2004) at 3, available at
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/lweb/conferences/2004/johnjay/pdf/Johnson.pdf ("[Our
so-called Founding Fathers held the strong conviction that in their day the English
constitution was being subverted, not only in the colonies but also in the Mother Country.
For many of them rebellion was not a rejection of the English constitution, but rather the
only means available whereby they might preserve those aspects of English government
and law which they held most precious.").
87 See LINEBAUGH, supra note 84, at 38 ("A charter was a material object with a
physical history. At seventeen and three-quarters inches wide and eighteen and one-
quarter inches long...") ("We should quote the preface to the second of Coke's Institutes
of the Laws of England (1642): ' ... Charta de Foresta is called Magna Charta de
Foresta, and both of them are called Magnae Chartae Libertatum Angliae'-the great
charters of English liberties. They were published by reading aloud four times a year, at
the Feast of St. Michael's, Christmas, Easter, and the feast of St. John's. They were read
in Latin certainly, in Norman French translation probably, and in English possibly.").
88 See id. at 136 ("The working class in England .. .- from the radicals of the
1790's to the Chartists of the 1830's-was by no means ready to ignore the particulars of
the commons allowed by Magna Carta.").
89 Frederick Douglass, SPEECH, Rochester, New York Corinthian Hall, (July 5,
1852), http://www.lib.rochester.edulindex.cfn?page=2945 (last visited Feb. 16, 2012)
("The blessings in which you, this day, rejoice, are not enjoyed in common. The rich
inheritance of justice, liberty, prosperity and independence, bequeathed by your fathers,
is shared by you, not by me. The sunlight that brought light and healing to you, has
brought stripes and death to me. This Fourth July is yours, not mine. You may rejoice, I
must moum. To drag a man in fetters into the grand illuminated temple of liberty, and
call upon him to join you in joyous anthems, were inhuman mockery and sacrilegious
irony.).
90 Mary Minow, The USA PATRIOT Act, LIBRARY JOURNAL, Oct. 1, 2002, at
paragraph 2, available at http://www.libraryjournal.com/article/CA245044.html (last
visited Feb. 16, 2012) ("Supporters of the Patriot Act say they're not against civil
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think we can no longer afford. 91 It is a significant occasion indeed, when we
are offered the opportunity to exercise such precious rights in mediation.
While scholars contribute to an ongoing effort to define privacy in the
legal sense, citizens continue to believe in the right to privacy as a given.92
This belief remains strong despite a profound lack of knowledge about its
origins or current meanings, inside and outside the courtroom.93 Indeed, the
belief in these rights still forms the basis of our national mythology, 94 if not
our reality.95 Few participants in mediation would be able to articulate the
concept of natural rights over positivism 96 as the basis for their beliefs that
certain rights are inalienable, pre-dating govemments.97 Most Americans
would be unable to reference Magna Carta Chapter 3998 to invoke their
rights, yet it is the basis of many of these rights guaranteed in the
Constitution.99
liberties, but public safety requires granting the government greater surveillance
powers ... Privacy advocates, including many library professionals, say we need national
security and public safety but not at the expense of our rights as citizens.").
91 Marc Rotenberg, Privacy and Secrecy After September 11, 86 MINN. L. REV.
1115, 1135 (2002) ("Most critically, we must oppose the fatalism that has captured the
minds and hearts of too many Americans. We should reject the premise that after
September 11 we can no longer afford the privacy or freedom that we previously
enjoyed.").
92 Hyman Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 34, 36 (1967)
("Privacy, no less than good reputation or physical safety, is a creature of life in a human
community and not the contrivance of a legal system concerned with its protection.").
93 See SCHEINGOLD, supra note 62, at 14 ("The focus of the myth of rights is
preeminently on courts and on the maintenance of a stable system of rules.").
94 See id at 17 ("The myth of rights ... like other ideologies seeks to be all things to
all people-or at least as many things to as many people as possible.").
95 See id. at 61 ( "In the final analysis it is not the accuracy of the image but its
attractiveness, that determines the success of the myth of rights.").
96 See Brest, supra note .38, at 1297 ("The tension between positivism and natural
law has been a perennial theme in American constitutional jurisprudence . . . The debate
has centered on the extent to which the Justices may protect interests or rights beyond
those mentioned in the document.").
97 See id at 1296.
98 See LINEBAUGH, supra note 84, at 45 ("Chapter 39 has grown to embody
fundamental principles, habeas corpus, trial by jury, prohibition of torture.").
99 See id at 179 ("[T]he principles of Magna Carta appear in the provisions of the U.
S. Constitution concerning the jury and habeas corpus. As the Constitution was amended,
particularly by the Fifth (due process of law in federal cases), the Eighth. (prohibition of
cruel and unusual punishment), and the Fourteenth (due process of law in state cases), the
authority of Magna Carta in American jurisprudence deepened.").
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The existence of privacy rights in ADR processes, both in relation to the
state and in relation to other parties (even members of a family), is the basis
for 'offering confidentiality in mediation. Protection of a "sphere of private
autonomy" 00 is extolled as a reason to engage in mediation. Privacy is in
place when agreeing to mediate. Various aspects of the right to privacy are
present in mediation as they are in court, such as: protection from invasion
by the federal government through search and seizure, the right not to
incriminate oneself, the right to be free of invasion into one's personal affairs
by other citizens, and the freedom to make decisions about intimate
relationships, about children, and/or about our bodies.101 The rights of
privacy that would be in place in a court room also apply in mediation and
should receive the same protection. Unlike a courtroom, however, if
mediators probe for information that goes beyond the bounds of relevahcy,102
the parties themselves must determine what to disclose.103 How can parties in
mediation determine what is and is not relevant? What is required to be
disclosed by the parties prior to and during mediation? What may parties
discuss outside the mediation?104 These questions are confronted in
100 See Pruneyard, supra note 82 ("The constitutional terms, 'life, liberty and
property' do not derive their meaning solely from the provisions of positive law. They
have a normative dimension as well, establishing a sphere of private autonomy which
government is bound to respect.") (Marshall, J., concurring).
101 See Gerety, supra note 61, at 266 ("All of this comes in the end to a control over
the most basic vehicle of self-hood: the body. For control over the body is our first form
of autonomy ... Any plausible definition of privacy, then, whatever the sources of its
normative commitments, must take the body as its first and most basic reference for
control over personal identity.").
102 See Pavlich, supra note 20, at 723 ("In general, using praise, subtle inflections to
indicate unease, probing questions, synopses, and so on, the mediators assert a
deliberately understated local authority that 'receives' and shapes 'confessions' in the
direction of dispute settlement.").
103 See id. at 722 ("[D]iscourses are solicited from participants in the mediation
process which requires all parties to declare a version of self apropos a dispute (what it
did or did not do, why it followed a course of action, what its interests are, the outcomes
it desires, where it is prepared to compromise, etc.)").
104 Sam Jackson, What Is Confidential In Virginia Now?", Virginia Mediation
Network Conference Packet 13 (October, 2002) (on file with the author) ("The parties.
sometimes want more privacy for communications and information in a mediation than is
provided by the statute. In a business matter, for example, disputants often need
assurances that trade secrets or other sensitive business information will not be
disseminated outside the mediation session by the parties. In a family case, the parents
may wish to limit with whom a party may discuss sensitive matters raised in a
mediation.").
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mediation every day by separating couples, corporations and consumers,
employers and employees, landlords and tenants, etc., often without benefit
of legal counsel or an understanding of the legal parameters of the mediation
process.
Having a right to privacy in mediation does not mean that maintaining
confidentiality is always in the best interests of all the parties, or of society in
general.10 5 While corporations, in the hopes of preventing public disclosure
of damaging information, 106have a long history of preferring private
negotiation to the public arena of the court,10 7 it does not necessarily follow
that consumers or employees benefit from pre-dispute clauses that preempt
their access to the courts.10 8 Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) processes
that claim to provide court reform by "informalizing" justice' 09 blur the
distinctions between what is public and what is private."10 Information that
105 See Leatherbury and Cover, supra note 4, at 2224 ("[C]onfidential non-binding
mediation is inconsistent with a policy of open government because, although the public
agency need not accept the mediator's resolution, if it does choose to accept it, the
process of reaching that resolution has been removed from public scrutiny.).
106 Pam Martens, Millions of Americans Pushed Into No-Law System by Colluding
Banks, COUNTERPUNCH, August 3, 2009, available at
http://www.counterpunch.org/Martens08032009.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2012) ("[T]he
same Wall Street banks who shackled their stockbrokers to mandatory arbitration clauses
and used at least one of these compromised arbitration forums when employees blew the
whistle; were the same investment firms that forced their investing customers into
mandatory arbitration forums as a condition of opening a brokerage account.").
107 See AUERBACH, supra note 64, at 33 ("In 1768, the New York Chamber of
Commerce established the first private tribunal in America for extra-judicial settlement of
commercial disputes. 'All controversies,' the Chamber insisted, 'are antagonistic to
commerce."').
108 See Weston, supra note 4, at 600 ("[T]he use and enforcement of form-
compulsory ADR or predispute binding arbitration clauses that increasingly appear in
ordinary consumer transactions, medical service provisions, and employment contracts
... not only preclude access to public courts but also may set the terms of the ADR
process.").
109 See ABEL, supra note 17, at 6 ("Where formal institutions are largely passive'and
reactive, informal institutions can be purposive and proactive. They obliterate the
fundamental liberal distinction between public and private, state and civil society, what is
forbidden and what is allowed. In order to facilitate this expansion, they carefully
cultivate the appearance of being noncoercive.").
110 See Reuben, supra note 15, at 579-80 ("[T]he age-old public/private distinction
in law is proving more challenging than ever. Governmental contraction is leading to the
privatization of many government functions, while private conduct is increasingly taking
on public characteristics.").
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the public is entitled to knowI' is exchanged behind closed doors. 112 In such
informal processes, parties are left to decide what is private and what must be
disclosed, often without benefit of legal counsel.113
Despite agreement that there are areas into which government may not
tread, vast differences exist among scholars in defining which areas are
public and which are private. Liberals subscribe to the view that sexuality,
marriage, and family, are privatel1 4 while conservatives see the economy as
private.11 5 In mediation, determining what is public and what is private
references both the constitutional protections of privacy from government
intrusion and the tort protection from intrusion by other people. Parties in
some states have the option to decide whether to maintain or waive 16
confidentiality in relation to the court. A signed agreement to mediate is used
by most mediators, prior to mediation, to spell out the responsibilities and
111 See Miller, supra note 54, at 429 ("[T]he right of public access to court
proceedings and records derives from our English common law heritage. It exists to
enhance popular trust in the faimess of the justice system, to promote public participation
in the workings of government, and to protect constitutional guarantees.").
112 See Reuben, supra note 15, at 639 ("The processes are removed from public
witness, negating any possibility the dispute's resolution will have any public educational
or deterrent value. More importantly perhaps, there is no mechanism for ensuring that
society's laws are accurately administered.").
113 Russell Engler, And Justice For All-Including the Unrepresented Poor:
Revisiting the Roles of the Judges, Mediators and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 1987,
1988 (1999) ("The rules primarily prohibit clerks, mediators, and other court players
from giving legal advice to unrepresented litigants. In theory, the prohibition is intended
to protect the unrepresented litigant from receiving legal advice from someone not
qualified to give such advice. In practice, however, the prohibition deprives the
unrepresented litigant of the opportunity to obtain legal advice throughout the course of
the proceeding.").
114 Robert H. Mnookin, The Public/Private Dichotomy: Political Disagreement and
Academic Repudiation, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1429, 1430 (1982) ("[L]iberal Democrats
would characterize a broad range of activities concerning sexuality and marriage as
'private.' They argue that in this sphere the state should facilitate private ordering and
avoid regulation, especially regulation based on moralistic or paternalistic grounds.").
115 See id at 1432 ("Conservatives emphasize the importance of private property,
and see the market as an institution that appropriately rewards talent and contributes to
economic efficiency. Various governmental programs to redistribute economic resources
are generally disfavored as interfering with private enterprise.").
116 See Jackson, supra note 104, at 7 ("' [W]aiver' ... by definition is a 'knowing
and intelligent' relinquishment of rights.").
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requirements of parties and mediators. These agreements are contracts 17
whose purpose it is to address the intention of all parties to negotiate in good
faith, and to clarify confidentiality in relation to the court and other people.
While the right to consult an attorney is generally assumed or specifically
mentioned in agreements to mediate, parties can also stipulate other advisors
with whom they may discuss what occurs during the mediation. Parties
should be free to seek advice and counsel, not only from attorneys, but also
from financial advisors, counselors, or members of their support network,"l8
whose guidance would help them gain necessary information and perspective
to make better decisions." 9 The tort aspect of privacy requires that parties
name those from whom they wish to seek information, advice, and support.
Once the parties have named their consultants in the agreement to mediate,
discussing the mediation with anyone else becomes a breach of contract.
During divorce mediation, couples are attempting to reestablish separate
lives as individuals. What is private and what is public (what is "public"
becomes what must be shared with the other partner) particularly in joint
custody arrangements,120 becomes a constitutional tightrope. Parents have a
right to know where their child is and with whom, to know the child's health
and safety are maintained. At the same time, separating couples again
become individual entities with equal rights,121 including the right to keep
personal information private. While the couple relationship ends upon
divorce (or separation in unmarried couples), the parenting relationship
117 See Kirtley, supra note 1, at 5-6 ("In contrast to adjudicatory forms of dispute
resolution-hearings, arbitration and trials-mediation is a contractarian process.").
118 See Jackson, supra note 104, at 6 ("Some mediators tell disputants that what is
said in mediation cannot be discussed with anyone else. Yet, a confidentiality rule that
prevents the disputants from discussing communications heard-and information
learned-in the mediation with anyone else might undermine the goal of assuring that the
parties make informed decisions.").
119 See Nolan-Haley, supra note 8, at 776 ("The absence of truly educated
decisionmaking means that mediation may very well result in uninformed and potentially
harmful results.").
120 MARY ANN MASON, THE CUSTODY WARS: WHY CHILDREN ARE LOSING THE
LEGAL BATTLE AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABoUT IT, at 40 (1999) ("As New York Judge
Felicia K. Shea observed: 'Joint custody is an appealing concept. It permits the court to
escape an agonizing choice, to keep from wounding the self-esteem of either parent and
to avoid the appearance of discrimination between the sexes."') (quoting Dodd v. Dodd,
93 Misc.2d 641, 643 (1978)).
121 See id. at 18 ("Biological parenthood, not marriage or nurture, defines parental
rights. The law must treat biological mothers and fathers as equals.").
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usually continues. Children1 22 walk a constitutional tightrope as they shuttle
between two environments ("homes"), attempting to figure out what they can
and can't say to each parent, potentially withholding more and more
information if the level of conflict between the parents remains high. The
state also has a prominent role in divorce and custody issues under the
doctrine of parens patriae.123 While some may think of the family as a
sphere of private life and decision making, the state has long maintained its
right to regulate behavior of family members and to override parents'
decisions through social welfare agencies and the courtS. 124 Use of standards
that cannot be quantified, such as the best interests of the child, 125 give
government agencies enormous power over families. 126 Prior to reaching a
court hearing, parties filing petitions for custody, visitation, and/or child
support may encounter a barrage of court-appointed surrogates such as
122 Jonathan Montgomery, Children As Property, 51 THE MODERN L. REV. 323, 342
(1988) ("Disputes about the extent of parental rights raise issues concerning the interests
of children . . . arguments may be about the rights of adults, with no reference to the
children. 'The object (I would like to call her or him a person but this is hardly
permissible) is curiously dehumanized to the point of becoming like a piece of land over
which there is a boundary dispute.") (quoting M.D.A. Freeman, Towards a Critical
Theory ofFamily Law, 38 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 153, 159 (1985)).
123 STEVEN L. SCHLOSSMAN, LOVE & THE AMERICAN DELINQUENT: THE THEORY
AND PRACTICE OF 'PROGRESSIVE' JUVENILE JUSTICE, 1825-1920, 8 (1977) ("From the
creation of reformatories in the 1820's to the establishment of juvenile courts three-
quarters of a century later, the principal legal justification was the doctrine of parens
patriae ... A medieval English doctrine of nebulous origin and meaning, parens patriae
sanctioned the right of the Crown to intervene into natural family relations whenever a
child's welfare was threatened.").
124 Frank I. Goodman, Professor Brest on State Action and Liberal Theory, and a
Postscript to Professor Stone, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1331, 1356 (June 1982) ("It has been
common forever to speak of the public functions of the family in producing and
socializing 'the next generation.' Using this and other rationales, the state attempts to
determine the content of and then enforce performance of familial roles, both of parents
and of children.").
125 See id. ("Modern statutory schemes authorize social welfare agencies backed by
courts to intervene on no more precise grounds than 'the best interests of the child' or the
child's 'need for supervision."').
1 2 6 W. NORTON GRUBB & MARVIN LAZERSON, BROKEN PROMISES: How AMERICANS
FAIL THEIR CHILDREN, 53 (1982) ("Embedded in this conception of the state's
responsibility for children is an instrumental view: children are valued not for the
individuals they are, but as instruments in achieving other goals-economic growth, the
reduction of welfare costs, stable and fluid labor markets, a high level of profits, social
peace.").
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guardians ad litem, psychological evaluators, 127 parent educators, and ADR
practitioners, who have varying levels of access to private information 28 and
who may have power regarding the decisions.129
B. Defining Privacy
The American judiciary has wrestled with the right to privacy for over
one hundred years. In 1890 the Harvard Law Review published The Right to
Privacy 30 by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, a milestone in the
development of privacy law. Warren and Brandeis felt compelled to write
their article in the context of enormous technological changes in photography
and printing.'3' The article addressed the tort concept of privacy: what
protections do we have from invasion into our private sphere by others? They
asserted that the law had evolved from recognizing "corporeal property" to
"incorporeal rights" from which "there opened the wide realm of intangible
property, in the products and processes of the mind, as works of literature
and art, goodwill, trade secrets, and trademarks."1 32 The authors cited Judge
Cooley's phrase, "the right 'to be let alone'" 33 as the basis for their
127 E. Ruth Bradshaw & Robert W. Hinds, The Impact of Client and Evaluator
Gender on Custody Evaluations, 35 FAM. & CON. CTS. REV. 317, 318 (July 1997) ("An
important part of the evidence presented to the court in custody matters is the evaluation
report, which is said in many instances to be valued by the judiciary ... The report is
designed to be an appraisal of the family, written from a social science perspective.").
128 See GRUBB & LAZERSON, supra note 126, at 13 ("[Americans] have consistently
articulated the sanctity of the private family and reaffirmed private responsibility for
childrearing in order to 'strengthen the family;' at the same time they have adopted
policies and supported institutions that claim public responsibility, 'replace' the family,
and assert that families cannot be private.").
129 See ABEL, supra note 17, at 4 ("The social status of professionals ... tends to be
a function of the power they exercise over people and resources... once the alternatives
are in business, their staff develop a 'professional' stake in increasing caseload,
expanding jurisdiction, fostering dependence by the lay public, exaggerating the level of
their own technical skills, limiting membership, etc.").
130 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right To Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV.
193, 193 (1890).
131 See Gormley, supra note 69, at 1350 ("Linotypes and faster presses were
available by the 1870's, along with more striking typography, color printing, cartoons
and photographs. Format changed dramatically from the pre-Civil War papers, allowing
two, three and even eight-column banner headlines to be spread across the front page.").
132 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 130, at 194-95.
133 See id. at 195.
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argument. Warren and Brandeis saw the existing law of defamation as
inadequate, as it pertained only to material injuries. Their claim was that the
"individual is entitled to decide whether that which is his shall be given to
the public."' 34 Ultimately they went beyond the analogy to property, naming
a principle of "inviolate personality."l 35 Warren and Brandeis' 1890 article
continues to be a reference point for case law, legislation, and legal
scholarship in attempting to define and clarify the nature of tort privacy.136
In the early twentieth century Roscoe Pound took an approach similar to
the Europeans: a breach of privacy was an insult to one's honor, a principle
going back to Greek and Roman law.137 In Europe the principle applied only
to persons of elevated status; the middle and working classes were not
considered to have any honor to defend. 138 European privacy law has
evolved to grant all persons the respect and dignity that were once held only
by the wealthy and well-born.139 Although in the U.S. the definition of
privacy as "inviolate personality" adopted by Warren and Brandeis
overshadowed the European definition of insult, Pound's perspective is
entirely applicable to mediation. Many participants come into mediation
because they feel their honor has been impugned. Mediation can offer an
opportunity for parties to express recognition of a wrong committed and to
134 See id. at 199.
135 See id. at 205.
136 See Bloustein, supra note 63, at 962 ("Three-quarters of a century have passed
since Warren and Brandeis published their germinal article ... In this period many
hundreds of cases, ostensibly founded upon the right to privacy, have been decided, a
number of statutes expressly embodying it have been enacted, and a sizeable scholarly
literature has been devoted to it. Remarkably enough, however, there remains to this day
considerable confusion concerning the nature of the interest which the right to privacy is
designed to protect.").
137 Roscoe Pound, Interests of Personality, 28 HARV. L. REV. 343, 357 (1915) ("In
Greek law every infringement of the personality of another is . . . (contumelia); the injury
of honor, the insult, being the essential point, not the injury to the body. In Roman law,
injury to the person is called iniuria, meaning originally insult, but coming to mean any
willful disregard of another's personality.").
138 See Whitman, supra note 83, at 1165-66 ("Indeed, well into the twentieth
century, only high-status persons could expect to be treated respectfully in the daily life
of Germany or France, and only high-status persons could expect their 'personal honor'
to be protected in continental courts. Members of the lower orders-the vast majority of
the population-certainly had no meaningful right to respect. Quite the contrary.").
139 See id. at 1166.
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make amends.140 Most mediators have witnessed the power of apology in
resolving disputes.141
American privacy law has gone in two directions, one dealing with
protection from invasion by the state, 142 the other from invasion by other
people.143 Some scholars maintain that without the protection of privacy, all
human relationships are vulnerable, 144 arguing that protection from unwanted
intrusion by others is "the very essence of freedom and dignity." 45 Each of
us has the right to choose our confidants and closest allies. 146 We depend
upon the character and promise of those people in whom we confide, to hold
what we have said in confidence. Without such safeguards, we might be
140 Jonathan Hyman & Lela P. Love, If Portia Were a Mediator: An Inquiry Into
Justice In Mediation, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 166, 167 (2002-03) ("The recognition and
remorse that underlie apology can arise through the dialogue made possible by mediation
and the richer understanding of the situation such dialogue can generate.").
141 Carl D. Schneider, What It Means to Be Sorry: The Power of Apology in
Mediation, 17 MED. Q. 213, 266 (2000) ("[W]e in a real sense lose face when done a
moral injury ... But our moral relations provide for a ritual whereby the wrongdoer can
symbolically bring himself low-in other words, the humbling ritual of apology, the
language of which is often that of begging for forgiveness.") (quoting MURPHY &
HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY (1988)).
142 ELLEN ALDERMAN & CAROLINE KENNEDY, THE RIGHT To PRIVACY, XV-Xvi
(1995) ("[A]lthough the word 'privacy' is not specifically mentioned in the Constitution,
our right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is. The Fourth Amendment
has been interpreted as protecting our privacy at least against government officials, and as
such it is the most direct constitutional safeguard for privacy.").
143 Stanley J. Benn, Privacy, Freedom and Respect for Persons, in PRIVACY, 24 (J.
Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman, eds.) (1971) ("It is not only the authorities we
fear. We are all under strong pressure from our friends and neighbors to live up to the
roles in which they cast us. If we disappoint them, we risk their disapproval, and what
may be worse, their ridicule. For many of us, we are free to be ourselves only within that
area from which observers can legitimately be excluded. We need a sanctuary or retreat,
in which we can drop the mask.").
144 Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J., 475, 477 (1967-1968) ("[P]rivacy is not
just one possible means among others to insure some other value, but that it is necessarily
related to ends and relations of the most fundamental sort: respect, love, friendship and
trust. Privacy is not merely a good technique for furthering these fundamental relations;
rather without privacy or the possibility of privacy they are simply inconceivable. They
require a context of privacy or the possibility of privacy for their existence.").
145 See Bloustein, supra note 63, at 974 ("He who may intrude upon another at will
is the master of the other and, in fact, intrusion is a primary weapon of the tyrant.").
146 See Baker, supra note 50, at 1177-78 ("The identification of personal
relationships as an aspect of privacy to be protected provides a substantive, privacy-
related content for the Court's privacy analysis.").
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loath to share ourselves with anyone.147 Thus, a most basic human right is to
be found in controlling information about ourselves,148 to decide with whom
we share personal information.149 These principles are in many ways
discordant with the confidentiality agreements parties are required to make in
mediation, not with trusted confidants, but with their adversaries!' 50 The
autonomy' 5' to make decisions about what information we share and with
whom, is a critical element of self-determination in mediation. Thus, the
right to privacy in mediation is exercised by parties if they understand the
consequences of their choices and can weigh the risks' 52 against the benefits
of sharing information, as they endeavor to make informed decisions.153
147 Edward J. Eberle, The Right To Information Self-Determination, 2001 UTAH L.
REv. 995, 996 (2001) ("Personal information is not only an important ingredient to our
conceptions of ourselves. Since others form judgments about us based upon what they
know of us, our personal information is also significant in determining these judgements.
For these reasons, people need certain control over the core attributes of their personal
identities.").
148 See Fried, supra note 144, at 483 ("[P]rivacy in its dimension of control over
information is an aspect of personal liberty.").
149 See id. at 485 ("[E]ven between friends the restraints of privacy apply; since
friendship implies a voluntary relinquishment of private information . . . .").
150 See Deason, Predictable Mediation Confidentiality in the U.S. Federal System,
supra note 1, at 245-46 ("[A] privilege enhances candid communication by building on
an existing foundation of trust that is inherent in a consultation with an advisor.
Mediation, in contrast, involves adversary parties whose relationship is often
characterized at the outset by a high level of distrust.").
151 BECKY COX WHITE, COMPETENCE To CONSENT 15, 16 (1994) ("Autonomy is
important to decision making because choices are opportunities to act on values. Since
autonomy has to do with principled decision making, autonomous choices have three
characteristics: They are informed (i.e., the choice is made by someone who possesses the
material data); made with understanding (i.e., the choice is made after the material data
have been considered and their impact appreciated); and uncoerced (i.e., the choice is
freely made rather than being forced on the decision maker).").
152 W. A. Parent, Privacy, Morality and the Law, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 269, 276
(1983) ("[I]f others manage to obtain sensitive personal knowledge about us they will by
that very fact acquire power over us. Their power could then be used to our disadvantage.
The possibilities for exploitation become very real. The definite connection between
harm and the invasion of privacy explains why we place a value on not having
undocumented personal information about ourselves widely known.").
153 See Nolan-Haley, supra note 8, at 781 ("The principle of informed consent is the
vehicle through which autonomy is measured in decisionmaking.").
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C. Constitutional Protections ofPrivacy
As U.S. citizens and residents continue to trust that the rights guaranteed
in the Constitution-particularly in the Bill of Rights-are firmly established
in our legal system, there is considerable difficulty in actually defining when
these rights are in effect.154 Scholars have argued for many years that these
rights, based originally on protection of private property, 55 do not always
serve the social good.156 As changes in the law occurred, the concept of
protection of individual rights' 57 gave way to the idea of protecting the
interests of citizens,' 58 thereby balancing the individual's privacy right,
historically seen as a property right, with competing social interests.159
It was only after the Civil War with the passage of the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments that the property rights of slave owners were
abolished in all states by the creation of a constitutional right not to be
154 See Baker, supra note 50, at 1163 ("One of the major failings of the Court has
been its treatment of privacy as a self-explanatory, unitary concept, when in fact one or
more of a number of distinct meanings may lie behind a claim to privacy protections.").
155 Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy Under
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 HARV. L. REV. 950, 951 (1977) ("According to
Blackstone, 'So great moreover is the regard of the law for private property, that it will
not authorize the least violation of it; no not even for the general good of the whole
community."').
156 See id. at 948 n.23 ("No amount of admiration for our traditional system should
blind us to the obvious fact that it exhibits too great a respect for the individual, and for
the entrenched position in which our legal and political history has put him, and too little
respect for the needs of society, when they come in conflict with the individual.") (citing
Roscoe Pound, Do We Need a Philosophy ofLaw?, 5 COLUM. L. REV. 339, 344 (1905)).
157 See Pound, supra note 137, at 346 ("Individual interests which it is conceived the
law ought to secure are usually called 'natural rights' because they are not the creatures
of the state . . . . Those which are secured and the means whereby they are secured are
called legal rights; those which ought to be secured are called natural rights.").
158 See Note, supra note 155, at 980 ("This shift is consistent with the legal realist
premise that the task of the courts is not so much to protect the rights of individual
defendants as to safeguard the 'interest' of citizens generally in being free from arbitrary
government intrusions.").
159 See id. at 966 ("Balancing and accommodating competing societal interests in
the pursuit of compromise and expediency emerged as the keynote of the realist
approach. No longer could the judiciary hide behind the fagade of essentially
indeterminate deductions from so-called absolute moral principles in order to force upon
society its own values and thereby obstruct progress toward maximum social
efficiency.").
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enslaved.160 With the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment the Court also
created the principle of "selective incorporation," holding that fundamental
rights granted in the Bill of Rights were incorporated into the Fourteenth, and
therefore applied to the states. 161 With the Griswold v. Connecticut decision
in 1965,162 the protection went beyond freedom from intrusion by the
government, to freedom from regulation by the government. 163 However,
defining some rights as fundamental1 64 but not absolute makes it difficult to
know which rights are fundamental and what remedies the assault on these
rights may providel 65 when balanced against the public good.166
160 See Henkin, supra note 85, at 1411 ("Significant judicial monitoring of
governmental accommodation of private rights to public goods came only after the Civil
War: after the essential private right-freedom-was finally established by the thirteenth
amendment; after the fourteenth amendment commanded the principal arbiters of that
accommodation-the states-not to deny the equal protection of the laws or due process
of law.").
161 See id. at 1418 ("In the end, the Court adopted a doctrine of 'selective
incorporation': those provisions of the Bill of Rights that are 'fundamental' (and almost
all are, surely the 'preferred liberties' of the first amendment); are incorporated in the
fourteenth amendment, and are applicable to the states.").
162 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See also GRISWOLD v.
CONNECTICUT, The Oyez Project at IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law,
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1964/1964_496 (last visited March 12, 2012).
("Though the Constitution does not explicitly protect a general right to privacy, the
various guarantees within the Bill of Rights create penumbras, or zones, that establish a
right to privacy. Together, the First, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments, create a new
constitutional right, the right to privacy in marital relations. The Connecticut statute
conflicts with the exercise of this right and is therefore null and void.").
163 See Henkin, supra note 85, at 1424 ("In a word, the Court has been vindicating
not a right to freedom from official intrusion, but to freedom from official regulation.").
164 See id at 1428 ("Whether as substantive due process or as Privacy,
'fundamentality' needs elaboration, especially with respect to the weight particular rights
are to enjoy in the balance against public good.").
165 See Pound, supra note 137, at 365 ("Next to property in corporeal things, the
interest in body and life is on the whole the interest most completely capable of legal
protection. But the practical limitations are considerable ... with respect to merely
mental injuries, the danger of imposture, the difficulty, if not impossibility, of satisfactory
proof, and the difficulty of devising adequate redress stand in the way of complete
securing by law of an interest which the law is quite willing to recognize fully.").
166 See Henkin, supra note 85, at 1430 ("Especially now that we have added a new,
expandable zone of autonomy, fundamental but not absolute, a jurisprudence of
balancing of rights and goods cries for thinking about public goods. The Court has not
told us which assertions of governmental authority promote purposes that are not
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In determining the basis for the right to privacyl 67 in mediation, we are
referencing multiple sources: federal and state constitutional protections from
invasion by the government, federal and state statutes, common law, and
Supreme Court decisions. These legally established safeguards of rights
presumed to be inalienablel 68 are protected by the state.169 Confidentiality in
mediation offers protection from intrusion by the state and gives parties
control over what information they chose to give to others. 170 Thus, the right
to privacy, whether it is called "inviolate personality" or autonomy,171 is
inherent in the voluntary aspect of mediation on the most basic level: that of
the liberty to make personal choices that define who we are and how we live
our lives, every day.172 The claim to an autonomous self, making informed
permissible, or not public, or not good, which public goods are 'ihsufficient,' which
'acceptable,' which are 'compelling."').
167 Jeffrey H. Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy & Personhood, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 26, 39
(1976) ("[P]rivacy is necessary to the creation of selves out of human beings, since a self
is at least in part a human being who regards his existence-his thoughts, his body, his
actions-as his own.").
168 See Henkin, supra note 85, at 1414 ("Presumably, these rights, retained and
inalienable, are not necessarily absolute but may be outweighed by a sufficient public
good.").
169 Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 438 (1980)
("[T]he typical privacy claim is not a claim for noninterference by the state at all. It is a
claim for state interference in the form of legal protection against other individuals, and
this is obscured when privacy is discussed in terms of noninterference with personal
decisions.").
170 DANIEL J. SOLOVE & MARc ROTENBERG, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW, at 1
(2003) ("Information privacy concerns the collection, use and disclosure of personal
information . . . . Information privacy increasingly incorporates elements of decisional
privacy as the use of data both expands and limits individual autonomy.").
171 See Henkin, supra note 85, at 1425 ("Primarily and principally the new Right of
Privacy is a zone of prima facie autonomy, of presumptive immunity from regulation, in
addition to that established by the first amendment. The zone, Justice Blackmun told us,
consists of 'personal rights' that can be deemed 'fundamental' that are 'implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty."').
172 Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARv. L. REv. 801, 802 (1989) ("The
point is this: child-rearing, marriage and the assumption of a specific sexual identity are
undertakings that go on for years, define roles, direct activities, operate on or even create
intense emotional relations, enlist the body, inform values, and in sum substantially shape
the totality of a person's daily life and consciousness. Laws, that force such undertakings
on individuals may properly be called 'totalitarian,' and the right to privacy exists to
protect against them.").
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decisions-though defined differently by liberals and conservatives 173
exists for every adult before, during, and after mediation.
As programs using ADR continue to proliferate,174 concerns about the
lack of due process safeguards 75 have been raised. When mediation is court-
referred or court-ordered, parties believe themselves to be under the
authority 76 of the court. Theoretically, there is regulation and supervisionl 77
of those mediators whose caseloads are, to a considerable extent, court-
referred.' 7 8 In private mediation, however, negotiations are conducted behind
closed doors' 79 with much less oversight. Parties may be subject to pressures
173 See id at 761-62 ("Liberalism is grounded in a conception of individual self-
government. Its institutions are designed primarily to secure individual autonomy: the
freedom of each to choose and pursue his own ends, limited only by the principle that
others must be free to do likewise. By contrast, the 'self' that is to govern itself in the
republican understanding is a political or communal entity. Republican political
institutions are designed with a view to substantive popular participation, republicanism
sees liberty as an active and supra-individual condition, a distinctly human potential
realizable only through participation in political self-government.").
174 See Engler, supra note 113, at 2031-32 ("[C]ourts increasingly are turning to
mediation in an effort to maintain docket control . . . . Reports of high settlement rates
and litigant satisfaction with the process provide justification for, and added momentum
to, the call for more court-connected mediation.").
175 See Reuben, supra note 15 ("[A] troubling aspect of ADR is . .. the absence of
even the most basic procedural safeguards, such as the right to counsel and the right to
present evidence on one's behalf.").
176 Daniel J. Meador, Inherent Judicial Authority in the Conduct of Civil Litigation,
73 TEx. L. REv. 1805, 1805 (1995) ("The term 'inherent authority' . . . means the
authority of a trial court, whether state or federal, to control and direct the conduct of
civil litigation without any express authorization in a constitution, statute or written rule
of court. This authority, in other words, flows from the powers possessed by a court
simply because it is a court.").
177 See Thompson, supra note 31, at 514 ("The courts' reluctance to supervise the
mediation process, for fear that it will become less efficient in getting rid of cases, creates
a virtually unregulated enclave of adversarial activity within a process loosely defined as
conciliatory and facilitative.").
178 See Hensler, supra note 49, at 186 ("By the mid-1990's, more than half of state
courts, and virtually all of the federal district courts, had adopted mediation programs for
large categories of civil suits.").
179 See id. at 187 ("The consequence of the widespread adoption by legislatures and
court rule of civil case mediation has been the development and growth of a new and
largely unregulated industry that operates-by design-behind closed doors.").
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to participate 80 and settle 181 in a process managed by those holding
themselves out as neutrals, who are accountable to no one, 182 and who
maintain that they have no authority.183 The conflict between protecting
privacy and preserving other legal rights raises significant questions: What
information do parties have the right to control in mediation? When is one
free from invasion by the federal or state governments, or other people?
When must the public good be served by allowing all available evidence? 184
Recognition by mediators and parties of the following privacy protections in
place in mediation as well as in court, would alleviate some of the dangers to
autonomy, self-determination, and justice in mediation,185 as it is currently
practiced.
1. Fourth Amendment
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
180 See Nolan-Haley, supra note 32, at 61 ("Even in programs which are not strictly
mandatory, when court personnel encourage parties to mediate, the invitation is not
lightly refused. Particularly in unrepresented litigants, such a suggestion from an
authority figure can easily be perceived as a command.").
181 See id. at 61-62 ("Without lawyers, parties may not recognize the subtle
difference between referral to mediation, compulsion to mediate, and friendly coercion to
reach a settlement.").
182 See Thompson, supra note 31, at 530-31 ("The parties are then asked or forced
to participate in a private, largely-unregulated, consensual process, usually presided over
by private citizens or lawyers, essentially responsible to no one.").
183 Susan S. Silbey, Mediation Mythology, 9 NEGOTIATION. J. 349, 352 (1993)
("Mediation mythology promotes the mistaken notion that mediators are passive
participants in a process shaped by forces they have not deployed. . . Although mediators
are claimed to act without power, to be unable to impose a decision as judges and
arbitrators do, they nonetheless regularly act with authority and power.").
184 See Kuestar, supra note 48, at 577-78 ("[P]rotection offered by confidentiality
agreements is illusory. Agreements limiting access to information disclosed in mediation
could be declared void as against public policy. Judges are forced to balance the benefits
to the public by settling disputes out of court against the current policy favoring court
decisions based upon all available evidence.").
185 See Reuben, supra note 15, at 641 ("ADR should be recognized as an expansion
of public justice, rather than the establishment of a private alternative to public justice.").
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The notion of a man's privacy right within his home, 186 seen as a
property right, is attributed to Sir Edward Coke in his statement defending
such a right in 1644.187 In 1761 William Pitt the Elder, speaking about the
Excise Bill, said:
The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the force of the
Crown. It may be frail-its roof may shake-the wind may blow through
it-the storm may enter, the rain may enter-but the King of England
cannot enter-all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined
tenement! 188
Thus, the sanctity of the home as codified in the Fourth Amendment
references English legal tradition. 189 The Fourth Amendment prevents the
federal government from enacting unreasonable search and seizure upon the
people. The Third Amendment protects citizens from being forced to quarter
soldiers. In 1886 the decision in Boyd v. United States,190 reinforced these
principles by upholding the right to protect one's "person, property and
papers even against the process of law, except in a few specified cases." 91 In
1928 in Olmstead v. United States'92 Justice Brandeis dissented from the
majority, arguing that wiretapping, while not a physical trespass or seizure of
tangible property, was still an illegal search and seizure under the Fourth
Amendment. It was not until 1967 in Katz v. United StateS193 that the Court
found that electronic devices used for surveillance may violate the Fourth
Amendment in the same way as an illegal search.194 In his opinion in Katz,
186 See SOLOvE & ROTENBERG, supra note 170 ("[P]rivacy doctrine is most at home
at home, the place women experience the most force, in the family ... This right to
privacy is a right of men 'to be let alone' to oppress women one at a time.") (citing
CATHARINE A. MACKINNoN, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, at 45-46 ).
1 8 7 EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND,
chapter 73, p. 162 (1644) ("For a man's house is his castle, & domus sua cuique est
tutissimum refugium; for where shall a man be safe, if it be not in his house?").
188 See Gormley, supra note 69, at 1358 (quoting Cooley, J.).
189 See id. at 1358.
190 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-29 (1886).
191 See Gormley, supra note 69, at 1359.
192 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
193 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
194 Peter G. Madrinan, Devil in the Details: Constitutional Problems Inherent in the
Internet Surveillance Provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, 64 U. PITT. L. REV.
783, 784 (2003).
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Justice Stewart asserted that the Fourth Amendment "protects people, not
places."l 95
Application of Fourth Amendment protection to mediation allows parties
to keep what is said in mediation from being presented as testimony in court,
thus preventing government invasion into private matters. Most states have
passed legislation granting confidentiality in mediation. 196 Many state codes
and court rules on mediation grant sanctuary from invasion by the state in the
protection of confidentiality. However, many confidentiality statutes have
stipulations that allow the court to override it. 197 The offer of confidentiality
raises Fourth Amendment issues since parties must agree to mediate in good
faith-which includes the willingness to provide all relevant
informationl 98-but in general mediation fails to define what is relevant. In
195 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. See also Cornell University Law School Legal
Information Institute,
http://www.1aw.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSCCR_0389 0347_ZS.html
(describing the Court's finding in Katz as "[b]ecause the Fourth Amendment protects
people, rather than places, its reach cannot turn on the presence or absence of a physical
intrusion into any given enclosure. The "trespass" doctrine of Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, and Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, is no longer controlling.")
(last visited Mar. 18, 2012).
196 See supra note 36.
197 AL. CIV. CT. MEDIATION R. 10-11; ALASKA R. Civ. P. 100; ARIZ. REV. STAT.
§ 12-2238 (LexisNexis 1956); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-7-206 (1987); CAL. EvID. CODE
§§ 1119-1124 (West 2012); id. at §§ 1126-1128; COLO. CODE REGS. §13-22-307 (2007);
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-235d(b)-(d) (2011); D.C. CODE §164203 (2001); GA. R. ADR
VIl.A; VII.B Appendix A; IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 9-804-806 (West 2012); 710 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 35/4-36/6 (2004); IND. CODE § 4-21.5-3.5-26 (1996); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 5-512(a); id. at §§ 5-512(b)(1-(5) (West 2011); KY. ST. CT. MEDIATION R. 12; LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 4112 (West 2011); ME. R. Civ. P. 16B(k); MD. R. Civ. P. § 17-109;
MINN. ST. GEN. PRAc. R. 114.08; Miss. R. MEDIATION FOR Civ. LIT. VII.; Mo. S. CT. R.
17.06; MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-21-7(5)(a) (2011); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 25-2914 (West
2011); id. at §§ 25-2935-2936; NEV. REV. STAT. § 48.109 (1991); N.H. SUPER. CT. R.
170(E); N.J. CT. R. 1:40-4(c)-(d); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-7B-4-5 (West 2011); N.Y.
JUD. § 849-b.6; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 150B-23.1(j) (West 2011); N.D. R. CT.
8.8(d)(1)-(3); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2710.03; id. at § 2710.07 (West 2011); S.C. ADR
R. 6(e); id. at 7(c); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-13A-6 (West 2011); id. at § 19-13A-8;
TENN. R. S.CT. R. 31.7; TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.073 (West 2001);
UTAH JUD. CODE ANN. § 78-31c-106 (LexisNexis 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. § 5717
(West 2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.22 (West 2011); id. at § 2.2-4119B; WASH.
REV. CODE § 7.07.050 (2006); W.VA. TRIAL CT. R. §25.12; Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 904.085(4)(e) (West 2011).
198 See Kovach, supra note 67, at 611 ("[S]ince a primary focus of mediation,
whether in a settlement or empowerment context is increased understanding and
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litigation, attorneys and judges sort out what is relevant and cannot be
protected. In mediation, parties, often unrepresented,199 are left to figure it
out on their own.200 Being asked to disclose "all relevant information" to an
adversary, often without advice of counsel, and without understanding how
the information could be used in court if the mediation does not succeed, puts
justice very much at risk in mediation.201 It is paradoxical to promise
confidentiality in mediation, at the same time essentially suspending other
legal rights202-such as access to the court203 or use of legal remedies
including rules of evidence-if parties do choose litigation.204 When parties
communication, disclosures are necessary. The scope of information to be disclosed,
however, remains within the purview of the parties.") (emphasis added).
199 See Nolan-Haley, supra note 32, at 99 ("Unaware of their legal rights,
unrepresented parties may unwittingly surrender them and still profess great satisfaction
with the court mediation process.").
200 See Engler, supra note 113, at 2035 ("The fundamental clash between the need to
achieve voluntary and informed choices by disempowered and legally unsophisticated
litigants without providing sufficient advice or assistance to make the choices truly
informed remains a major unresolved dilemma in the context of court-connected
mediation.").
201 See Nolan-Haley, supra note 32, at 75-76 ("[I]f justice has anything to do with
making knowledgeable choices based on an understanding of relevant law, then under
court mediation practices justice is serendipitous, depending upon which mediator a
disputant draws.").
202 See id. at 63 ("This, then, is the paradox of court-based mediation: Despite the
initial search for justice based on an objective standard outside of themselves, namely
law, disputing parties are required by courts and coached by mediators to place the locus
of decision making in themselves. The result is 'individualized justice.' The parties'
original expectations for justice through law have been suspended.").
203 See Hensler, supra note 25, at 196 ("With increasing barriers to litigating, fewer
citizens will find their own way into court ... Those who are not barred from using the
courts by contractual agreement will increasingly find themselves shepherded outside the
courthouse to confidential conferences presided over by private neutrals in private
venues.").
204 See id. at 172 ("[O]ne study of disputes within a large urban community
concluded that many citizens chose to take disputes to court, rather than to more informal
dispute resolution institutions, because they valued public vindication of their rights or
positions.").
574
[Vol. 27:3 2012]
CONFIDENTIALITY IN MEDIATION
unwittingly forfeit legal rights,205 another basic mediation principle, that of
self-determination, 206 is violated.
While the protection of "solitude" or "sanctuary" of individuals inside
and outside the home from intrusion by the government has been established
under some circumstances, 207 it has proven difficult to determine what is
"reasonable" or "unreasonable" in others, regarding bank records,
automobiles, or in cases involving drugs or alcohol. 208 With the passage of
the USA PATRIOT Act, 209 Fourth Amendment protections are in even
greater danger due to the use of warrantless surveillance, ordered by
President George W. Bush shortly after the attacks on September 11,
2001.210 Bush's warrantless surveillance policies were continued by
President Barack Obama when in 2009 his administration sought renewal of
the program from the national security court. 211 Although statutes regulating
mediation often include strict limitations preventing mediators from
reporting to the court,212 the USA PATRIOT Act and other legal processes
205 See id. at 189, 190 ("[A] facilitative mediator might suggest that the parties
should put aside notions of legal rights and remedies ('rights talk') and re-conceptualize
their dispute as a problem that would be best to solve and then move on.").
206 See Hedeen, supra note 35, at 274 ("The centrality of self-determination in the
mediation community cannot be overstated.").
207 See Gormley, supra note 69, at 1368 ("On the pro-privacy side of the equation,
the Court over the past two decades-in many different contexts-has protected
individual solitude from governmental intrusion, within the castle of the home and
beyond.").
208 See id. at 1369-70.
209 USA PATRIOT ACT, H. R. 3162, 10 7th Congress, § 1 (2001) ("To deter and
punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the world, to enhance law
enforcement investigatory tools, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and
House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, This
Act may be cited as the 'Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism"'.).
210 James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets US. Spy on Callers Without Courts,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at Al, A16.
. 211 Angie Drobnic Holan, Warrantless Wiretaps Back in the News, POLITIFACT
(Apr. 17, 2009), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/promises/promise/180/end-
warrantless-wiretaps/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2012).
212 AL. ST. MEDIATION R. 11-12; ALASKA R. CIv. P. 100(g); ARiz. REV. STAT. § 12-
2238B (LexisNexis 1956); Ark. Code Ann. § 16-7-206 (West 2011); CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 1119 (West 2012); 13 COLO. REGS. § 13-22-307 (2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-
235d(b)-( c) (2011); DEL. CT. CH. R.174(c); D.C. CODE § 16-4203(a) (2001); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 44.102(3) (West 2012); GA. R. ADR VH.A; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-804 (West
2012); § 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/4 (2004); IND. CODE § 4-21.5-3.5-18 (1996); KAN.
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can override mediator privilege. 213 Parties in mediation cannot be guaranteed
that confidentiality will always be preserved if the mediation fails.214
Protecting privacy in mediation requires mediators to know and inform
parties of the unpredictability of upholding it. 215
2. Fifth Amendment
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
STAT. ANN. § 5-512 (West 2011); KY. ST. S.CT. MEDIATION R. 12; LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 4112 (West 2011); ME. R. 16B(h)(1)-(2); MD. R. Civ. P. § 17-109(a)-(b); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. 233 § 23C (West 2011); MICH. MEDIATION CT. R. § 2.411(B)5; MINN. ST.
GEN. PRAc. R. 114.08; Miss. R. MEDIATION FOR Civ. LIT. Exhibit A; Mo. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 435.014 (West 2011); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 25-21(6) (2011); NEB. REv. STAT.
§ 25-2914 (West 2011); NEV. ADR R. 11; N.H. SUPER. CT. R. § 170(D)(4); N.J. CT. R.
§§ 1:40-4(c)-(d); N.M. STAT. § 44-7B-4 (West 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-23.1(j);
N.D. S.CT. R. § 8.8(2)(d); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2710.03 (West 2011); OK. STAT.
§§ 1824 5-6 (West 2011); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36.220(a) (West 2012); 59 PA. CODE
§ 5949(a) (2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-19-44(a) (West 2011); S.C. ADR R. 6(e);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-13A-4 (West 2011); TENN. R. S.CT. 31 § 5(a)(b); TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.053(c) (West 2011); UTAH JUD. CODE ANN. § 78-31c-
107 (LexisNexis 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. § 5715 (West 2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
576.9 (West 2011); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.07.030 (2006); W.VA TRIAL CT. R. § 25.12;
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-43-103(a)-(b) (West 2011).
213 See infra Part IV.
214 See Kuestar, supra note 48, at 573 ("Mediation clients are often given the
mistaken impression, through confidentiality agreements and expressed or implied
promises by the mediator, that everything said in a mediation session is confidential and
immune from any investigation. This presumption of confidentiality in mediation is based
on legal assumptions which do not provide a clear-cut rule.").
215 See Nolan-Haley, supra note 32, at 76 ("[U]nder current practices, the influence
of law on court mediation is, at best, unpredictable in any given case ... this imbalance
has significant implications for the ultimate fairness of court mediation .. . it is a question
that relates to the fundamental fairness of court-instituted procedures that purport to
deliver justice.").
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The Fourth and Fifth amendments are seen as offering complementary
protections from invasion by the state. 216 The Fourth Amendment protects
against government seizure or use of personal items considered private
property; the Fifth Amendment protects against use of books or papers that
might incriminate their owner.217 The Fifth Amendment is also seen as
protecting privacy 218 by prohibiting the government from compelling
confessions of persons under government investigation. Government use of
private papers or conversations, gathered in violation of privacy protections,
infringes on constitutional rights.219 A penalty of exclusion of evidence may
be imposed if the state attempts to use illegally obtained evidence. 220
The origin of the protection against self-incrimination stems from abuses
of English courts that sought to determine religious and political views of
dissidents prior to being accused; the principle eventually extended to all
compulsory self-incrimination. 221 The restructuring of the criminal trial
216 R. Kent Greenawalt, Silence As A Moral and Constitutional Right, 23 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 15, 16 (1981) ("Like the Fourth Amendment ban on unreasonable
searches and seizures, the privilege against self-incrimination stands as a barrier to the
government's acquisition of information about criminal activities.").
217 See Note, supra note 155, at 955 ("The fourth amendment prohibited the
government from seizing and using as evidence the defendant's personal books and
papers because they are articles of personal property; the fifth amendment added a second
layer of protection for books and papers which might tend to incriminate their owner. 'In
this regard,' wrote Justice Bradley, 'the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost into
each other."').
218 See id. at 987 ("Unless the fourth and fifth amendments can be read as putting a
premium on the value of personal privacy in the face of government encroachment, it is
difficult to imagine what these amendments can mean.").
219 See id at 990.
220 See id. at 982 ("[C]onsistent with relativistic assumptions and accommodating
methods, the penalty of exclusion will be imposed upon the government only in
proceedings in which the Court estimates that the incremental benefits in terms of
deterrence are likely to outweigh the incremental costs in terms of lost convictions of
guilty defendants. The number of contexts in which the Court will permit exclusion
seems to be decreasing with each passing year, and the exclusionary rule may be in
danger of total abandonment.").
221 See Greenawalt, supra note 216, at 55 ("Claims against compulsory self-
incrimination had arisen mainly in reaction to questions about religious orthodoxy and
political loyalty that had been put by English prerogative courts to persons who had not
been formally accused. Though early assertions of the privilege were cast in terms of the
wrongfulness of demanding that people not otherwise accused of crime be required to
accuse themselves, these claims had been broadened to cover all formally compelled self-
accusation.").
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process in the mid-nineteenth century brought about changes that eliminated
mandatory testimony by the accused.222 The establishment of the principle of
presumption of innocence and a standard of proof defined as "beyond a
reasonable doubt" allowed defendants to choose to remain silent, putting the
burden of proof on the prosecution.223 These changes in the criminal trial
process also include prohibitions against torture or the inference of guilt if a
defendant declined to testify. 224 The prohibition against use of force to gain
admissions of guilt from the accused is a crucial aspect of Fifth Amendment
protection.225 The protection against self-incrimination is integral to the
concept of liberty that is at the heart of the Constitution.226 The aspect of
compulsion is the basis for the determination of self-incrimination. Although
mediation has not generally expanded into criminal cases, the potential
danger exists in cases in which no criminal charges have been brought, but
where self-incriminating information is solicited by mediators. If criminal
acts are disclosed-in screening, orientation, or in the mediation itself-
mediators are confronted with the contradictions between the promise of
confidentiality and their role as state actors with obligations to report abuse
and neglect of children, intent to harm oneself or another, planning a crime,
etc.
From the initial contact with the mediator or mediation center, parties
find that in order to proceed with mediation they are asked to disclose a great
deal of personal information. Information sought from parties may include
details of the incident(s), descriptions of their work and home lives and their
relationships, drug or alcohol use, or occurrences of domestic violence, 227
222 John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination at Common Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1047, 1068-69 (1994).
223 See id. at 1070.
224 See id. at 1084-85.
225 See Note, supra note 155, at 946 ("Wigmore found the crucial element of fifth
amendment protection to be the prohibition of compulsion exerted on the person of the
defendant to produce assertive conduct or to 'extract from the person's own lips an
admission of his guilt."') (citing WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2263 (3d. ed. 1940).
226 Erwin N. Griswold, The Right to Be Let Alone, 55 Nw. U. L. REV. 216, 220
(1960) ("[T]he [Fifth Amendment] privilege is more than a series of technical rules
governing a miscellany of exemptions from the ordinary duty to testify. It must be seen as
a functioning member of the body of our liberties, arising truly out of the 'higher law'
background which so thoroughly permeates our Constitution and its construction.").
227 Intake forms used by some mediation providers ask parties to disclose large
amounts of personal information regarding their own behavior and the behavior of others
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some of which could be incriminating. Mediators guide the process by
extracting information, seeking confessions, 228 and reworking statements in
the direction of settlement. 229 Thus parties engage in a confessional ritual230
as they explain their view of the events. The compulsion to offer information
calls into question whether parties' Fifth Amendment rights are protected
when information is gathered for mediation,231 as mediators inquire about
parties' jobs, housing, and/or personal lives, without actually knowing how
the information will be used. Confusion about the relationship of mediation
to the law 232 and uncertainty about court oversight233 easily lends itself to the
potential for coercion 234 to enter into mediation and to reveal personal
information235 that is potentially incriminating.
in the household, including a spouse or children. Samples from Mediation Centers on file
with the author.
228 See Pavlich, supra note 20, at 722 ("So commonplace is confession nowadays
that we do not even see it as a form of constraint, as an obligation, or even as a power.
Rather, we seem fixated on telling all, pouring out the fables that might liberate ourselves
from the gnawing suspicion that repressing secrets can lead to events too dark to
contemplate.").
229 See id. at 723 ("[T]he mediators try to extract and fashion particular sorts of
confessions by constantly probing for information, rephrasing issues, praising or
castigating confessors-all of which are directed at dispute settlement.").
230 See id. at 722 ("[C]ommunity mediation can be included as a confessional site
that constructs a 'ritual of discourse' requiring subjects to disclose the truth about
themselves around a given set of circumstances.").
231 Gary R. Clause, The Constitutional Right to Withhold Private Information, 77
Nw. U. L. REv. 536, 543 (1982) ("Justice Stevens recognized that the government can
infringe the interest in nondisclosure of personal information not just by disseminating
private information to the public, but also by the process of gathering that information.").
232 See Nolan-Haley, supra note 32, at 85 ("[C]ourt mediation without knowledge of
law offers simply the illusion of justice. Unless bargaining is informed by knowledge of
law, justice in court mediation is also a 'castle in the air."').
233 See Meador, supra note 176, at 1806 ("The United States inherited the concept
of a court's inherent authority over its process and procedure from the English courts.
This inherent authority is well established and widely accepted in the state and federal
judiciaries, although views differ as to the precise scope of such authority.").
234 See Weston, supra note 4, at 604 ("Because ADR use is largely unaccountable
and the players unregulated, the potential to exploit bargaining power or abuse the
process is ripe, with seemingly minimal consequences.").
235 See Pavlich, supra note 20, at 722 ("[C]ommunity mediation embraces a
confessional ethos that pressures disputants as they refashion themselves in the quest to
settle a dispute.").
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During the orientation phase, mediators seek to make good on the
promise to provide faster, cheaper, and better resolution than litigation-by
bringing parties into mediation. Studies have found that coercion to
participate in mediation is effective. 236 Direct pressure by the court can be
brought to bear on disputants to compel participation in mediation. 237 Those
who decide not to participate are often seen as adversarial. 238 Where
mediation programs are housed in the court, or mediations are conducted in
courthouses, parties may be unable to distinguish between mediation and
judicial processes. 239 Many community mediation centers depend largely on
the courts for cases as well as finding.240 Thus the pressure on mediation
programs may translate into pressure on the parties 241 to reveal private
information, 242 to enter mediation, to continue in mediation,243 and to reach
236 See Hedeen, supra note 35, at 276-77.
237 See id. at 277 ("[e]xplicit coercion may be used to persuade a reluctant disputant
to agree to mediation by implying that prosecution will be initiated if mediation is not.
Implicit coercion is evident in referrals by judges who agree to dismiss the court case if
successful mediation takes place, and it appears in communications from prosecutors,
police officers, and mediation program staff") (quoting Janice A. Roehl & Royer F.
Cook, Issues in Mediation: Rhetoric and Reality Revisited, 41. J. Soc. ISSUES 161, 172
(1985)).
238 See Silbey, supra note 183, at 352 ("The routine recourse to mediation creates a
bias against those who do not participate, with the result that they are often negatively
characterized and thus stigmatized as adversarial by those who rely on mediation to
resolve a good share of the dispute caseload.").
239 See Hedeen, supra note 35, at 277.
240 Timothy Hedeen & Patrick Coy, Community Mediation: The Ties That Bind, 17
MEDIATION Q., 351, 356 (2000) (([the study] "bears out our concerns regarding
mediation's dependence on the courts for funding. She found that funding agencies have
a profound impact on the shape and approach of individual programs .... ) (citing ALBIE
DAVIS, MEDIATION IN MASSACHUSSETTs: A DECADE IN DEVELOPMENT, 1975 TO 1986, at
35 (1986)).
241 See id. at 356-57 ("[I]f mediation programs and their mediators are subject to
bureaucratic pressures to keep cases moving through the docket by a written agreement,
they will likely pass that pressure on to the parties seated around the mediation table:
'Mediators remind recalcitrant disputants that if they don't come to agreement, the court
may hold it against them."' (quoting J.E. BEER, PEACEMAKING IN YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD:
REFLECTIONS ON AN EXPERIMENT IN COMMUNITY MEDIATION, at 212 (1986).)).
242 See Pavlich, supra note 20, at 723 ("[D]isputants are enticed to confide as fully
as possible to delegated local authorities (the mediators).").
243 See Hedeen, supra note 35, at 279.
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settlement. 244 Pressure can also come from a party's attorney, using
mediation to provide a "reality check."245 The court's purpose in supporting
mediation is clearly to produce settlements, 246 which in turn puts the onus on
mediators to produce high settlement rates.247 In private disputes, ADR
processes are often mandated through business contracts with consumers or
employees in which parties' unknowingly abandon remedies normally
available in court. 248 Parties with less power who engage in mediation with
institutions or parties of .greater power and resources are vulnerable to
pressures to voluntarily relinquish private information 249 and to
compromise. 250
Privacy law is meant to protect against abuses of power by government
institutions. Mediation has become one of these institutions, 251 despite being
characterized as a voluntary process in which it is the parties who have the
power.252 The mythology that the parties control the mediation 253 belies its
244 See Fiss, supra note 29, at 1075 ("Consent is often coerced ... Like plea
bargaining, settlement is a capitulation to the conditions of mass society and should be
neither encouraged nor praised.").
245 See Thompson, supra note 31, at 533.
246 See id. at 516 ("Courts and legislatures ... have readily accepted mediation, not
necessarily because of an interest in self-determination, but because cases settled with
little effort or expense by the judicial system.").
247 See Nolan-Haley, supra note 32, at 98 ("[S]ettlement is too often the unitary goal
of court mediation programs. Given the pressure techniques used by some court
mediators and the high number of reported. settlement rates... there are serious fairness
concerns for the litigants . . . .").
248 See Hensler, supra note 49, at 184 ("[B]usinesses have enthusiastically embraced
arbitration for disputes between them and individual consumers and between
management and its employees... Today, an increasing number of consumer transactions
and workplace disputes are governed by arbitration agreements that require consumers
and workers to waive their rights to a legal remedy if a dispute arises as the result of the
transaction.").
249 See Eberle, supra note 147, at 996 ("Each person requires a certain inviolable
area of personal freedom, beyond unwarranted official inquiry or incursion, in which to
think, formulate, and structure one's life freely.").
250 Judith L. Maute, Mediator Accountability: Responding to Fairness Concerns,
1990 J. Disp. RESOL. 347, 354 (1990) ("Compromise is an equitable solution only
between equals; between unequals, it 'inevitably produces inequality."') (quoting J.
AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW?, at 136 (1986)).
251 See Silbey, supra note 183, at 353 ("Th[e] mythology has been quite successful
in generating support for the institutionalization of mediation and the establishment of
both a market and an occupation in the practice of mediation.").
252 See Hedeen & Coy, supra note 240, at 359.
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function as an informal process that extends the reach of the court.254
Mediators, while appearing to be informal and autonomous,255 gather
information under the rubric of "storytelling" 256 (frequently characterized as
"venting"). 257 In the prefatory note to the Uniform Mediation Act, the
authors clarify that while candor is encouraged in mediation,258 it is not
"essentially a truth-seeking process in our justice system such as
discovery." 259 It would follow then, that parties prior to and during mediation
should know that they maintain the same right not to disclose information,260
as they would in court. Without understanding the right to withhold
253 See Silbey, supra note 183, at 351 ("A large body of empirical evidence exists
which demonstrates that, despite claims to the contrary, the mediation process is
routinized. It is not adapted by or responsive to individual parties, their particular
characteristics, individual claims or situations.").
254 See HARRINGTON, supra note 16, at 170 ("Informalism expands the capacity of
the justice system to manage minor conflicts and legitimates the extension of state
intervention on functionalist grounds.").
255 See HOFRICHTER, supra note 19, at xiv ("[T]he informal systems are forms of
law, not isolated spheres. They remain connected to the formal legal system and legal
concepts. Both are part of the state and rely on each other, even though the informal state
creates an appearance of autonomy.").
256 Janet Rifkin, Jonathan Millen & Sara Cobb, Toward A New Discourse for
Mediation: A Critique of Neutrality, 9 MEDIATION Q. 151, 161 (1991) ("[A]ll human
communication can be understood as story, or narrative. Narrative refers to the way in
which stories cohere together . . . what a successful mediator does is facilitate the
production of a coherent narrative.").
257 Deborah Hensler, A Research Agenda: What We Need to Know About Court-
Connected ADR, 6 DIsp. RES. MAG. 15, 17 (1999) ("In mediation parties are ... invited
to present their side of the dispute. But anecdotal data suggest that many mediators view
this process as 'venting,' rather than as an opportunity for parties to present facts that will
shape an outcome.").
258 U.M.A. Prefatory Note (2001),
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/mediat/med50l.htm at 6 ("Candor during
mediation is encouraged by maintaining the parties' and mediators' expectations
regarding confidentiality of mediation communications.") (last visited Mar. 19, 2012).
259 See id. at 10.
260 See Clause, supra note 231, at 542 ("Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice
Stevens recognized the right of informational privacy in two short sentences. The right of
privacy comprises 'at least two different kinds of interests ... the individual interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters,' while 'another is the interest in independence in
making certain kinds of decisions."').
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information, 261 and the importance of considering the potential consequences
of what they disclose, 262 participants in mediation may jeopardize their right
not to incriminate themselves. 263 In 1964 the Court, in Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, saw the right not to incriminate oneself as "our respect for the
inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each individual 'to a
private enclave where he may lead a private life.'264 It is sufficient for the
purposes of assessing whether mediation is appropriate to simply ask if
parties feel safe in negotiating directly with the other party. If an order of
protection documenting an incident of violence exists between the parties, it
normally serves as an indicator that mediation is not appropriate. In all other
cases, mediators would assess parties' sense of safety in the same way they
must assess parties' capacities 265 to negotiate in good faith, to formulate
proposals, and to make decisions in their own best interests, in order to
determine if mediation is appropriate. Given the difficulties in predicting the
legal limitations of confidentiality, it is imperative that mediators consider
carefully what information they solicit.
The Fifth Amendment also offers protection by providing a guarantee of
due process.266 In defining mediation as consensual, due process is generally
261 See SOLOVE and ROTENBERG, supra note 170, at 2 ("Information privacy law is
an interrelated web of tort law, federal and state constitutional law, federal and state
statutory law, evidentiary privileges, property law, contract law, and criminal.law ... It is
developing coherence as privacy doctrines in one area are being used to inform and
structure privacy responses in other areas.").
262 See Eberle, supra note 147, at 974 ("In the information age, possession of
information is power. Possession of personal information is the power to influence if not
manipulate, human behavior ... The more that is known about a person, the easier the
person is to control.").
263 See Clause, supra note 231, at 553 ("The Fifth Amendment's privilege against
self-incrimination also involves the right to withhold information. The Court has stated
that 'one of the several purposes served by the constitutional privilege against compelled
testimonial self-incrimination is that of protecting personal privacy."').
264 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (quoting United States
v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581-82 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dissenting)).
265 See Oberman, supra note 11, at 797 ("Parties must have the capacity to
understand and carry out all the requirements of the mediation process in order to meet
the definition of self-determination. Mediators must have the ability to explain these
requirements and the awareness to know if parties are understanding them. Otherwise the
parties will not be sufficiently informed to exercise self-determination regarding the
decision whether or not to participate.").
266 "[N]or shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
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considered inapplicable 267 within the context of mediation.268 Mediation
advocates make the assumption that parties wish to settle their disputes in
conciliatory processes offering savings in costs and time. This assumption is
not substantiated by research. 269 Many disputants still prefer using the courts
in order to seek public vindication,270 rather than informal dispute resolution.
Studies claiming success based on participant satisfaction with mediation
programs271 fail to address the larger issues such as the use of mediation to
prevent access to courts or concerns that mediation is not providing more just
outcomes. 272 The search for justice that brings most petitioners into the court
system is converted in mediation from a demand for rights, into an ostensibly
collaborative conversation about needs.273 Addressing needs rather than
rights shifts attention away from the available legal remedies that comprise
due process. Instead, mediators guide parties towards settlement based on
actions individuals may take to achieve reconciliation. 274
267 Nancy A. Welsh, Disputants' Decision Control in Court-Connected Mediation:
A Hollow Promise Without Procedural Justice, 2002 J. DIsP. RESOL. 179, 187 ("At a
minimum, the procedural due process jurisprudence raises doubts regarding the
applicability of procedural due process to court-connected mediation and other processes
defined as 'consensual."').
268 See id. at 191 ("[U]sing the lens of procedural due process jurisprudence,
mediation may be viewed as relieving the courts of the obligation to deliver either
substantive or procedural justice.").
269 See Hensler, supra note 257, at 16 ("Empirical results suggesting that ADR may
not save litigation costs or time have struck a sour note because they fly in the face of
data indicating that lawyers and parties think ADR is producing such savings. The
discrepancy between subjective and objective data gives empiricists pause.").
270 See Hensler, supra note 204.
271 Deborah Hensler, ADR Research at the Crossroads, 2000 J. Disp. RESOL. 71, 77
("As the ADR movement has grown, an increasing number of non-profit organizations
and individual scholars have become committed to its continuation. It is not surprising
that these organizations and individuals would prefer to celebrate ADR's successes,
rather than investigate its limitations, to focus on positive outcomes rather than ponder
null or negative results.").
272 See Hensler, supra note 49, at 188 ("We know virtually nothing about the
outcomes of mediation programs, about whether they change the distribution of power
between the 'haves' and 'have nots.' We have no idea whether mediation helps to open
the courts to disputants of lesser means or those with 'less important' claims . . . .").
273 See Silbey, supra note 13, at 177 ("The mediation ideologues promised a
magical process that would satisfy fundamental human needs by making participants
more self aware, competent and happy.").
274 See Cobb, supra note 23, at 412.
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Mediation often looks like other court processes such as settlement
conferences. 275 Mediation differs from court processes in the lack of
oversight by the court276 of procedural277 and substantive fairness.278 In
addition to concerns about fairness in the process, parties cannot evaluate
fairness of proposals 279 without adequate legal information. 280 While
mediation ideology281 champions the notion that parties benefit from seeing
disputes as problems to be solved, 282 research has shown that many
disputants want to engage in procedures based on facts and law.283
Therefore, concerns about the right to due process are raised by pressures
275 See Welsh, supra note 267, at 192 ("In the courts studied, mediation most
resembled traditional judicial settlement conferences, with a privately selected and
privately paid mediator substituting for a publicly paid and publicly selected judge.").
276 See Weston, supra note 7, at 34-35 ("The question posed here is whether, and to
what extent, the judicial power to monitor, regulate and sanction participants extends to
court-connected ADR processes, in particular mediation, where the legislature has
accorded a broad confidentiality privilege.").
277 See id. at 64 ("Confidentiality statutes can conflict with a court's authority to
enforce its own procedural rules and orders mandating specific conduct or good faith
participation in the court-connected ADR setting.")
278 Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE
L.J. 1545, 1560 (1991) ("The informal law of the mediation setting requires that
discussion of principles, blame, and rights, as these terms are used in the adversarial
context, be deemphasized or avoided . . . mediators typically suggest that the parties
'eschew[] the language of individual rights in favor of the language of interdependent
relationships.' They orient the parties toward reasonableness and compromise, rather than
moral vindication.").
279 See Maute, supra note 250, at 349 ("Theoretically, mediator accountability is
satisfied by ensuring a procedurally fair process that treats parties with dignity and
respect and stops intimidating or abusive behavior. Substantively, absent abuse of the
mediation process, any settlement agreed to by the parties is deemed fair.").
280 See id. at 367.
281 Susan Silbey, Ideology, Power and Justice, IN JUSTICE IN POWER IN LAW AND
SOCIETY RESEARCH, 272, 272 (Bryant Garth & Austin Sarat eds., 1998) ("[T]he term
'ideology' generally points to the ability of ideas to affect social circumstances. Thus
sociologists have sometime described the function of ideology as the capacity to advance
the political and economic interests of groups or classes . . . .").
282 See Hensler, supra note 257, at 15 ("ADR practitioners-particularly
mediators-have long emphasized the qualitative benefits of substituting problem-
solving processes for adjudication.").
283 See Hensler, supra note 25, at 95 ("Sally Merry and Susan Silbey's research on
why Americans take disputes to court ... suggest[s] that at least through the mid-1980s
litigants expected legal disputes to be resolved on the basis of public norms-that is what
they thought 'justice' was about.").
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brought to bear on parties to produce information that may jeopardize their
right not to incriminate themselves, and by pressure to settle disputes out of
court. Promotion of mediation as private2 84 and as an alternative to
litigation 285 obscures the reality that in court-referred cases at the least,
mediators are state actorS286 and parties continue to have a right to due
process.
3. Fourteenth Amendment
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
The Fourteenth Amendment carries a complex and controversial history,
beginning with the intention to guarantee citizenship to all persons born in
the United States,2 87 particularly former slaves. The Dred Scott decision in
1857288 deemed slaves incapable of being citizens.289 Without listing specific
284 See Reuben, supra note 15, at 594 ("An understanding of the basic routes by
which a disputant may find himself or herself in an ADR hearing begins to demonstrate
how the government plays a central, indispensable, and inseverable role in the seemingly
private ADR system.").
285 See Silbey supra note 13 at 174 ("[R]ather than competition for courts and the
legal profession, it is more appropriate to see mediation as an addition to, rather than
displacement of, traditional legal services.").
286 See Reuben, supra note 15, at 608 ("The dissipation of ADR euphoria should
permit judges and other legal policy makers and practitioners to more soberly understand,
evaluate, and implement ADR. One reality that should become quickly apparent is that
modern ADR is often driven by state action.").
287 The controversy continues in the present day as Republicans question the
Fourteenth Amendment's granting of citizenship to all children born in the U.S. Rep.
Luis Gutierrez, Why We Should Welcome McConnell's Demand for Hearings on
Rescinding 14th Amendment, August 4, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rep-luis-
gutierrez/mcconnell-is-right-to-dem b 670899.html.
288 Dred Scott v Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). See WEST'S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
AMElUcAN LAW at 280 (1998) ("[T]he U.S. Supreme Court placed its stamp of approval
on the institution of slavery, holding that slaves were not 'citizens' within the meaning of
the Constitution, but only 'property' lacking any constitutional protection whatsoever."
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rights, the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 laid a foundation
for equal citizenship.290 Unfortunately, for the following eighty years the
ideal of equal citizenship was abandoned in decisions handed down by the
Court, such as Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896,291 establishing the separate but
equal doctrine.292 Equal protection was not instituted until Brown v. Board of
Education in 1954.293 The Court holds as suspect laws that classify and
stigmatize some persons based on traits that are "immutable and highly
visible-such as race or sex.294 The Court found three sets of interests as
"fundamental": 1) voting rights, 2) access to the courts, and 3) rights
regarding marriage, procreation and family relations.295 While the Fourteenth
Amendment does not grant total immunity from state intrusion in these
matters, it sets a high standard for denial of protection. 296 The claim for
equality under the Fourteenth Amendment is the claim to be treated the same
as other members of a specific group who share the attributes at issue. 297 The
Fourteenth Amendment expansion of the constitutional guarantee of equality
increased federal government power in relation to both the states and private
institutions,298 through the doctrine of state action. State action as defined by
the Fourteenth Amendment includes discriminatory acts committed by
government officials or agents or private persons "cloaked with some
measure of state authority." 299 According to this definition, mediation is state
action, referring at the very least, to court certified mediators and court-
referred mediation cases.
In 1965 the Court "exploded the world of individual liberties wide
open"300 in its decision in Griswold v. Connecticut, finding that married
289 See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION at 641 (Leonard W. Levy,
Kenneth L. Karst, & Dennis J. Mahoney, eds., 1986).
290 See id. at 642.
291 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). See WEST'S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
AMERICAN LAW, supra note 288, at 281 ("The Supreme Court placed its imprimatur on
. . . forms of racial apartheid in the landmark decision Plessy v. Ferguson.").
292 See id. ("Following Plessy, the 'SEPARATE-BUT-EQUAL' doctrine remained
the lodestar of Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence for over half a century.").
293 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
294 See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 289, at 644.
295 See id. at 644.
296 See id.
297 See id. at 646.
298 See id.
299 See WEST'S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 288, at 288.
300 See Gormley, supra note 69, at 1391.
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couples using contraception had a right to privacy, to be free from intrusion
of the state into the home/bedroom. 301 After Griswold the Court extended the
right not to be intruded upon in the home or in the association of marriage, to
the right of "liberty of choice" 302 in Roe v. Wade.303 Choices regarding
marriage, procreation, and individual liberty encompass both substantive304
and procedural rights. 305 The rulings in Griswold and Roe, clarified the
court's role in preventing the state from overstepping the boundaries of the
social contract. 306 Two kinds of decisions were seen as fundamental decision
privacy. One was in decisions about whom to marry, how to educate one's
children and how to define one's family; the second kind refers to the social
contract 307-attempting to establish which decisions are personal and
private308 -and which belong to the state. 309 As the law evolved, personal
relationships-not only in marriage-came to be seen as a protected privacy
right.310 In the context of the Fourteenth Amendment, decisions made in
mediation about family life and individual autonomy, embody these
constitutional rights. The process of mediation offers a concrete opportunity
to exercise them.
301 See id. at 1392.
302 See id. at 1396.
303 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
304 See Baker, supra note 50.
305 See Gormley, supra note 69, at 1397.
306 See id. at 1413.
307 See id. at 1410 n.353 (citing JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT
(B.B. Macpherson, ed. 1980) ("The person who gives 'express consent' to enter into a
society becomes a 'perfect member of that society, a subject of that government."').
308 See Rubenfeld, supra note 172, at 770 ("But what is this 'private life' to which
personhood now adverts? It is, of course, the field of sexuality: marriage, contraception,
childbearing, and so on. Personhood finally comes to rest its case on the fundamental
importance of sexuality . )... 
309 See id. at 805 ("The right to privacy exists because democracy must impose
limits on the extent of control and direction that the state exercises over the day-to-day
conduct of individual lives.").
310 See id. at 784 ("There are perhaps no legal proscriptions with more profound,
more extensive, or more persistent affirmative effects on individual lives than the laws
struck down as violations of the right to privacy. Anti-abortion laws, anti-miscegenation
laws, and compulsory education laws all involve the forcing of lives into well-defined
and highly confined institutional layers... They affirmatively and very substantially shape
a person's life; they direct a life's development along a particular avenue. These laws do
not simply proscribe one act or remove one liberty, they inform the totality of a person's
life.").
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The Fourteenth Amendment protection of fundamental rights311 has
come to include personal liberties guaranteed in the Bill of RightS312 such as
freedom of speech, religion, assembly, right to counsel, right to be protected
against unreasonable search and seizure, the right not to incriminate oneself,
the right to a jury trial, and the right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment. 313 Through the doctrine of incorporation, 314 the fundamental
rights315 emanating from the first eight amendments 316 are "made
applicable" 317 to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, in the due process
clause.318 States are required to uphold equal protection 319 of "life, liberty or
property." While there is a symbiotic relationship between liberty and
privacy, they are not the same. Privacy is security from coercion or invasion,
311 Felix Frankfurter, Memorandum on Incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 78 HARv. L. REv. 746, 749 (1965)
("[T]he Fourteenth encompasses only 'fundamental' rights .... ).
312 Thomas I. Emerson, Nine Justices In Search of A Doctrine, 64 MICH. L. REV.
219, 228 (1965) (citing Mr. Justice Douglas in Griswold ("Specific guarantees in the Bill
of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give
them life and substance."').
313 See WEST'S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 288, at 287.
314 Norman Redlich, Are There Certain Rights ... Retained By The People? 37
N.Y.U. L. REv. 787, 800 (1962) ("[The basic] 'incorporation' theory of Justice Black or
the 'absorption' approach of Justice Brennan is the assumption that the Fourteenth
Amendment, either by original intention in 1868 or by subsequent interpretation, includes
certain rights which, prior to 1868, were available to Americans only as a protection from
intrusion by the federal government.").
315 See Emerson, supra note 312, at 229 ("The right of privacy can be considered
such a fundamental right and hence protected under the due process clause.").
316 Robert B. McKay, The Right ofPrivacy: Emanations and Intimations, 64 MICH.
L. REv. 259, 264 (1965) ("It has long been accepted constitutional doctrine . . . that at
least 'some of the personal rights safeguarded by the first eight Amendments against
National action may also be safeguarded against state action, because a denial of them
would be a denial of due process of law."').
317 See Frankfurter, supra note 311, at 748 ("On the basis of the judicial
development, case by case, the use of the phrase 'made applicable' represents a shorthand
for an intellectual process that has been worked through and need not be repeated at
length.").
318 See Redlich, supra note 314, at 799 ("As Justice Douglas demonstrated in his
dissent in Poe v. Ullman, . . . it is possible to interpret the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to include rights in addition to those specified in the first eight
amendments.").
319 See WEST'S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 288, at 287.
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while liberty is the freedom to make personal choices: 320 i.e. freedom of
religion protects the right to choose one's own belief system, while privacy
allows us to keep those beliefs to ourselves. 321 In mediation, both freedom
and privacy may be at stake as parties sort out what personal information is
relevant to disclose, what they may withhold during negotiations about
significant life choices about where they live or work, or when they see their
children. 322
The protection of private relationships in the Fourteenth Amendment
gives additional weight to the physician-patient, priest-penitent, and
attorney-client privilege. 323 Confidential relationships324 presume a trust
placed by an individual in an agent who has agreed to put this individual's
interest above their own.325 This privilege has been granted in most states to
mediators and parties in mediation.326 A privilege that grants mediators
immunity from testifying is seen by some as critical to maintaining
neutrality.327 However, in other privileged relationships, the duty of
320 See Gross, supra note 92, at 44 ("[A] source of confusion is perhaps avoided if
we speak of security as 'freedom from,' distinguishing it from 'freedom to' . . . both
notions seem to have been subsumed in the parlance of constitutional law under the term
'liberty . . . ').
321 Thomas H. O'Connor, The Right To Privacy in Historical Perspective, 53 MASS.
L.Q. 101, 102 (1968).
322 See Baker, supra note 50, at 1163 ("[T]he 'right of selective disclosure,' is
concerned with the ability of 'individuals, groups or institutions to determine for
themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to
others."').
323 See id. at 1178 (quoting Justice Douglas) ("The right of privacy has no more
conspicuous place than in the physician patient relationship, unless it be in the priest-
penitent relation.").
324 See Gavison, supra note 169, at 436 ("The concern here is the existence of
relationships in which confidentiality should be protected, so that parties know that
confidences shared in these relationships will not be forced out.").
325 See Hughes, supra note 10, at 57 ("A confidential relationship arises when an
individual justifiably places his or her trust in an agent, expecting the agent to place the
principal's interest above his or her own, and the agent accepts the responsibility . .. For
many professions, the duty of confidentiality is imposed upon members of the respective
professions by codes of ethics or by statutes.").
326 See supra note 36.
327 Note, Protecting Confidentiality in Mediation, 98 HARv. L. REv. 441, 445-46
(1984) ("[P]rotection of the mediator's status as a neutral demands recognition of a
distinct privilege on his part not to testify. This privilege must be assertable by the
mediator when necessary to protect his interest in neutrality or on the motion of a party,
when necessary to protect party expectations.").
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confidentiality applies only to the professional, not the client.328 A mediation
privilege applies not only to communications between the mediator and
client, but among all the parties in mediation.329 Unlike evidentiary
exclusions, a mediator privilege is not tied to the purpose of the disclosure.330
Statutes vary regarding who holds the privilege: the mediator, the parties, or
the mediation process itself.331 Without understanding who holds the
privilege, it is difficult to determine who can waive it. 332 Thus it remains
unclear whether the mediator may still invoke the privilege, even if the
parties to the mediation have waived confidentiality. 333
As mediators work with parties to navigate the territory between rights
and needs, between privacy and the social good, and between confidentiality
and the rules of evidence, the question may be posed: is mediation a site of
due process protection under the Fourteenth Amendment? 334 Are parties
releasing the court from its obligation to provide procedural justice by
consenting to mediation? 335 This question has been addressed by the Task
Force on Alternative Dispute Resolution in Employment in creating a due
328 See Hughes, supra note 10, at 33.
329 See id. at 30.
330 See Rosenberg, supra note 1, at 165 ("[T]he protection from the mediator
privilege applies regardless of the purpose for disclosing, while the evidentiary exclusion
makes evidence inadmissible only when offered to prove the validity or amount of the
claim.").
331 See id. at 159 ("[Sltates that provide for a mediator privilege differ on whether
the privilege runs with the mediator, the parties, or the proceedings themselves.").
332 See id ("[I]t is the privilege holder who may assert or waive the privilege.").
333 See Perino, supra note 4, at 9 ("Unlike some other privileges, such as the
attorney-client privilege, the nature and purpose of a nediation privilege requires that the
mediator be permitted to invoke a privilege in at least some situations where all the
parties to the mediation have waived confidentiality.").
334 See Welsh, supra note 267, at 180 ("[P]rocedural due process jurisprudence
indicates that the courts' appreciation of procedural justice is unlikely to translate easily
to processes in which the disputants, not the courts, are deemed to exercise control over
outcomes.").
335 See id at 191 ("Indeed, using the lens of procedural due process jurisprudence,
mediation may be viewed as relieving the courts of the obligation to deliver either
substantive or procedural justice. When the disputants in civil actions reach their own
settlements through mediation, they relieve the courts from the obligation to reach
decisions that meet a standard of substantive justice.").
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process protocol for employment disputes,336 to support parties' rights to due
process in mediation and arbitration. The need to establish this protocol
makes clear that fairness in mediation is not the equivalent of the Fourteenth
Amendment protection of due process-the ethic of fairness rarely addresses
the inequalities between parties in the larger social context.337 While
assurances are routinely given by mediators that neutrality 338 and fairness of
the mediator are to be expected, 339 these claims are not supported by research
findings.340 In naming mediation centers "community justice centers," 341
mediation advocates obscured the potential use of mediation to sacrifice
equality before the law to another set of priorities 342 mandated by the court
336 A Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes,
http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/alliance/resources/Guide/Due process protocol empdispute.ht
ml (last visited Feb. 16, 2012).
337 See Grillo, supra note 278, at 1569 ("Equating fairness in mediation with formal
equality results in, at most, a crabbed and distorted fairness on a microlevel; it considers
only the mediation context itself. There is no room in such an approach for a discussion
of the fairness of institutionalized societal inequality.").
338 Sara Cobb & Janet Rifkin, Neutrality As A Discursive Practice: The
Construction and Transformation of Narratives in Community Mediation, 11 STUD. IN
LAW, POL. AND Soc'y 69, 70 (1991) ("The lack of clarity in the ethical standards of the
professional organizations is reflected in the absence of any specific guidelines for the
practice of neutrality; instead, local and tacit understandings about neutrality (based on
the psychologized vocabulary) guide practice.").
339 See Craig A. McEwen, Nancy H. Rogers, & Richard J. Maiman, Bring In The
Lawyers: Challenging the Dominant Approaches to Ensuring Fairness in Divorce
Mediation, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1317, 1327 (1995) ("[C]ommentators differ sharply about
whether there exist standards for evaluating the fairness of outcomes. For some mediation
advocates, fair outcomes are in the eyes of the beholder-if parties believe the outcome
to be fair, then it is.").
340 Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of
Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, Wis. L. REv. 1359, 1400 (1985) ("Our
review of social science writings on prejudice reveals that the rules and structures of
formal justice tend to suppress bias, whereas informality tends to increase it.").
341 See HOFRICHTER, supra note 19, at xiv ("NDR [Neighborhood Dispute
Resolution] falsely affirms the neighborhood as the basis of justice in the community ...
-[I]t presents an idea of community and collective self-help that is contrived, uses
community culture against itself as a form of regulation and, by its presence, distracts
attention from broader community issues.").
342 See Delgado et al., supra note 340, at 1404 ("The ideal of equality before the law
is too insistent a value to be compromised in the name of more mundane advantages.").
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for speed, economy, and flexibility,343 in which fairness of outcomes and the
right to due process may be jeopardized.
3. First Amendment
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances.344
Protection of privacy in mediation through the Fourth, Fifth, and
Fourteenth Amendments creates a conflict with the First Amendment right to
free speech. The First Amendment grants not only the right to speak, but also
freedom of the press, the right to receive information and communication,
and the right to know.345 The court's authority to override a confidentiality
privilege346 rests on the right of the public to hear every man's evidence.347
But there are also aspects of the First Amendment that grant privacy: in the
home from unwanted solicitations and in public places from being an
unwilling observer or listener, where one is a "captive audience." 348 First
Amendment privacy combines the principles of protection from the state, and
protection from other members of the community. The notion of privacy
343 See Della Noce, supra note 14, at 548 ("Where improved case management
efficiency was promised in order to gain (or keep) political and financial support for
court-connected mediation programs, pressures naturally came to bear to demonstrate
that those efficiencies were being achieved.").
344 U.S. CoNsT. amend. 1.
345 Thomas I. Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, [ 1976] WASH. U.
L.Q. 1, 2 (1976) ("It is clear at the outset that the right to know fits readily into the First
Amendment and the whole system of freedom of expression. ... First the right to read, to
listen, to see, and to otherwise receive communications, and second the right to obtain
information as a basis for transmitting ideas or facts to others.").
346 See Perino, supra note 4, at 9 ("[M]atters of convenience do not outweigh the
important public policy in favor of requiring those with relevant evidence to testify or to
be subject to discovery."). See also id. at 12 ("[W]hile confidentiality is important, it is
not absolute. Like all privileges, a mediation privilege is an exception to the principle that
the public is entitled to 'every man's evidence."').
347 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW, 4 § 2192 at 2966 (1905) (citing the Duke of Argyll speaking in 1742 to
the Bill for Indemnifying Evidence ("[T]he public has a claim to 'every man's evidence,'
and that no man can plead exemption from this duty to his country.")).
348 See Gormley, supra note 69, at 1379.
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under the first Amendment is not only freedom of speech, but freedom of
thought, as voiced by Justice Marshall in Stanley v. Georgia:
If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no
business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may
read or what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels
at the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds.349
Yet in court-referred mediation, parties in essence become the captive
audiences of mediation providers who are sanctioned by the court to offer
mediation services. 350 Mediators make assurances that privacy will be
maintained, at the same time parties may be required to attend group
orientation sessions, often held in the courthouse.351 As state actors,352
mediators have the power: 1) to gain access to petitions filed with the court;
2) to contact parties to discuss the details of the petition; 3) to determine
whether parties have the capacity of self-determination and demonstrate a
good faith intention to participate in mediation; and 4) to decide if mediation
is appropriate. Whether in courthouse mediation orientation sessions, or by
phone or mail, parties are urged to consider mediation rather than
litigation.353 The initial purpose in filing a petition so that a judge will hear
one's case, 354 is transformed 355 into a maze of informal quasi-legal
349 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
350 See Phillips, supra note 34, at 2 (describing, as an example of state regulation of
mediation, the training requirements for state-employed mediators in North Carolina).
351 See id. ("Litigants not meeting the criteria to be exempted are mandated to: 1)
attend a group mediation orientation. . . .").
352 Omer Shapira, Exploring the Concept of Power in Mediation: Mediators'
Sources of Power and Influence Tactics, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 549-50 (2009)
("Mediators in court-connected mediations strengthen their position power through their
linkage with the court and its aura of authority.").
353 See Hedeen, supra note 35.
354 See Hensler, supra note 25, at 196 ("With little experience of public adjudication
and little information available about the process or outcomes of dispute resolution,
citizens' abilities to use the justice system effectively to achieve social change will
diminish markedly.").
355 See HARRINGTON, supra note 16, at 35 ("State authority is not withdrawing from
dispute resolution in periods of informal reform, it is being transformed. ... Forms of
therapeutic intervention in conflict resolution often blurs the State's role in organizing
these forums for building consensus and in defining what conflicts they will hear.").
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processes 356 with which one is expected to comply, prior to a hearing in front
of a judge. Filing petitions for custody357 or visitation may result in referral
to orientation for mediation in addition to a parenting class (which in many
states is mandatory),358 and court appointment of a Guardian ad litem.359
The doctrine of parens patriae,360 giving the state power to decide what
is best for children, is invoked when petitions are filed for custody, or
visitation, or both.361 Use of the courts to socialize and stabilize families is
nothing new. 362 During the period of reform in the early twentieth century,
juvenile and family courts were seen as a mechanism for integrating
356 See id. at 15 ("The construction of informal ideology is linked to the
reconstruction of judicial power and authority ... Like legal formalism, the legitimacy of
delegalization reforms is still grounded in procedure, but, in contrast to formalism, these
procedures are characterized as 'informal alternatives."').
357 KENNETH KIPNIS, KINDRED MATTERS: RETHINKING THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE
FAMILY 3-4 (Diana Lietjens Myers et al. eds., 1993) ("The view that children are under
the sovereignty of their parents has largely given way to a different account, one we can
call custody. The term suggests an entrusting of the child to the care of its parents.
Custody acknowledges the truism that it take three to make a marriage: a man, a woman
and a state. ... parental authority is a stewardship, a special permission that the state
bestows and can revoke if its conditions are not met.").
358 Susan L. Pollet & Melissa Lombreglia, A Nationwide Survey of Mandatory
Parent Education, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 375, 375 (April 2008) ("At this point in the
evolution of family services and interventions ... there are parent education programs in
forty-six states throughout the United States. Some of these program mandate attendance
by state statute (twenty-seven states), and others have county-wide or district-based
mandates (five states), and some states have judicial rules and orders (six states)., Some
statutes mandate all parents to attend (fifteen states), while others leave it within the
discretion of the judge (fourteen states.)").
359 BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 540 (3d. ed. 1969) (defining guardian ad litem
as: "A person appointed by the court during the course of litigation, in which an infant or
a person mentally incompetent is a party, to represent and protect the interests of the
infant or incompetent.").
360 See id. at 911 (defining parens patriae as: "The doctrine that all orphans,
dependent children and incompetent persons, are within the special protection, and under
the control, of the state.").
361 Douglas R. Rendleman, Parens Patriae: From Chancery to the Juvenile Court,
23 S. C. L. REv. 253 (1971) ("[I]n the first half of the nineteenth century, the chancery
phrase parens patriae came to be used to justify the state in sundering children from
parents. . .a lineal descendent of poor law mechanisms for parting pauper children and
their parents and placing the children out as apprentices.").
362 See HARRINGTON, supra note 16, at 20 (The campaign to 'Americanize' the
immigrant, rehabilitate the delinquent, the deviant, and the discontent are examples of
programs for the socialization of law. . . .").
595
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
immigrants and the lower classes into American life.3 63 In the 1970's and
1980's, with the emergence of court sanctioned ADR processes, 364 the
emphasis in court and legislative policies to address parties' rights was
replaced by a focus on crisis management 365 and settlement.366 As a result of
policies promoting ADR, mediators, evaluators, 367 and parent educators368
have gained considerable influence 369 in reinforcing the state's power370 to
define family norms.371 With zeal reminiscent of the nineteenth century
363 See Schlossman, supra note 123, at 58 ("The juvenile court flunked parents just
as the public school flunked children; in both instances the lower-class immigrant was the
principal victim.").
364 See HARRINGTON, supra note 16, at 75 ("The ABA Conference on Popular
Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice (1976) launched a national campaign to
experiment with mediation and arbitration. Following the recommendations of this
conference (The Pound Conference), the U.S. Department of Justice created the Office
for Improvements to the Administration of Justice (OIA) ... One of OIA's main
responsibilities was to promote national attention and provide leadership for the
development of informal minor dispute processes.").
365 See HOFRICHTER, supra note 19, at xiii ("[Neighborhood Dispute Resolution]...
is an institution of social crisis management rather than justice.").
366 See HARRINGTON, supra note 16, at 74.
367 See Bradshaw & Hinds, supra note 127, at 318 ("[E]valuators are usually
counselors . .. expected to preserve neutrality in the custody dispute. However, the nature
of the information required for the report (e.g. a description of relationships among the
child and the family and other significant people) ... will be strongly influenced by
perceptions of 'appropriate' behaviors.").
368 See Pollet & Lombreglia, supra note 358, at 379 ("[M]andating parent education
for all parents going through separation or divorce is a 'major social policy step' for the
courts.").
3 6 9 MURRAY EDELMAN, POLITICAL LANGUAGE WORDS THAT SUCCEED AND POLICIES
THAT FAIL at 75 (1977) ("The helping professions are the most effective contemporary
agents of social conformity and isolation. In playing this political role they undergird the
entire political structure, yet they are largely spared from self-criticism, from political
criticism, and even from public observation.").
370 See George B. Curtis, The Checkered Career of Parens Patriae: The State as
Parent or Tyrant? 25 DEPAuL L. REv. 895, 901-02 (1976) ("The concept of parens
patriae ... evolved from theory to doctrine. The state could invade the home, replace the
parents, and take custody of the child.").
371 See Rubenfeld, supra note 172, at 776 ("Foucault -identifies a normalizing
function exercised throughout the political and social apparatus, working to mold our
identities into patterns designated as healthy, sane, law-abiding, or otherwise normal.").
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reformers who set standards of acceptable parenting,372 new standards now
define and measure collaborative and healthy parenting relationships. 373
Parent education programs are endorsed as positively influencing parenting
behavior.374 Mechanisms such as mediation375 and parent education thus
create a rhetoric 376 that places blame on individuals377 rather than addressing
the social and political conditions.at the root of the conflict, 378 such as
poverty. 379 Poverty usually results in a lack of decent housing, lack of
372 Rendleman, supra note 361, at 253 ("Poverty, the use of alcohol, and 'immoral'
behavior were all reference points which the controlling groups in the nineteenth century
selected to define others as abnormal and themselves as normal. The remedy was to
inculcate conventional mores by parting the malleable children from their unregenerate
parents and raising the children by dominant standards.").
373 Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal
Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARv. L. REv. 727, 732 (1988)
("[D]ivorce is now described as a process that, through mediation, restructures and
reformulates the spouses' relationship, conferring equal or shared parental rights on both
parents although one, in practice, usually assumes the primary responsibility").
374 See Pollet & Lombreglia, supra note 358, at 377 ("It is believed that
'interventions, such as parent education, can have a positive influence on the adjustment
of children if such programs can increase parental sensitivity to their children's needs,
reduce conflicts and promote more cooperative approaches to parenting."').
375 See MASON, supra note 120, at 236-37 ("Most of the feminist critics assert that
the adversarial court process, warts and all, provides more protection and support for
women than does mediation. Even granting the patriarchal nature of the legal process and
the almost unlimited discretion afforded individual judges, these critics maintain that the
presence of lawyers serves women's rights, and that the authority of rules and precedent,
neutrally conceived, provides a more empowering alternative for the powerless.").
376 See Fineman, supra note 373, at 730 ("The professional language of the social
workers and mediators has progressed to become the public, then the political, then the
dominant rhetoric. It now defines the terms of contemporary discussions about custody
and effectively excludes or minimizes contrary ideologies and concepts.").
377 See ABEL, supra note 17, at 7 ("It is just because individuation is the primary
function of informal institutions that they can accomplish their purpose ... Informal
institutions produce this result by treating all conflict as individually caused and
amenable to individual solution.").
378 See HOFRICHTER supra note 19, at xxvi ("This interpersonal view of disputes
ignores the ways in which individuals may benefit qua individuals but lose as members of
a larger social class whose interests cannot be fully satisfied through law or private case-
by-case resolution of personal grievances because the issues involve questions of political
power that extend beyond legality.").
379 See EDELMAN, supra note 369, at 71 ("[C]ommon is the view that the poor
require treatment and control whether or not they display any pathological symptoms.
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medical care, and work demands that do not allow parents much time to
spend with their children.380 Guardians ad litem, evaluators, and social
workers make recommendations to the court regarding custody and visitation
based on "the best interest of the child" standard.381 These professionals who
carry out the state's agenda, 382 base their recommendations on a parent's
willingness to comply with court standards. 383 Although charged with
representing the best interests of the child,384 Guardians ad litem may have
spent little time with families before making a determination regarding the
quality of the parent-child relationship. 385 Mediators and parent educators
also represent a court-sanctioned ideology386 in favor of joint custody.387
Though this belief is manifestly political and class based, the language social workers use
to justify surveillance and regulation of the poor is psychological in character.").
380 David F. Lebaree, Parens Patriae: The Private Roots of Public Policy Toward
Children, 26 HIST. EDUC. Q. 113 (Spring 1986) ("American ideology puts an
unreasonable burden on the family and then has the agents of the state grudgingly step in
when the family fails to deal with this burden, all the time grumbling about parental
responsibility.").
381 Margaret Martin Barry, The District of Columbia's Joint Custody Presumption:
Misplace Blame and Simplistic Solutions, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 767, 769 (1997) ("From
the beginning, courts have viewed their role with regard to child custody determinations
as one of parens patriae-a duty to protect vulnerable citizens. Consistent with that role,
the best interest of the child has been the driving standard, and, as such, statutory
presumptions have been stated in those terms.").
382 See Fineman, supra note 373, at 742 ("The 'best interest of the child' standard
without the legal presumption of maternal custody, as well as the emergence of concepts
like the 'psychological parent,' mandated the involvement of mental health professionals
in custody decisionmaking.") .
383 See Rubenfeld, supra note 172, at 784 ("The danger, then, is a particular kind of
creeping totalitarianism, and unarmed occupation of individuals lives. That is the danger
... a society standardized and normalized, in which lives are too substantially or too
rigidly directed. That is the threat posed by state power in our century.").
384 Joan B. Kelly, The Best Interest of the Child A Concept in Search ofMeaning, 35
FAM. & CONCILLATION CTS. REV. 377, 378 (1997) ("Discussions and declaration of
children's best interests are often vague, circular, and laden with psychological concepts
and cliches that themselves lack definition and consensus.").
385 See GRUBB & LAZERSON, supra note 126, at 44 ("Americans lack any sense of
'public love' for children, which would parallel parental love; therefore public
institutions are more concerned with children as instruments to achieve other social goals
efficiently-high growth rates, lower welfare costs, social peace-than with children's
well-being.").
386 Linda K. Girdner, Custody Mediation in the United States: Empowerment or
Social Control? 3 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 134, 139 (1989) ("When there is a hegemonic
ideology, shared by the legal system, other institutions, and citizens, there is little need
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Under the presumption of joint custody,388 parents are assessed based on
their ability to separate the couple relationship from the parenting
relationship, 389 and the intention of each parent to maintain a "friendly"
relationship with the other parent. 390 Mediators, as well as parent educators,
social workers, Guardians ad litem and evaluators are likely to impose
standards on families that may be undesirable, 391 unattainable, or both.392
Thus, in custody and visitation disputes, rights of parties to practice freedom
of thought about parenting as protected by the First Amendment are
endangered by court referrals to informal processes that are often only
nominally voluntary.
for explicit or coercive means of social control, since most individuals voluntarily
consent to attitudes and behaviors which are sanctioned by the ideology.").
387 See id. at 142 ("Even when mediation is not mandatory, many private mediators
believe that it is their responsibility to advocate in the best interests of the child and they
believe that joint custody represents that interest.").
388 See Barry, supra note 381, at 771-72 ("Over the past two decades, joint custody
has been the solution a la mode. Joint custody ostensibly strives for gender equity in its
allocation of parental rights and obligations. Unfortunately in its preoccupation with
parents this approach tends to invert the wisdom of Solomon by instructing the courts to
divide the child in the name of settling the parents conflicting claims.").
389 See Fineman, supra note 373, at 745 ("Divorce requires parents to 'decouple
from their former marital and nuclear roles and begin to recouple at a level of shared
parenting responsibilities."').
390 See id. at 751 ("When forced to choose between parents, helping professionals
preferred the parent who would most freely allow the child access to the other parent. The
notion of 'the most generous parent' became synonymous with the determination of who
was the better parent.").
391 See id. at 769 ("[A[n unrealistic and idealized version of shared parenting
independent of the relationship (or lack thereof) between parents is now imposed on
couples after divorce").
392 See GRUBB & LAZERSON, supra note 126, at 37 ("Ever since the early nineteenth
century, alarms about family life have usually expressed fears that lower-class children
have not been socialized in appropriate ways-to obey laws, to obey their superiors, and
to accept the ethic of self-improvement through individual effort-rather than concern
about the ravages of poverty on children.").
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D. Tort Law Protections of Privacy
The effort to define a private sphere that is not only free from intrusion
by the government, but from other people as well, 393 creates a conflict
between the right to know and the right to be let alone-between privacy and
free speech.394 For over thirty years following Warren and Brandeis' article,
state courts attempted to determine whether a right to privacy existed.395 In
privacy cases, litigation could be pursued in the same way one might sue for
slander or libel, although, in privacy cases the injury occurs even when the
information made public is true.396 Justice Warren and Justice Brandeis
concluded that intrusion into another's privacy is infringing on a property
right: "In each of these rights, as indeed in all other rights recognized by the
law, there inheres the quality of being owned or possessed."397
Despite the enormous amount of scholarship on how to define privacy,
there is still much debate about what it is.398 Privacy is often discussed as a
result of the loss of it, rather than the positive aspects of retaining it.399 In
1915, Roscoe Pound discussed the evolution in the law to distinguish
individual rights from group rights. 400 Pound points out the contradiction in
seeing the individual and the group as opposites, stating: "there is a social
interest in the individual moral and social life." 401 Pound identified seven
aspects of what he called "the interests of personality": 1) the right to
393 See ALDERMAN & KENNEDY, supra note 142, at 155 ("Warren and Brandeis
were arguing for a right against private individuals-friends, neighbors, employers and
especially members of the press.").
394 See Emerson, supra note 345, at 20 ("The clash between the right of privacy and
the right to know is obvious. One is almost the exact opposite of the other. Indeed, the
right of privacy has been defined by some as the right not to disclose information about
oneself to others, or the right to control the dissemination of information about oneself.").
395 William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 386 (1960).
396 See ALDERMAN & KENNEDY, supra note 142, at 165 ("It is the private facts tort
in the right to privacy that most directly challenges, and clashes with, the right to a free
press, because it is here that a person can sue the press for publishing the truth.").
397 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 130, at 205.
398 See Thompson, supra note 31.
399 See id at 440 ("In any attempt to define the scope of desirable legal protection of
privacy, we move beyond the neutral concept of 'loss of privacy' and seek to describe the
positive concept that identifies those aspects of privacy that are of value.").
400 See Pound, supra note 137, at 349 (". . . the law slowly worked out a conception
of private rights as distinguished from group rights.").
401 See id
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physical integrity; 2) the right to free motion and locomotion; 3) the right to
the use of natural media; 4) the right of property; 5) the right of free
exchange and free contact; 6) the right of free industry; 7) the right of free
belief and opinion. 402 These rights grant respect for each individual's
freedom to chart a course in the world, to make his or her own mistakes, and
to correct them.403
Since Pound, many legal scholars have weighed in on the issue of how to
define privacy. In a pivotal article in 1960, based on his analysis of over
three hundred cases, Dean Prosser isolated four aspects of tort privacy as: 1)
intrusion on someone's seclusion or solitude; 2) public disclosure of private
facts;404 3) false light; 4) appropriation of someone's name or likeness for
personal gain.405 Scholars have since referenced, and challenged, Prosser's
categories. 406
Perhaps in 1960 it would have been hard to imagine that less than twenty
years later, petitioners in most civil courts would be routinely offered,
guided, urged, or mandated into ADR processes in which they are essentially
intruded upon-being expected to voluntarily disclose personal information
to their adversaries. Despite rhetoric about the voluntary nature of mediation,
many courts and mediators place considerable pressure on parties to agree to
mediate. 407 Unlike more familiar tort privacy cases involving the media, 408 in
402 See id. at 351, 354.
403 See Benn, supra note 143, at 8-9 ("[A] general principle of privacy might be
grounded on the more general principle of respect for persons ... To conceive someone
as a person is to see him as actually or potentially a chooser, as one attempting to steer
his own course through the world, adjusting his behavior as his perception of the world
changes, and correcting course as he perceives his errors.").
404 See Bloustein, supra note 63, at 980 ("[T]he wrong here is not the disclosure
itself, but rather the disclosure is a violation of a relationship of confidence. Disclosure,
whether to one person or many, is equally wrongful as a breach of the condition under
which the information was initially disclosed.")
405 See Prosser, supra note 395, at 389.
406 See Bloustein, supra note 63, at 965-66 ("Thus, under Dean Prosser's analysis,
the much vaunted and discussed right to privacy is reduced to a mere shell of what it
pretended to be. Instead of a relatively new, basic and independent legal right protecting a
unique, fundamental and relatively neglected interest, we find a mere application in novel
circumstances of traditional legal rights designed to protect well-identified and
established social values.").
407 See Hedeen, supra note 35.
408 See ALDERMAN & KENNEDY, supra note 142, at 157 ("[W]hen privacy torts go
up against the First Amendment ... they are most often used against the media. Then it is
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mediation, parties are mutually 4 09 subject to intrusion by their adversaries
and the mediator. Even if fear of violence from the other party is not an issue,
imbalance of power in the parties' relationship-whether with a spouse,
landlord, boss, or corporation-puts parties in mediation in a position to have
their privacy invaded.410 Being asked to speak honestly and openly411 about
the dispute with the person/s with whom the dispute occurred could place
mediation participants in a precarious situation, trusting an adversary to
uphold the agreement to confidentiality. Indeed, confidentiality is offered in
mediation as a guarantee that although privacy is breached, the information
will not be used elsewhere. 4 12 The experience of privacy is normally
associated with an environment in which there is leisure and space to explore
aspects of ourselves without concerns about how society would view our
choices. 4 13 Privacy allows us to decide with whom we wish to share our
minds or bodies and who we wish to exclude.4 14 In mediation, we are asked
a clash between the right to be let alone and the right to know, a clash between privacy
and the press.").
409 While all parties are taking a risk in trusting that the other party will comply with
confidentiality, it may not place all parties at an equal risk. Given social differences,
some parties may reveal more, or have more vulnerability in being exposed. See, e.g.,
Grillo, supra note 278, at 1607 ("To the extent that women are more likely than men to
believe in communication as a mode of conflict resolution and to appreciate the
importance of an adversary's interests, this system does not always suit their needs.").
410 See Bloustein supra note 63, at 1003 ("[O]ur law of privacy attempts to preserve
individuality by placing sanctions upon outrageous or unreasonable violations of the
conditions of its sustenance. This, then, is the social value served by the law of privacy,
and it is served not only in the law of tort, but in numerous other areas of law as well.").
411 John R. Silbar, Masks and Fig Leaves, in PRIVACY 234 (J. Roland Pennock and
John W. Chapman, eds. 1971) ("Complete openness and honesty are wholly beneficial
only in relation with a wholly benevolent Other. Complete openness is possible only to
an omniscient Other. In the absence of an all-knowing and loving God, complete
openness is both impossible and dangerous.").
412 Douglas J. Sylvester and & Sharon Lohr, The Security of Our Secrets: A History
ofPrivacy and Confidentiality in Law and Statistical Practice, 83 DENv. U. L. REv. 184,
(2005-2006) ("Confidentiality is closely associated with information privacy as used by
the law and, specifically, with the concern for secondary uses.").
413 See Gavison, supra note 169, at 448 ("[Plrivacy builds on the way in which it
severs the individual's conduct from knowledge of that conduct by others. Privacy thus
prevents interference, pressures to conform, ridicule, punishment, unfavorable decisions,
and other forms of hostile reactions.").
4 14 See Gerety, supra note 61, at 268 ("Invasions of privacy take place whenever we
are deprived of control over such intimacies of our bodies and minds... from the access of
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to trust that sufficient mechanisms are in place to protect privacy, that
outweigh the risks of disclosing private information. 4 15
It might seem an exercise in futility to argue for protection of tort privacy
in mediation when we live in a social climate in which many people seek out
opportunities to disclose enormous amounts of personal information about
themselves. 4 16 Social networking sites, internet dating, group e-mail lists,
publicly held cell phone conversations, etc., might indicate that privacy is not
highly valued in the twenty-first century. The danger of identity theft,
computer hackers, and both corporate 4 17 and government access to enormous
amounts of private information especially since 9/11,418 would seem to
nullify any attempt to preserve privacy under any circumstances. Yet
mediation proponents have made privacy, through the mechanism of
confidentiality, a cornerstone in their appeal to parties to forego other legal
remedies in favor of mediation. This indicates that in the context of
the uninvited ...We should be able to share our intimacy with others only as we
choose.").
415 See Gavison, supra note 169, at 459 ("Invasions of privacy are hurtful because
they expose us; they may cause us to lose our self-respect, and thus our capacity to have
meaningful relations with others.").
416 Bobbie Johnson, Privacy no longer a social norm, says Facebook founder,
GuARDIAN.Co.UK. (January 11, 2010, 01.58 GMT),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2010/jan/11/facebook-privacy (last visited Feb.
17, 2012) quoting Mark Zuckerberg at the Crunchie awards in San Franciscoo...". . .
."People have really gotten comfortable not only sharing more information and different
kinds, but more openly and with more people.... . . That social norm is just something
that has evolved over time."
417 Shelly Palmer, Facebook Privacy: An Oxymoron, DIGITAL LIVING,
(December 13, 2009), http://www.shellypalmermedia.com/2009/12/13/facebook-privacy-
an-oxymoron/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2012) (discussing privacy dangers of Facebook: "The
real danger to your privacy is not from your friends or friends of friends, it's from
Facebook itself. These new settings are structured to make your data more available, not
less. ... Why? Facebook is now competing with Twitter to be the realtime data and brand
sentiment engine of choice. They need your status updates and behaviors to be available
to them or they can't repackage you and sell the data."
418 Eric Lichtblau and & James Risen, Bank Data Sifted in Secret by U.S. to Block
Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Washington, (June 23, 2006), at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/23/washington/23intel.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2012)
("Under a secret Bush administration program initiated weeks after the Sept. 11 attacks,
counterterrorism officials have gained access to financial records from a vast
international database and examined banking transactions involving thousands of
Americans and others in the United States, according to government and industry
officials.").
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mediation and law, privacy is still considered a principle that merits being
safeguarded. 4 19
III. WHAT IS CONFIDENTIALITY?
A. Defining Confidentiality
1. Wigmore's Exclusions
Tracing the confidentiality privilege4 20 to its roots in English law,
Wigmore lists four criteria to determine whether someone may be excused
from the duty to give testimony:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence
that they will not be disclosed;
(2) The element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties;
(3) The relation must be in one which in the opinion of the community
ought to be sedulouslyfostered;
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the
correct disposal of litigation. (emphasis in original)4 2 1
Wigmore finds spousal privilege, attorney-client privilege, privilege
among jurors, and a privilege between the government and informers
acceptable based on these four criteria. He questions the privilege when
applied to physician-patient and priest-penitent. 422  Applying a
confidentiality privilege to mediation is even more problematic since it is
419 See Bloustein, supra note 63, at 973-74 ("[O]ur Western culture defines
individuality as including the right to be free from certain types of intrusions. This
measure of personal isolation and personal control over the conditions of its abandonment
is of the very essence of personal freedom and dignity, is part of what our culture means
by these concepts. . .... He who may intrude upon another at will is the master of the other
and, in fact, intrusion is a primary weapon of the tyrant.").
420 See Gibson supra note 4, at 33 ("A privilege is a blanket protection from
testimony, usually based on the special relationship between parties ... The key premise
in this line of reasoning is that a confidential relationship is considered necessary for the
function of the office.").
421 See Wigmore, supra note 347, § 2285 at 3185.
422 See id. at 3186.
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often unclear who holds the privilege, thus raising, a question regarding
Wigmore's criterion (2)-whether confidentiality is essential to the
relationship. 423 Unlike other applications of testimonial privilege, in
mediation opposing parties must also agree to keep one another's
confidences. 424 Wigmore's criterion (3) raises questions regarding mediation
as an accepted institution in society-it has been argued that a mediator-
party relationship is not comparable to a lawyer-client or spousal
relationship. 425 In addition, statutes and court rules that grant broad
confidentiality protection 426 call into question the relationship of a mediation
confidentiality privilege to other statutes, rules, and policies that support
public access to the courts.427 The court is responsible for protecting innocent
third parties, enforcing criminal laws, and providing fairness in the
process. 428 Finally, it is argued that the broad statutory protections of
confidentiality in mediation constitute an incursion into the court's
responsibility to oversee and sanction litigants and attorneys.429
423 See Deason, The Quest for Uniformity, supra note 1, at 81 (An attorney, doctor,
or priest is consulted as a trusted figure who will act or provide advise in the party's best
interest. ... Within mediation, in contrast, the initial level of trust is far lower. ... The
mediator is not a trusted counselor, but merely a neutral.").
424 See Deason, supra note 150.
425 See Hyman, supra note 2, at 20 ("A lawyer-client privilege will only apply
within a lawyer-client relationship. A spousal privilege requires that the parties be united
in the bonds of matrimony. These institutions are both socially recognizable and have
elaborate sets of rules and standards that govern whether the privileged relationship
exists. The same cannot be said of 'mediation."').
426 See Thompson, supra note 54, at 330 ("The over inclusive language tends to
promise complete and total confidentiality without accommodating conflicting policies,
statutes, rules, and principles of justice that require limited exceptions to the general rule
of confidentiality in mediation sessions.").
427 See Miller, supra note 54, at 429 ("The right of public access to court
proceedings and records derives from our English common law heritage. It exists to
enhance popular trust in the fairness of the justice system, to promote public participation
in the workings ofr government, and to protect constitutional guarantees.").
428 See Thompson, supra note 54, at 334 ("In their efforts to protect confidentiality
in mediations, the legislature and courts have failed to take into account conflicting duties
and responsibilities created by other statutes and rules as well as legitimate concerns
about other important public policies, such as protecting innocent third parties, enforcing
criminal laws and providing simple fairness to the participants in the dispute resolution
process.").
429 See Weston, supra note 7, at 35 ("The strong statutory protection for mediation
confidentiality threatens a court's traditional power to monitor the litigation process and
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2. Confidentiality in the US Census
There are precedents for the promise of confidentiality in U.S. history.
One example is the Federal Census. The federal government has gathered
information for statistical purposes 430 every ten years, since 1790. Prior to
1850, the results of the census were posted in public places. 431 Due to the
increased reluctance of the populace to participate voluntarily, public posting
of the census results was discontinued.432 Concerns for privacy were
addressed by having census workers take an oath to keep all information
confidential.433 By 1890, when this remedy was not seen as sufficient,
Congress passed legislation to criminalize disclosures, attaching both civil
and criminal penalties to charges brought against any person who breached
the public trust by disclosing information gathered for government statistical
purposes. 434 Despite these measures, it is now acknowledged that the U.S.
Census Bureau produced a report two days after the attack on Pearl Harbor
on December 9, 1941, that listed details regarding Japanese-American
populations in selected cities.435 The Commerce Department had the
to sanction parties and attorneys when the offending conduct occurs in a court-connected
mediation context.").
430 See Sylvester & Lohr, supra note 412, at 152 ("The concept of confidentiality,
although linked in part to an evolving sense of human dignity and entitlement, was used
mainly to encourage citizen compliance with data collection requests. Indeed, the concept
of confidentiality in law appears to have been little more than a tool for fostering trust
between data subjects and federal statistical agencies-a trust that submitted data would
only be used for the purposes for which it was originally submitted.").
431 See id. at 155-56.
432 See id. at 157 ("The increase in questions and the rise of individual mistrust of
government uses of data led to the first frameworks for assuring confidentiality of census
data ... .").
433 See id. at 158-59 ("By the mid-nineteenth century, various directives were
issued ordering that census data be kept strictly confidential.").
434 See id.
435 James Bovard, The 2010 Census: Will Your Answers Stay Private?, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, (March 24, 2010),
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2010/0324/The-2010-Census-Will-
your-answers-stay-private (last visited Feb. 17, 2012) ("Until a decade ago, the bureau
denied any improper role in the internment. Two researchers in 2000 provided so many
smoking gun documents that the bureau finally admitted some culpability. But it proudly
declared that it had never provided the names and addresses of specific Japanese-
Americans to law enforcement or the military.").
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authority to fulfill interagency requests436 and released the information.
Based on the Second War Powers Act of 1942, the protection granted for
confidentiality in the census was temporarily repealed (lawmakers restored it
in 1947).437 In the 1970s, when the public became aware of abuses in law
enforcement surveillance practices, several new laws were put in place to
restore faith in the government's promise to protect private information. 438
Once again, however, disregarding promises of confidentiality, in 2003-2004
the State Department supplied information on the number of Arab-Americans
living in the U.S. by ZIP code, to the Department of Homeland Security.439
1. The Uniform Mediation Act (UM4)
In an effort to create consistency in regulation of mediation, particularly
in defining confidentiality, 440 the UMA (Uniform Mediation Act)44 1 was
drafted jointly by the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform
State Laws (NCCUSL) and the Dispute Resolution Section of the American
Bar Association (ABA). A few states have, with modifications, adopted it.442
In Section 4443 the UMA spells out the confidentiality privilege444:
436 J.R. Minkel, Confirmed: The U.S. Census Bureau Gave Up names of Japanese-
Americans in WW II, SCI. AM., March 30, 2007, http://www.scientific
american.com/article.cfm?id=confirmed-the-us-census-b. (last visited Feb. 17, 2012).
437 See id.
438 See Sylvester & Lohr, supra note 412, at 173 ("The privacy Act's, FERPA's,
FCRA's and other laws' prohibitions on secondary uses were intended to counteract ...
fears and restore confidence in the benign and beneficial nature of government
purpose.").
439 See Bovard, supra note 435.
440 Philip J. Harter, The Uniform Mediation Act: An Essential Framework for Self-
Determination, ILL. U. L. REV. 255 (Spring 2002) ("Until the very last meeting of the
drafting committee, the entire thrust of the proposed UMA was the evidentiary
privilege.").
441 UNI. MEDIATION ACT (Last Revised or Amended in 2003) Drafted by the
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS,
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/mediat/2003finaldraft.htm#TOC1 4.
442 Gary Provencher, The Uniform Mediation Act: An Analysis of Current State
Acts, THE MAYHEW-HITE REPORT, (2006-2007), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/jdr/mayhew-
hite/vol5issl/index.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2012).
443 See UNI. MEDIATION ACT, supra note 441.
444 See Hughes supra note 10, at 36 ("If protecting confidentiality represented the
predominant mission of the drafting committees, the creation of a mediation privilege and
the protections it will provide for mediators epitomizes the heart and soul of this effort.").
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SECTION 4. PRIVILEGE AGAINST DISCLOSURE: ADMISSIBILITY;
DISCOVERY.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in Section 6, a mediation communication
is privileged as provided in subsection(b) and is not subject to discovery or
admissible in evidence in a proceeding unless waived or precluded as
provided by Section 5.
(b) In a proceeding the following privileges apply:
(1) A mediation party may refuse to disclose, and may prevent any
other person from disclosing, a mediation communication.
(2) A mediator may refuse to disclose a mediation communication,
and may prevent any other person from disclosing a mediation
communication of the mediator.
(3) A nonparty participant may refuse to disclose, and may prevent
any other person from disclosing, a mediation communication of the
nonparty participant.
(c) Evidence or information that is otherwise admissible or subject to
discovery does not become inadmissible or protected from discovery solely
by reason of its disclosure or use in a mediation.
Critics point out that the UMA grants a privilege that goes beyond the
expectations of confidentiality in other professional relationships. 445 In
granting a privilege to the mediator,446 parties may be prevented from
introducing evidence, 447 even if they decide to waive their privilege.44 8 The
mediation privilege is therefore unlike lawyer-client or doctor-patient
privilege in which the clients or patients hold the privilege and it is the duty
445 See id. at 37 stating that: "[T]he idea of extending the privilege to the agent or
helper is unique among all the professional relationships."
446 Paul Dayton Johnson, Jr., Confidentiality in Mediation: What Can Florida Glean
from the Uniform'Mediation Act? 30 FL. ST. U. L. REv. 499 (2003) ("In other confidential
relationships, such as attorney-client privilege, on which the UMA provision is based,
'the privilege against testifying belongs to the part[ies] and can be waived.' Under the
UMA, mediators have a separate privilege and can refuse any request to testify.")
447 See Harter, supra note 440, at 254 ("[T]he mediator can refuse a discovery
request for or refuse to testify about a mediation communication, but the mediator cannot
block others from doing so.").
448 See Gibson, supra note 4, at 33 ("The lawyer-client privilege can be waived by
the client ... leaving his or her lawyer no standing to enforce confidentiality. In this sense
the lawyer-client privilege is possibly better thought of as a client privilege... typically
mediator-client privileges cannot be waived by the client alone ... ") (emphasis in
original).
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of the professional to protect it. The UMA would override rules of evidence
routinely used to distinguish between unreliable information and probative
evidence. 449 The UMA creates a privilege that exceeds protections of
settlement negotiations under rules of evidence, such as Federal Rule 408,450
"depriving our courts as well as the victims of wrongdoing from access to
essential evidence that could result in a manifest injustice." 451 The broad
privilege protecting mediators452 interferes with the authority of the court to
find the truth,453 and undermines self-determination of the parties.454 The
final version of the UMA leaves the responsibility to the parties 455 to create
restrictions, 456 often without awareness of the limitations to such
contracts.457
449 See Hughes, supra note 10, at 32-33.
450 Stephen A. Hochman, What's Wrong with the Unifonn Mediation Act, and How
to Fix It, Copyright 2003 Stephen A. Hochman, at 1.
451 See id. at 2.
452 See Harter, supra note 440, at 263 ("[T]here tended to be an absolutism, and a
view that only the mediator could make various decisions, that fails to recognize that
while mediation is an important means to self-determination and an important means to
making hard decisions, there are other, competing considerations that must at times be
balanced.").
453 See Hughes, supra note 10, at 77 ("Under the language in the UMA,
confidentiality, as a means, is no longer promoting the ends of self-determination. To the
extent that mediation confidentiality impairs the parties' self-determination, the
mediation privilege should yield to self-determination and to the court's ability to
determine the truth.").
454 See id. ("If the parties access to justice is hampered, or is so restricted by the
UMA as to be virtually non-existent, any relationship between the results achieved in
mediation and self-determination will be merely coincidental.").
455 See Harter, supra note 440, at 260 ("The incarnation of confidentiality in the
final version of the UMA raises concern. It no longer provides for a common law
evolution of confidentiality but instead authorizes the parties themselves to define its
parameters beyond the testimonial privilege."). ,
456 See Kuester, supra note 48, at 577 ("Currently, almost every mediation begins
with the mediator eliciting a promise from the parties that all proceedings will be held in
confidence. This 'promise' is often made in the form of a written release or consent
form.").
457 See Harter, supra note 440, at 260 ("[S]omewhere the UMA should indicate
there are limits on the ability to contract for complete confidentiality ... the [Model
Standards of Conduct for Mediators] recognize in the confidentiality provision that there
are limits to confidentiality based on public policy."). .
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In contrast to the broad privilege defined in Section 4, the UMA
acknowledges court authority to override confidentiality, providing only two
exceptions in Section 6(b)458:
(b) There is no privilege under Section 4 if a court, administrative agency,
or arbitrator finds, after a hearing in camera, that the party seeking
discovery or the proponent of the evidence has shown that the evidence is
not otherwise available, that there is a need for the evidence that
substantially outweighs the interest in protecting confidentiality, and that
the mediation communication is sought or offered in:
(1) a court proceeding involving a felony [or misdemeanor]; or
(2) except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), a proceeding to
prove a claim to rescind or reform or a defense to avoid liability on a
contract arising out of the mediation.
Thus, despite the effort to provide consistency, the UMA does not and
cannot guarantee protection of confidentiality in all circumstances. 459
Although mediators may continue to believe that everything said in
mediation is confidential, 460 there is, in fact, no way to predict when
something said in mediation may become necessary evidence in another case
in another jurisdiction. 461
4. Mediators' Responsibilities to Define Exceptions to
Confidentiality
In addition to court authority to override confidentiality, mediators
themselves are in the position of having to decide when circumstances
warrant disclosure of information. Laws requiring professionals to report do
458 UNI. MEDIATION ACT, supra note 441, at § 6(b).
459 See Hughes, supra note 10, at 54 ("[E]ven if the language receives uniform
enactment by the states, which is doubtful, it will not receive uniform enactment by the
courts.").
460 See Harter, supra note 440, at 251 ("Parties regularly expect that what they tell
the mediator in confidence will remain just between them, and mediators regularly
promise virtually complete confidentiality to the participants.").
461 See id. ('...[T]he parties can never know just where a challenge to
confidentiality might be brought or even whether it will be directly related to the subject
on the table.").
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not exempt privileged relationships.462 In making a decision to disclose
information, mediators must make an assessment based on ethical terms
which are not well defined, 463 such as those spelled out in the UMA Section
6 (a)(7):
SECTION 6. EXCEPTIONS TO PRIVILEGE
(a) There is no privilege under Section 4 for a mediation communication
that is:
(7) sought or offered to prove or disprove abuse, neglect, abandonment
orexploitation in a proceeding in which a child or adult protective services
agency is a party ... .
Ultimately, mediators must know what they are obligated to report, and
what is permissible to report. Mediators should define the terms by which
they must judge whether disclosure of information is required, and inform
parties of their standards. 464
A comparison can be made between confidentiality offered in mediation
and that offered to participants in government statistical surveys. In both
examples, individuals are asked to reveal private information that is protected
after the fact by assurances that it will not be used for secondary purposes.465
However, confidentiality in mediation is more complex in that these
assurances must be given not only by representatives of government (in this
case mediators), but also by the other parties. While confidentiality in
mediation has been granted through statutes and court rules in most states, 466
462 See Gibson supra note 4, at 52 ("Most reporting laws also state that no one shall
be relieved of the duty to report because of the privileged or confidential nature of the
communications.")
463 See id. at 55 ("Definitions of key ethical terms vary, and they are open to diverse
interpretation. Therefore mediators need to be made more aware of what constitutes
grounds for disclosure.")
464 See id. at 64 ("Codes of conduct do not provide neat algorithms for all cases in
circumstances ... . Even within a code, there will be latitude for personal decisions.
Obligatory disclosure is a function of the codes of ethics that are established in
mediation. Permissible disclosure is a function of the beliefs and values of the individual
mediator and it is incumbent on the mediator to inform his or her clients of the approach
and standards that will be used in the mediation process.") (emphasis in original).
465 See Sylvester & Lohr, supra note 412, at 184 (emphasis in original).
466 See Thompson, supra note 54, at 330 ("The uncertainty in the concept of
confidentiality is compounded by the vast array of overlapping common law decisions,
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as well as by the federal government, 467 assurances that protections are in
place regarding confidentiality may be subject to pressures similar to those
brought to bear on the Census Bureau during World War II.468 In addition to
the potentially chilling effect of the USA PATRIOT Act on confidentiality
(which will be addressed in Part IV), even confidentiality in lawyer-client
relationships, is not sacrosanct since 9/11.469
B. An Overview of Statutes and Rules on Confidentiality in Mediation
in the Fifty States and the District of Columbia
Six states specifically name mediation as private, 470 thereby making a
direct connection between confidentiality and privacy. Stipulations regarding
confidentiality are present in statutes and rules governing mediation
programs and practices, in forty-nine states471 and the District of Columbia.
statutes, court rules and professional standards that address these issues with broad over
inclusive language.").
467 See Hughes, supra note 10, at 17 ("As of 1994, the legislatures of the several
states and the federal government had enacted 2000 statutes, more than double the
number from five years prior ... estimates now raise the number of statutes with
provisions affecting mediation to 2500.").
468 See Madrinan, supra note 194, at 795 ("President Bush signed H.R. 3162, now
re-titled as 'The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001,' at a ceremony held in the White House
East Room. In his remarks that day, President Bush declared: 'This government will
enforce this law with all the urgency of a nation at war."').
469 See Rotenberg, supra note 91, at 1118-19 ("[T]he USA PATRIOT Act is not the
only means by which privacy provisions in the United States have been diminished since
September 11. The attorney-general has also indicated that attorney-client privilege, one
of the oldest privileges in common law, may be violated by police.").
4 7 0 ALA. CODE § 6-6-20; ALASKA RULES OF CIV. PROCEDURE P. PART XIII GENERAL
PROVISIONS RULE 100; DEL. COURT OF CHANCERY CH. RULE 174; MINN. GEN. R.
PRACTICE TITLE I RULE 114; N.HAMPSHIRE H. SUPERIOR SUP. COURT. RULE 170; OK.
CHOICE IN MEDIATION ACT § 12-1836;.
471 New York State has no general statute or court rule on mediation or
confidentiality. There are some localities that have established rules and there are some
specific areas where mediation is offered such as Education Law §4404-a Mediation
program for Students with Disabilities; or the Family Court Act § 1018 Conferencing and
Mediation. In addition, Judiciary Law §849-b. Establishment and administration of
centers; is applicable statewide.
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1. Mediation Statutes are Categorized Under: Civil Procedure,
the Judiciary, Evidence, or Independently
In fourteen states the statutes regulating mediation fall under headings
for civil practice or procedures, 472 thus locating mediation within the realm
of due process. 473 If mediation is listed with other civil procedures offered by
the courts, does this confirm mediation as a site of due process protection, or
does consent to mediation nullify substantive due process? 474 Does consent
also require parties to forfeit the right to procedural due process? 475 Do
courts consider it within their authority to oversee parties' rights to
472 CODE OF ALA. CODE TITLE 6 CIVIL PRACTICE CHAPTER 6 REMEDIES § 6-6-20
(1975); ALASKA RULES R. OF CIVIL CIV. PROCEDURE P. PART XIII GENERAL PROVISIONS
RULE 100; ARiz. REVISED REV. STATUTES STAT. TITLE 12 COURTS AND CIVIL
PROCEEDINGS ARTICLE 4 § 12-2238; ARK. CODE TITLE 16 PRACTICE, PROCEDURES &
COURTS § 16-7-206; CONN. GENERAL GEN. STATUTES STAT. CHAPTER 900 COURT
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 52-235; ILLINOIS ILL. CODE RIGHTS AND REMEDIES § 710
ILCS 35/ UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT; LA.OUISIANA CODE TITLE 9 CIVIL CODE
ANCILLARIES §4101-4112 LOUISIANA MEDIATION ACT; MONTANA CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 25 CIVIL PROCEDURE CHAPTER 21 RULE 7; NEBRASKA NEB. CODE CHAPTER 25
COURTS CIVIL PROCEDURE §§25-2901 To 25-2911 DISPUTE RESOLUTION ACT AND §§25-
2930 To 25-2943 UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT; NEW MEXICO CHAPTER 44 MISCELLANEOUS
CIVIL LAW MATTERS §§44-7B-1 To 44-7B-6 MEDIATION PROCEDURES ACT; OKLAHOMA
STATUTES TITLE 12 CIVIL PROCEDURE § § 1821-1825 DISTRICT COURT MEDIATION ACT
AND § § 1831-1836 CHOICE IN MEDIATION ACT; TEXAS. STATUTES STAT. CIVIL PRACTICE
AND REMEDIES TITLE 7 § 154; VIRGINIA CODE CIVIL REMEDIES AND PROCEDURES 20.2
§§8.01-576.4 TO 801-576.12 AND 21.2 §§8.01-581-21 To 8.01-581.26; WYOMING
STATUTES TITLE 1 CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 1-43-101 To 1-43-104.
473 CORNELL UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL, LIT LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE,
http://topics.law.comell.edu/wex/dueprocess (last visited Feb. 17, 2012), Introduction at
paragraph 1, defining due process ("These words have as their central promise an
assurance that all levels of American government must operate within the law... and
provide fair procedures.").
474 See Reuben, supra note 15, at 615 ("[I]t is striking that court-related ADR
processes have not yet been subjected to constitutional scrutiny for due process violations
or other trespasses. As such programs become even more pervasive, and as courts and
practitioners become more sensitive to the constitutional dimensions of the ADR
movement, this situation seems almost certain to change.").
475 Andrew T. Hyman, The Little Word 'Due', 38 AKRON. L. REV. 3 (2005) ("[T]he
word 'process' encompasses both substantive and procedural aspects as Congress
indicated when it passed the Process Act of 1789. Were it not for the technical way that
Congress used and understood the word 'process' in 1789, that word would have to be
construed today according to its ordinary procedural meaning, rather than as having
substantive content also.").
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procedural due process in mediation?476 Due process requires a hearing of
facts prior to judgment.477 Can mediation be considered a site of due478
process when parties are often told that mediation is not about facts or
judgments?479 It is beyond the scope of this article to debate these questions
or to propose a solution regarding the place of mediation in relation to other
due processes. 480 It is important, however, to raise such questions, and to call
on the mediation community to address them.481 If, as in the fourteen states
listed, mediation is included as a civil procedure, information about the laws
and standards by which due process is measured should be provided for
parties who are considering whether or not to participate in mediation.
In twenty-seven states and the District of Columbia, regulation of
mediation falls under the judiciary or court rules,482 clearly giving courts the
476 See Welsh, supra note 267, at 180 ("Given the current state of procedural due
process jurisprudence, courts may lack both the desire and the ability to demand
procedural justice in third party processes that are classified as 'consensual.'").
477 BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 359, at 380 ("[W]herein he
declared that by due process of law is meant 'the law which hears before it condemns;
which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial."') (quoting Daniel
Webster).
478 See Hyman, supra note 475, at 4 ("In the context of the Fifth Amendment, the
word 'due' simply means 'owed' according to the 'law of the land,' and the Fourteenth
Amendment was meant to adopt that same meaning.").
479 See Hensler, supra note 257, at 17 ("Indeed, mediators often begin the process
by distinguishing mediation from fact gathering and judgment, and continue to emphasize
this distinction as the process unfolds.").
480 See Hyman, supra note 475, at 28 n.66 ("... Justice Scalia has also said that 'It is
precisely the historical practices that define what is "due"'... However, Justice Scalia
nevertheless has conceded that a departure from tradition may be 'due' if it subjectively
appears to be fundamentally fair ("'Fundamental fairness" analysis may appropriately be
applied to departures from traditional American conceptions of due process...').
481 See Welsh, supra note 267, at 180 ("[D]isputants' decision control, which is
meaningful to mediation advocates and the courts but a rather hollow promise for
disputants, may have the unfortunate effect of hindering the institutionalization of
procedural justice in consensual, court-connected processes.").
482 COL. REv. STAT. § 13-22-307 (1991); DEL. CH. R. 174; D.C. CODE § 16-4201-
4213 (2006); D.C. CIR. CIv. R. § LCvR 84.9; FLA. STAT. §§ 44-102-108 (2005); FLA.
STAT. § 44.201 (2004); FLA. STAT. §§44.401-406 (2004); GA. CODE ANN. §1 5-23-1-12
(1997); IOWA CODE § 679C.1-5 (repealed 2005); KY. R. ANN. MEDIATION R. 12; ME.
REV. STAT. tit. 4, § 18-B (2009); ME. R. Civ. P. 16B; MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC.
§ 3-2A-06C (West 2005); MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 23C (1985); MICH. R. CIV. PRO.
2.410-411; MINN. GEN. R. PRACTICE 114.01-14; Miss. R. MEDIATION EXHIBIT A; Mo. S.
CT. R. 17.01-07; NEv. REv. STAT. § 48.109 (1993); N.H. SUP. CT. R. 170; N.J. CT. R.
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authority and responsibility to monitor and regulate mediation.483 in five
states the mediation statutes and rules are found in chapters on evidence, 484
in effect demonstrating that the purpose of a confidentiality privilege is to
determine what is protected if the mediation does not result in agreement and
the dispute is litigated. In one state the mediation statute is found in the
section on offices and administration, 485 and in the remaining four states,486
an independent statute or section is allocated to mediation or alternative
dispute resolution.
2. Differences Among Statutes and Rules on Confidentiality
A comparison of all aspects of the statutes and rules among the fifty
states and the District of Columbia would be valuable in assessing the range
of practices under the heading of mediation. The scope here is limited to
identifying differences in the regulations in reference to confidentiality only.
Inconsistencies remain among the state statutes and rules on confidentiality
regarding who is the holder of the privilege, 487 what circumstances justify
overriding confidentiality, 488 and what enforcement provisions may be in
1:40-1-12; N.Y. JuD. LAW. § 849-b (McKinney 1986); N.C. GEN STAT. § 7A-38.1 (2009);
N.D. R. CT. 8.8; OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. §§ 2710.01-10 (West 2004); 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 5949 (1996); R.I. GEN. LAW §9-19-44 (1992); S.C. R. ALTERNATIVE DiSP. RESOL. 6-8;
TENN. S. CT. R. 31, §§ 1-24; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-10-101-114 (West 2008); W. VA
R. TIUAL CT. 25.01-16.
483 See Meador, supra note 176, at 180 ("[I]nherent authority is part of a broader
topic of judicial management of litigation. That topic, involving the extent to which a trial
court should affirmatively assert authority-inherent or otherwise-over its proceedings,
has sparked much debate over the past two decades.").
484 CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 1115-1128 (West 1997); HAW REV. STAT. § 626-1 (1989);
IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 9-801-814 (2008); S. D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 19-13A-1-15 (2008); S.
D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-13A-32 (2008); Wis. STAT. § 904.085 (2000).
485 IND. CODE §§ 4-21.5-3.5-1-27 (1996).
486 KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 5-501-518 (1996); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 36.200-238 (2003);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 5711-5723 (2005); WASH. REV. CODE. §§ 7.07.010-904 (2006).
487 See Deason, The Quest for Uniformity, supra note 1, at 90-91 ("The designation
of holders is important because it defines the purposes that the privilege serves: a
privilege held by the parties allows them to protect their expectation of confidentiality;
one held by the mediator furthers mediator neutrality.").
488 See id. at 104, 105 ("Most of the statutory exceptions to mediation
confidentiality are based on policy judgments that in specific circumstances the need for
disclosure exceeds the benefit of maintaining mediation confidentiality.").
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place if confidentiality is breached.489 In sixteen states, there is no mention of
a right to waive confidentiality. 490 When parties are not given the option to
waive confidentiality, then it might be said that the state is exercising the
"privilege." Removing the right to waive from the parties is certainly in
conflict with self-determination. 491 In some states where the right to waive is
not an option, the law or rule may still stipulate that a mediator must comply
with any statute or rule imposing a duty to provide evidence. 492 Twenty-four
states spell out the exceptions to confidentiality such as: intent to harm
oneself or another, abuse and neglect of children or incapacitated adults, or
intent to commit a crime. 493 When a statute or rule specifies that mediation is
protected as a settlement negotiation under Rules of Evidence as is the case
in twelve states,494 the door is open for disclosure of the terms of the
settlement or testimony regarding actions or statements that indicate bias,
fraud, or duress.495 Thus, even in those states where parties may not have a
right to waive confidentiality, they should still be informed that the
489 See Green, supra note 3, at 6 (arguing that defining confidentiality includes
specifying mechanisms for enforcing it).
490 Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, Tennessee, Wisconsin.
491 Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-Connected
Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization? 6 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 92-93
(Spring 2001) ("Self-determination has been identified as the fundamental core
characteristic of the mediation process. Nevertheless ... the existence and meaning of
self-determination cannot be taken for granted.").
492 Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Montana,
New Hampshire, North Carolina, Tennessee, Wisconsin.
493 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-2238 (1993); CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1124(c) (West 1997);
COL. REV. STAT. §13-22-307(b) (1991); D.C. CODE §16-4205(3) (2006); FLA. STAT. §
44.405(4)(a)(2) (2005); GA. R. ALTERNATIVE DisP. RESOL. VII(A)-(B); ); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 9-806(c)(d)(g) (2008); 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/3 (2004); IOWA CODE § 679C.3-4
(repealed 2005); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 5-512 (1996); ME. R. Civ. P. 16B(ii)-(iii); MD. R.
ALTERNATIVE Disp. RESOL. 17-109; NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2934(c) (2003); N.J. CT. R.
1:40-4(d); OHIo REV. CODE. ANN. § 2710.04 (West 2004).
494 Alaska, California, Indiana, Kentucky, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Hampshire, North Carolina, Tennessee, West Virginia.
495 See Note, supra note 327, at 449 ("The rule [408] does not, for example exclude
evidence offered to prove or challenge the actual agreement produced by the negotiations
... Moreover, the rule does not protect participants in negotiation who abuse the
negotiation process by committing fraud or by violating a duty owed to another
participant, such as a duty to bargain in good faith.").
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mediator's responsibilities might include the duty to testify as required by
rules of evidence. 496
The court is charged with balancing497 the protection of confidentiality in
mediation 498 against a greater public good that may be at stake. 499 Some of
the statutes and rules make clear the court's authority to override
confidentiality. In thirteen states and the District of Columbia, there is
specific reference to the power of the court to decide whether the search for
truth outweighs the potential damage to the functioning of mediation.500 In
nine states the language simply acknowledges that other laws or rules may
take precedence over confidentiality.50 Thus, while many mediators
continue to make blanket statements assuring the protection of confidentiality
in mediation, such statements are tenuous even in states where there is no
right to waive it. In states where exceptions to confidentiality include vague
statements such as "as by any law or rule," 502 it is nearly impossible for
mediators to adequately inform parties of the legal parameters surrounding
confidentiality.
3. Statutes and Rules are the Reference Points for Mediation
One conclusion can be drawn from the overview of state regulations of
mediation: confidentiality in mediation references the law. Despite
contradictions between confidentiality statutes and rules of evidence, 503 there
496 See Ehrhardt, supra note 59, at 119 ("[A] mediation privilege would prohibit the
use of statements made during mediation and offered during trial to attack credibility,
while Rule 408 may not.").
497 See Perino, supra note 4, at 11 n.60 (describing the "utilitarian balancing test
often applied to privileges" based on Wigmore's four criteria.).
498 See Green, supra note 3, at 5 ("Recognition of a privilege in this situation is
based on an institutional concern for mediation as an important and distinct resolution
process, rather than a concern for the mediators' own professional interests.").
499 See Perino, supra note 4, at 11 ("In Dean Wigmore's words, the public interest
protected must be substantial, 'because its admission would injure some other cause more
than it would help the cause of truth, and because the evidence of that injury is
considered of more consequence than the possible harm to the cause of truth."').
500 Arkansas, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Idaho, Illinois, Mississippi,
Nebraska, New Mexico, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin.
501 Alabama, Alaska, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, North Dakota,
Virginia.
502 VA. CODE § 8.01-581-22 (2002).
503 See Rosenberg, supra note 1, at 163 ("When dealing with the laws of privilege,
the rules of evidence and conflicts of law run a collision course. While rules of evidence
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can be no doubt that mediation falls within laws and rules created either by
legislation or by the authority of the judiciary, not as an alternative to the
law, but as an option within it. While state laws and court rules may seem
remote in some circumstances, in fact, they form parameters around all
mediations. 504 Although mediation is labeled an "alternative" to litigation, it
should not be misunderstood as an alternative to the law.50 5 The use of the
term "alternative dispute resolution" by the courts has been confusing for
mediators and parties. While the law is not the only reference point for
decision-making normS506 it is misleading to claim, at least in court-referred
mediation, that it is an opportunity for parties to make their own decisions
without interference from the court.507
Explaining confidentiality to parties in mediation is analogous to the
requirement that law enforcement officers inform suspects of their Miranda
rights.508 A primary aspect of the orientation for mediation is informing
generally try to elicit the facts, the rules of privilege serve to cloak them in order to
preserve other presumably greater interests.").
504 See Nolan-Haley, supra note 8, at 839 ("At a minimum, rules governing
disclosure of legal information in mediation should be broad enough to permit mediators
to identify legal issues that may arise.").
505 See Engler, supra note 113, at 2025 ("The voluntariness of an unrepresented
litigant's choices to settle or proceed to trial, to agree to particular terms of settlement, or
to choose mediation in the first place, must be measured by the extent to which the
litigant understands the risks of the alternatives, which in turn depends on the litigant's
understanding of the applicable law and facts.").
506 See Welsh, supra note 491, at 17 ("Mediation advocates also rejected the notion
that the law should serve as the exclusive source of substantive norms controlling
discussion and decision making in the dispute resolution process.").
507 See Nolan-Haley supra note 32, at 63 ("Whatever their original purpose in
seeking the court's intervention in their disputes, after referral to mediation, their dispute
resolution activity takes place without the official power of law, but nonetheless under its
aegis.").
508 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), THE OYEZ PROJECT at 1IT CHICAGO-
KENT COLLEGE OF LAW, (last visited 14 February Feb. 14, 2012)
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1965/1965_759 ("The Court held that prosecutors
could not use statements stemming from custodial interrogation of defendants unless they
demonstrated the use of procedural safeguards 'effective to secure the privilege against
self- incrimination.' The Court noted that 'the modem practice of in-custody
interrogation is psychologically rather than physically oriented' and that 'the blood of the
accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition.' The Court
specifically outlined the necessary aspects of police warnings to suspects, including
warnings of the right to remain silent and the right to have counsel present during
interrogations.").
618
[Vol. 27:3 2012]
CONFIDENTIALITY IN MEDIATION
parties about what is and is not confidential. Once the parties have gathered
to mediate, most mediators will again carefully explain what is and is not
confidential, 509 and will have parties sign a confidentiality agreement. Signed
confidentiality agreements formalize the parties' decisions regarding the
court and other people, as a contract.510 Parties must agree on the decision to
maintain or waive confidentiality in relation to the court (in states where
there is an option to waive). In addition, parties must stipulate the terms of
any public disclosure, 511 and can name those with whom they may wish to
consult regarding issues discussed in mediation. 512
Confidentiality in mediation requires adversaries to contract 513 to protect
one another's right to privacy. 514 Privacy gives each party the right to
determine what information is relevant and must be disclosed, through the
mechanism of self-determination. Agreeing to confidentiality intersects with
the requirements that parties act in good faith515 and have the capacity516 and
509 See Kirtley, supra note 1, at 9 ("Mediators regularly require all present to
promise to keep mediation discussions confidential, and routinely assure participants that
the proceedings are confidential (whether or not legal protection is certain).").
510 See id. at 10, 11 ("While such agreements may create expectations of
confidentiality their enforceability is problematic. Because the law views courts as
entitled to 'every [person]'s evidence, public policy forbids contracting to exclude
evidence. Agreements between individuals are not permitted to restrict the court's access
to testimony in its pursuit of justice.").
511 See Perino, supra note 4, at 5 n.26 ("Privacy from public disclosure means that
'[m]ediators are bound not to discuss with other people what is revealed to them in the
mediation unless such revelations are agreed to by the participants or compelled by a
court order or statute."' (citing Fohlberg and Taylor)).
512 See Jackson, supra note 104, at 13 ("In a family case, the parents may wish to
limit with whom a party may discuss sensitive matters raised in a mediation (e.g.,
prohibiting discussion with the children or other relatives).").
513 See Brazil, supra note 5, at 1026 ("Another tool that counsel might consider
using to increase protection for their settlement communications is a contract with the
opposition designed explicitly for the purpose of guaranteeing confidentiality. In such a
contract, the parties might commit themselves not to attempt to introduce at trial on the
merits, for any purpose, any statements made during settlement negotiations. Such a
contract clearly would reach farther than rule 408 and erect a stone wall instead of a split
rail fence between settlement negotiations and trial.").
514 See Kovach, supra note 67, at 601 ("[E]ven with possible exceptions, the
importance of the private nature of mediation cannot be overlooked; it is certainly a
primary attribute.").
515 See Note, supra note 327, at 453 ("Obligations to bargain in good faith or to
reduce an agreement to writing do not evaporate when parties enter mediation...").
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authority to participate in mediation. Without capacity, parties cannot make
the decisions about what information they must disclose. Without good faith,
parties fail to demonstrate the intention to disclose all relevant information 17
and to maintain confidentiality.
It is within the framework of established legal principles that the debate
regarding the pros and cons of confidentiality in mediation, and about who
holds the privilege,518 continues. Those against the broad scope of
confidentiality 519 conclude that there is insufficient evidence to warrant such
blanket immunities. 520 Critics claim that loss of mediator testimony goes
against public policy and prevents government transparency.521 Those in
favor of broad immunity claim that granting a mediator privilege protects
neutrality.522 Precluding mediator testimony is seen as essential to creating
516 Assessing capacity is also complicated. Courts deal with the complexities of
determining in what areas an adult is incapacitated. See Erica Wood, Addressing
Capacity: What is the Role of the Mediator? MEDIATE.COM, July 2003,
http://www.mediate.com/articles/woodE1.cfm (last visited Feb. 17, 2012)_("Indeed,
capacity is not a global concept. A court may determine an individual's capacity to make
decisions about self care and property, and may appoint a guardian or conservator,. But
there is also capacity to make a will, capacity to drive or marry, capacity to stand trial,
capacity to consent to medical treatment-and capacity to mediate.").
517 See Kovach, supra note 67, at 587 ("Elements of good faith consist of attendance
and participation in mediation session, providing full information regarding finances,
designation of an individual with full settlement authority ... .") (citing the Minnesota
farmer-lender mediation statute defining the obligation of good faith which includes
disclosure of financial information.).
518 See Kirtley, supra note 1, at 30 ("The mediation process presents a unique
context for the operation of an evidentiary privilege. Rather than the usual bilateral
relationship in traditional privileges, mediation always involves at least three persons: the
mediator and two parties."). -
519 See Perino, supra note 4, at 27 ("A broadly-worded rule does not tell the judge
either who may invoke the privilege or who controls it ... .").
520 See Gibson, supra note 4, at 40-41 ("There is little evidence to suggest that
mediation would be ineffective if it were not confidential... Some mediation programs
report high settlement rates despite the fact that they do not assure confidentiality.").
521 Will Pryor & Robert M. O'Boyle, Public Policy ADR: Confidentiality in
Conflict? 46 SMU L. REv. 2208 (1992-1993) ("Some have argued that the ADR
movement is on a collision course with the trend supporting open government. Critics
reason that ADR defeats the interests of open government.").
522 See Rosenberg, supra note 1, at 160 ("It is argued that granting the privilege to
the mediator ensures the preservation of the mediator's neutrality. There is fear that
unless the mediator is seen as being unbiased, parties will refuse to participate and
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trust in the mediator. 523 Mediator neutrality is considered an interest of the
parties as well as the mediator.524 These claims fail to address a critique of
neutrality as an illusory notion based on an assumption of the existence of
objectivity. 525 Neutrality 526 implies that there is a reality independent of the
biases of the one perceiving it.527 The promise of neutrality, often
erroneously used interchangeably with impartiality,528 is meant to assure
parties that the mediator has no personal stake in the outcome, which if
carried to its logical conclusion, would mean the mediator should have no
bias toward settlement. 529
disclose information in a mediation proceeding. If a mediator cannot project this image,
her effectiveness will be compromised.").
523 See Deason, Predictable Mediation Confidentiality, supra note 1, at 245 ("[A]
privilege enhances candid communication by building on an existing foundation of trust
that is inherent in a consultation with an advisor.").
524 See Note, supra note 327, at 456 ("The purpose of mediator neutrality indicates
that it is as much an interest of the parties as is confidentiality itself. Unless a mediator is
regarded as a neutral, the parties will refuse to participate in mediation...").
525 Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward
Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNs JOURN. WOMEN IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY 644-45
(1983) ("Objectivity is liberal legalism's conception of itself. It legitimizes itself by
reflecting its view of existing society, a society it made and makes so by seeing it and
calling that view, and that relation, practical rationality.").
526 Sara Cobb and Janet Rifkin, Practice and Paradox: Deconstructing Neutrality in
Mediation, 16 LAw & SOCIAL INQUIRY 37 (Winter 1991) ("The relative absence of any
research on the practice of neutrality suggests that neutrality functions like a folk concept,
talked, practiced, and researched on the basis of tacit and local understanding, contained
in (and by) a rhetoric about power and conflict.").
527 See id. at 38 ("[O]bjectivity,' (a reality independent of any observer) makes
possible 'neutrality' (the objective position from which one can participate in social
relations free of affiliation to any position).").
528 Donald T. Weckstein, In Praise of Party Empowerment-and of Mediator
Activism, 33 WILLIAMETTE L. REv. 533 n.156 (Summer 1997) ("'Impartiality' is
distinguished from 'neutrality.' The former term ...refers to performing the mediator
function, in word or deed, free from favoritism or bias...'Neutrality' refers to the
mediator's relationship, if any, with the disputants or the dispute.. .Neutrality
incorporates concerns with any conflict of interest of the mediator.").
529 See id. at 510 ("[I]nherent in the nature of the mediator's calling is a 'bias' in
favor of settlement.").
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IV. LIMITATIONS OF CONFIDENTIALITY IN MEDIATION
A. Legal Parameters Limiting Confidentiality Privilege
While mediation scholars engage in the ongoing debate about
confidentiality and the purposes it is meant to accomplish, the legal
structures that set limits on the protection of confidentiality are not often
acknowledged among practitioners or with participants. Rules of evidence
and the USA PATRIOT Act are two examples of laws and rules to which
many confidentiality statutes refer, either directly or indirectly, with which
mediators are bound to comply.
1. Rules ofEvidence
As we have shown, the offer of confidentiality in mediation does not
emerge spontaneously from thin air.530 Mediation functions within the legal
framework, all the while appearing to operate outside it.531 The framework of
the law provides rules of evidence that have been established over centuries
for the purpose of ensuring equal treatment of litigants.532 Federal and state
rules of evidence allow the court to override parties' decisions to maintain
confidentiality. 533 The privilege excusing mediators from testifying,534 is
530 See Gibson, supra note 4, at 34 ("Mediator confidentiality is controlled by
statute and by case law. Statutes exist in most states that have court-ordered mediation
and are usually a derivative from other statutes pertaining to the non-admissibility of
evidence from settlement conferences."),
531 See Pavlich, supra note 20, at 711, 712 ("...community justice is described as an
experiment that promises to alleviate aspects of the state's fiscal and legitimacy crises
within the dispute resolution arena: It proposes cost-effective techniques aimed at local
conflicts that do. not directly involve state agencies.. .but [it is seen by critics as] an
indirect form of state rule that is masked through the false ideological images erected by
advocates.").
532 See Delgado et al., supra note 340, at 1373 ("Rules of evidence also serve to
reduce prejudice.)
533 See Deason, Predictable Mediation Confidentiality, supra note 1, at 240
("[B]ecause mediation confidentiality is not (and should not be) absolute, the strength of
this expectation depends on the ability to predict, at least roughly, the limits on disclosure
in a future dispute. In the current legal environment, such prediction is not realistic
because so many uncontrollable factors determine which of many widely varying legal
frameworks a court will use to determine disclosure.").
534 See Ehrhardt, supra note 59, at 117 ("Most states have adopted some sort of a
mediation privilege. Some jurisdictions broadly apply the privilege to all mediations.. .If
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weighed against the court's duty to elicit the truth.535 The court determines
the foundation for the protection, in each case.5 36 An evidentiary exclusion
operates differently from a privilege. 537 Rule 501 allows federal courts to
decide on a case-by-case basis whether to invoke a privilege-and the courts
have used the protection sparingly.538 Courts use the "relevancy rule" to
make a determination on exclusion of evidence. The "relevancy rule"
excludes offers of compromise, but not admissions of fact. 539
Mediation falls under the protective umbrella applied to offers to
compromise or settle under Federal Rule 408, or similar state rules.540
Evidence can be disclosed from a settlement negotiation when it relates to
bias or prejudice of a witness, or exposes tactics to delay or obstruct criminal
investigations. 541 Rule 408 does not exclude evidence needed to prove or
disprove terms of an agreement reached during negotiation.542 Rule 408 does
not prevent information from being disclosed publicly-it only protects
the state does not protect confidentiality with a privilege, it is protected by Rule 408 or a
similar common law rule protecting settlement negotiations.").
535 Michael L. Prigoff, Toward Candor or Chaos: The Case of Confidentiality in
Mediation, 12 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 7 (1988), (quoting Wigmore: "no pledge of privacy
... can avail against demand for the truth in a court of justice.").
536 See Ehrhardt, supra note 59, at 111 ("The Court has not articulated a precise test
to apply to the recognition of a privilege. Rather it has interpreted Rule 501 as providing
federal courts with flexibility to develop rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis.").
537 See Rosenberg, supra note 1, at 165 ("The evidentiary exclusions for
negotiations differ from privileges, which usually provide protection against disclosure
rather than merely protection against admission into evidence at a court hearing. As a
result, most mediation privileges apply in all fora as opposed to those judicial hearings
that are governed by the rules of evidence.").
538 See Ehrhardt, supra note 59, at 111.
539 See Note, supra note 327, at 447 ("The relevancy rule has led to a distinction
between 'mere' offers to compromise, which are excluded, and independent admissions
of fact which are not.").
540 See Ehrhardt, supra note 59, at 103-04 ("No specific statute or court-rule is
necessary for Rule 408 to be applicable in mediation proceedings, regardless of whether
the mediation is voluntary or court-ordered. Mediations involve statements made during
attempts to settle or compromise a claim.").
541 See id. at 105 ("The final sentence of Rule 408 provides that the rule does not
require the exclusion of evidence relating to settlement offers when it is offered for
another purpose, 'such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention
of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or
prosecution."').
542 See Note, supra note 327, at 449.
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disclosure in a subsequent litigation. 543 Thus, a privilege grants greater
protection than Rule 408544 in that it may prevent parties in another
proceeding from discovering information disclosed in mediation. 545 Granting
a mediator privilege can prevent testimony regarding credibility of a
witness.546 Under rules of evidence, case-by-case decision-making by judges
regarding evidentiary exclusions and privileges creates a lack of
predictability for parties and difficulties for mediators in attempting to
explain what is and is not, confidential. 547
Transparency of governmental bodies is accomplished under the
Freedom of Information Act and similar state laws. 548 The judiciary,
however, is not subject to the same rules of open disclosure.549 By housing
mediation within the court's jurisdiction, records of the negotiation process
fall outside the jurisdiction of open records acts. 550 Thus, mediation functions
in most situations without transparency, 551 while parties are often put under
543 See Prigoff, supra note 535, at 4 ("[Rule 408] provides no protection against
public disclosure of information revealed in mediation ... the Rule only affects parties to
subsequent litigation.").
544 See Brazil, supra note 5, at 959 ("The language of rule 408 unfortunately leaves
a great deal of uncertainty about the scope of the rule. Trial judges must make judgments
on a relatively unguided basis in many gray areas.").
545 See id. at 1023 ("As an alternative to simple two-party settlement negotiations,
counsel could proceed with private mediations that are covered by recently enacted state
confidentiality statutes with much greater confidence in the scope of the protection they
afford.").
546 See Ehrhardt, supra note 59, at 120 ('[A] privilege shields the mediation process
from discovery and does not permit privileged matter to be used to impeach the
credibility of a witness.").
547 See Perino, supra note 4, at 33 ("[L]eaving resolution of confidentiality to case-
by-case analysis, however, may give rise to the same problems of inconsistent
interpretation. that arise when no privilege is created. Inconsistency could limit the
experiences of the privilege by making it harder for mediation participants to predict
whether their statements will remain confidential.").
548 The Freedom of Information Act 5 U.S.C. § 552, As Amended By Public Law
No. 104-231, 110 Stat. 3048.
549 See Pryor & O'Boyle, supra note 521, at 2215.
550 See id, referring to Texas: "Thus if mediation is ordered, clearly indicating that
the mediator serves under the authority and direction of a court, a strong argument can be
made that all records received and stored by the mediator during the negotiation process
fall outside the scope of the Open Records Act."
551 Michael Moffitt, Casting Light on the Black Box ofMediation: Should Mediators
Make Their Conduct More Transparent? 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 1 (1997)
("Many mediators and scholars treat mediation within any model as if it were a black box
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pressure from the courts to both mediate and settle.552 Parties frequently lack
an understanding of the rights they may be waiving by entering mediation.553
Although mediation promises fairness on the one hand, it is generally unable
to balance power on the other.554 Ethical standards require the mediator to
uphold neutrality and fairness, yet the relationship of procedural justice to
fairness is not defined555 and it is unclear whether the court has the authority
to monitor fairness. 556 The lack of transparency, furthered in part through
confidentiality in mediation, raises serious questions regarding both the
rights of the public and rights of unrepresented parties.557 These questions
are complicated exponentially by the existence of the USA PATRIOT Act.
or a kind of magic show in which the mediator 'does her thing' for or to the participants
without explaining what 'her thing' is or how or why it is expected to work. Indeed, some
mediators treat their role like that of a magician's, avoiding explanations as if they were
secrets that would ruin the effect of their efforts.").
552 See Engler, supra note 113, at 2020 ("Far from playing a minimal role in
settlement ... judges routinely encourage and pressure litigants to settle. Court rules
encourage judges to clear their dockets.").
553 See id. at 2010 ("The mediator may encourage the unrepresented party to seek
counsel or may terminate the mediation if he determines that one party is not competent
to participate. Otherwise, he must attempt to mediate. Since efforts to inform an
unrepresented litigant that the agreement entails the waiver of certain rights apparently
amount to impermissible legal advice, the mediator must simply watch silently while the
unrepresented litigant's rights are waived.").
554 See id. at 2032 ("Far from providing an impartial forum yielding fair results, the
process routinely favors the more powerful party, particularly where one party is
represented by counsel. The result is a process that is both unfair and partial.").
555 See Welsh, supra note 267, at 191 ("The research strongly suggests that
procedural justice considerations should underlie all of the third party processes that are
institutionalized within the courts, regardless of whether those processes are consensual
or non-consensual.").
556 See Weston, supra note 7, at 53-54 ("Judicial authority to sanction parties for
conduct or participation violations in a pretrial settlement conference or court-connected
arbitration is rarely challenged on confidentiality grounds. By contrast, courts are divided
as to whether mediation statutory confidentiality privileges prevent judicial consideration
of similar claims in a mediation setting.").
557 See Engler, supra note 113, at 2032 ("Under the guise of impartiality, the court
system funnels a large number of unrepresented litigants through mediation, a forum that
produces systematically unfavorable results to unrepresented litigants when measured in
terms of outcome.").
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2. USA PATRIOTAct
Clearly, confidentiality is much more complex than the current
expectations of privacy in mediation would indicate. Mediator assurances to
parties that everything said to them during screening, orientation, and in the
mediation itself is confidential, are misrepresentations. Mediators may be
reluctant to overload parties with information that they believe is
unnecessary in the hopes that the dispute never goes to litigation. Or,
mediators may not be well informed about rules of evidence that can be used
to overturn the parties' decisions to maintain confidentiality. Mediation
trainers may consider it confusing to include material on constitutional
privacy rights or rules of evidence, when training is focused on keeping
parties out of litigation. However, without giving parties information on the
limitations to confidentiality, mediation programs-even those connected
with the courts-function as an alternative558 not just to litigation,559 but to
the exercise of legal rights. 560 In addition to the everyday legal complications
surrounding confidentiality, promises of confidentiality in mediation are even
more tenuous since the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act in October, 2001,
6 1/2 weeks after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
Shortly after President Bush's address to the nation on September 1 1th,
FBI agents arrived at the headquarters of EarthLink in Atlanta with
subpoenas for electronic messages used by the terrorists, requesting that
EarthLink install its software, called Carnivore. EarthLink declined,
preferring to use its own programs to provide the information. 561 Perhaps to
lay the ground work for the upcoming battle between the aggressive
surveillance approach favored by President Bush and Attorney General
558 See Reuben, supra note 15, at 582-83 ("As ADR steadily seeps into the
landscape of disputes, one can readily envision it silently but surely displacing public
litigation as the primary means of resolving galvanized civil disputes.")
559 See Fiss, supra note 29, at 1089 ("Civil litigation is an institutional arrangement
for using state power to bring a recalcitrant reality closer to our chosen ideals. We turn to
the courts because we need to, not because of some quirk in our personalities.").
560 See Weston, supra note 4, at 618 ("Although some courts may be reluctant to
interfere with or inquire into ADR proceedings, and although confidentiality privileges
may limit the extent of judicial inquiry, an aggrieved party in court-annexed ADR
generally retains the right to a trial and the option to bring claims of bad faith to the
court's attention. In private contractual ADR similar protection and recourse are lacking
though the concern for process abuse is more compelling because the process is entirely
outside the auspices of the judicial system.").
561 See Madrinan, supra note 194, at 789.
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Ashcroft562 and civil liberties advocates fearing the expanded use of tools
proposed by the Justice Department, 563 President Bush stated on September
21, 2001 to a joint session of Congress5 that:
We will come together to give law enforcement the additional tools it needs
to track down terror here at home.
We will come together to strengthen our intelligence capabilities to know
the plans of terrorists before they act and to find them before they strike.
Soon after, the Justice Department's proposal (originally called the
"Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001") was evaluated by the House of
Representatives Committee on the Judiciary. 565 The Justice Department
argued that the law had failed to keep up with technology and that their
proposal represented a "careful, balanced, long overdue improvement... to
our capacity to combat terrorism." 566 By October 25, 2001 both houses of
Congress had passed the bill, without having time to read the final version
and with little time for debate. 567 When President Bush signed the PATRIOT
562 John W. Whitehead and Steven H. Aden, Forfeiting "Enduring Freedom " For
"Homeland Security": A Constitutional Analysis of the USA PATRIOT Act and the
Justice Department's Anti-Terrorism Initiatives, 51 AMER. U. L. REv. 1087 (2002) ("In
later testimony, Ashcroft stated that the Department of Justice's mission was redefined,
placing the defense of the nation and its citizens above all else. This historic
'redefinition' of the Justice Department's mission turned the focus of federal law
enforcement from apprehending and incarcerating criminals to detecting and halting
terrorism activity on American soil and abroad.").
563 See Madrinan, supra note 194, at 790 ("Despite the national clamor to combat
terrorism in the wake of the September 11 attacks, civil liberties advocates were
nonetheless alarmed by the latest proposal's grant of expansive electronic surveillance
and search powers to law enforcement officials, fearing that fundamental privacy
interests were being sacrificed in the name of antiterrorism.").
564 George Bush, Address to the Nation (Sept. 20, 2001) (transcript available at
Transcript of President Bush's address, CNN.COM./U.S.cnn.com/u.s.), Sept. 21, 2001
(September 21, 2001 2:27 AM EDT).
http://www.studentnews.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/
565 See Madrinan, supra note 194, at 790-91.
566 See id. at 791.
567 Laura Donohue & James Walsh, A Remedy for an Unidentified Problem, Op-Ed,
SAN FRAN. CHRON., Oct. 30, 2001,
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/l15 1/patriotact_a_remedy for an unide
ntifiedjproblem.html ("Still there were few hearings and little debate. Many
representatives didn't have an opportunity to read the House version before the vote. In
the Senate, the bill bypassed Judiciary Committee markup and went straight behind
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Act into law on October 26, 2001, he stated that "This new law that I sign
today will allow surveillance of all communications used by terrorists,
including e-mails, the Internet, and cell phones." 568 In essence, the
PATRIOT Act extended already existing tools used for criminal
investigations, to foreign intelligence investigations that have nothing to do
with criminal activities. 569
One controversial section of the PATRIOT Act, Section 215,570 gives the
government the authority to confiscate records from libraries and businesses
closed doors. Presented with a thumbs-up or thumbs-down option, and with little
opportunity to amend the bill, few lawmakers were willing to risk being seen as 'soft on
terrorism."'
568 From the White House President Bush at Signing ofAnti-Terrorism Bill On Oct.
26, 2001, ABOUT.COM, http://usgovinfo.about.com/blwhrelease20.htm.
569 David Cole, The Missing Patriot Debate, THE NATION, May 30, 2005,
http://www.thenation.com/article/missing -patriot-debate, ("The more fundamental myth
is that 'foreign intelligence' investigations are about terrorism ... A 'foreign intelligence'
investigation need only concern foreign-policy-related information about an agent of a
foreign power-defined so broadly that it includes any foreign national employee of any
organization not composed substantially of US citizens.").
570
SEC. 215. ACCESS TO RECORDS AND OTHER ITEMS UNDER THE
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT.
Title V of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1861 et seq.)
is amended by striking sections 501 through 503 and inserting the following:
SEC. 501. ACCESS TO CERTAIN BUSINESS RECORDS FOR FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS.
(a)(1) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or a designee of the
Director (whose rank shall be no lower than Assistant Special Agent in Charge) may
make an application for an order requiring the production of any tangible things
(including books, records, papers, documents, and other items) for an investigation
to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities,
provided that such investigation of a United States person is not conducted solely
upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution.
(2) An investigation conducted under this section shall--
(A) be conducted under guidelines approved by the Attorney General under
Executive Order 12333 (or a successor order); and
(B) not be conducted of a United States'person solely upon the basis of activities
protected by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
(b) Each application under this section--
(1) shall be made to--
(A) a judge of the court established by section 103(a); or
(B) a United States Magistrate Judge under chapter 43 of title 28, United States
Code, who is publicly designated by the Chief Justice of the United States to have
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that previously required a grand jury subpoena.57' Librarians spoke out
against Section 215 soon after the PATRIOT Act was passed,572 and
continued to do so as Congress later revisited some of its provisions. 573
Government statisticians, also alarmed by the potential violations of privacy
under Section 215, have protested that the PATRIOT Act undermines the
promises given by government agencies to keep government-held data
confidential. 574 Other concerns address the threat to constitutional
the power to hear applications and grant orders for the production of tangible things
under this section on behalf of a judge of that court; and
(2) shall specify that the records concerned are sought for an authorized
investigation conducted in accordance with subsection (a)(2) to protect against
international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.
(c)(1) Upon an application made pursuant to this section, the judge shall enter an ex
parte order as requested, or as modified, approving the release of records if the judge
finds that the application meets the requirements of this section.
(2) An order under this subsection shall not disclose that it is issued for purposes of
an investigation described in subsection (a).
(d) No person shall disclose to any other person (other than those persons necessary
to produce the tangible things under this section) that the Federal Bureau of
Investigation has sought or obtained tangible things under this section.
(e) A person who, in good faith, produces tangible things under an order pursuant to
this section shall not be liable to any other person for such production. Such
production shall not be deemed to constitute a waiver of any privilege in any other
proceeding or context.
571 See Cole, supra note 569 ("[A] grand jury subpoena is available only when the
government has sufficient grounds to believe a crime has been committed to go to the
trouble of empaneling a grand jury. Section 215 can be triggered without any evidence of
wrongdoing whatsoever.").
572 See Minnow, supra note 90 ("[L]ibrarians do have discretion in the actual
practice of creating and maintaining records in the first place. By better understanding the
Patriot Act and knowing what to do if faced with an incident, librarians can be prepared
to do the right thing and protect privacy.").
573 Steven J. DuBord, Librarians Unite Against Patriot Act Provisions, THE NEW
AMERICAN, (December 4, 2009, 12:56),
http://www.thenewamerican.com/index.php/usnews/congress/2467-librariins-unite-
against-patriot-act-provisions ("Librarians are virtually united in opposing the renewal of
the Patriot Act provisions that are set to expire this December 31, 2009. Thirty-two state
chapters of the American Library Association (ALA) have passed resolutions calling for
Congress to allow Section 215 of the act to expire.").
574 Douglas J. Sylvester & Sharon Lohr, Counting on Confidentiality: Legal and
Statistical Approaches to Federal Privacy Law After the USA Patriot Act, 2005 Wis. L.
REv. 1033, 1061 (2005) ("Statisticians in federal agencies and other statisicians
concerned about confidentiality, perhaps caught initially unaware by the Patriot Act's
intended reach and potential damage, immediately began seeking solutions to its trust-
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protections surrounding search and seizure, such as probable cause and
judicial review.5 75 In general, the USA PATRIOT Act threatens the
protection of privacy of individuals 576 at the same time it increases state
power577 and government secrecy.5 78 Section 215 is as applicable to
mediation as it'is to libraries and private businesses. 579 Under Section 215, if
a mediator's records were taken, she could not inform the parties5 80 and
would be protected from prosecution for complying.58 1 Yet, almost no
eroding potential. They have been vocal critics of attempts by government investigatory
agencies to violate the confidentiality of personal information.").
575 See Rotenberg, supra note 91, at 1118 ("The Act limits safeguards created by
fifteen statutes. It reduces probable cause standards in key laws. It significantly expands
the authority of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. It limits judicial review. It
creates a new 'sneak and peek' provision for police to undertake searches without the
customary notification requirement.").
576 See Sylvester & Lohr, supra note 574, at 1085 ("Embedding privacy in an
individual right places undue burdens on individuals to control their data, an increasingly
difficult challenge in the information age.").
577 See Rotenberg, supra note 91, at 1132-33 ("[P]rivacy law is established to
rectify asymmetries in power and to protect the rights of individuals against institutions
that are able to delve deeply into our private lives. Viewed in this light, the developments
since September 11 should be seen as an expansion of state power and a consequential
limitation on the freedom of individuals.").
578 See id. ("There has been no beneficial tradeoff between privacy and
openness... [t]here has simply been greater exposure of private life and greater secrecy
surrounding the actions of government.").
579 See Sylvester & Lohr, supra note 574, at 1060 (stating that: "Although Section
215's heading ... refers to 'business records' its actual provisions do not limit the nature
of information that may be included in 'tangible things,' nor does it limit the sources
from which such information may be requested.").
580 Thomas J. Costello, The Economic Trade-Offs of Privacy: Exploring the
Interaction of Economics and Privacy in the Formulation of Privacy Policy, Professional
Report for the Degree of Master of Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin, 31,
(2003) ("While the potential for an investigation by law enforcement is a privacy concern
and has proven to be contentious for many, an even more controversial area within
Section 215 is subsection 501(d). This provision makes it illegal to discuss searches, even
with those persons whose records are the subject of the subpoena.").
581 See Sylvester & Lohr, supra note 574, at 1061 ("[A] section 215 warrant cannot
be disclosed by the person to whom it was served. When an individual complies in good
faith with a section 215 warrant, he or she is granted immunity. In other words, while the
Patriot Act does not make release of otherwise confidential items legal, it does insulate
the recipient from legal action for any conduct undertaken pursuant to the warrant.")
(internal citations omitted).
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mention of concern about the impact of Section 215 on confidentiality in
mediation has been made.582
While the Justice Department insists it is targeting only suspected
terrorists, the PATRIOT Act expands the definition of "domestic terrorism"
to cast a wide net.583 Non-citizens, both documented and undocumented, are
targeted in the Act.584 The vague terminology in the Act allows the
government to search or confiscate papers in the very manner that the Fourth
Amendment was designed to prevent by a sweeping search of documents585
in order to produce evidence of wrongdoing.586 Thus, mediators should be
alarmed by the threat to confidentiality in the USA PATRIOT Act as long as
it remains in place.587 It cannot be claimed that this has never occurred. How
582 Susan Oberman, Mediation and The Right To Privacy: Confidentiality, The USA
PA TRIOT Act, And Us, MEDIATE.COM, (June, 2009),
http://www.mediate.com/articles/obermanSl.cfm. First published in the Virginia
Mediation Network online newsletter, Fall, 2007. A workshop entitled "Confidentiality
and the Right To Privacy" which raised the issues regarding the USA PATRIOT Act and
confidentiality in mediation, was presented by Susan Oberman at the Virginia Mediation
Network Conference, October 7, 2008.
583 See Whitehead & Aden, supra note 562, at 1092 ("At the same time that the
Justice Department is ostensibly targeting only this 'narrow class of individuals'
[terrorists] it has greatly expanded that class of suspects through the Patriot Act. Section
802 of the Act amends the criminal code 18 U.S.C. § 2331, to add a new definition of
'domestic terrorism."').
584 See id. at 1095 ([T]he lack of concern for the rights of non-citizens runs
thematically through the Adminstration's response to the terrorist attacks.").
585 Grant Gross, ACLU, other groups sue US gov't over border laptop searches, IT
WORLD (September 7, 2010, 12:45 PM),
http://www.itworld.com/hardware/ 19862/aclu-other-groups-sue-us-govt-over-border-
laptop-searches ("The American Civil Liberties Union and other groups have filed a
lawsuit challenging the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) practice of searching
laptops and other electronic devices at U.S. borders..The lawsuit, filed Tuesday by the
ACLU, the New York Civil Liberties Union and the National Association of Criminal
Defense Layers (NACDL), challenges a 2008 CBP policy that allows border agents to
search electronic devices of any traveler, without suspicion of wrongdoing.").
586 See Madrinan, supra note 194, at 824 ("[When the Bill of Rights' framers
identified 'papers' in the category of items to be secured by the Fourth Amendment, one
of the British tyrannies they sought to prevent in America was the agents of the executive
indiscriminately rummaging through documents.").
587 Felicia Sonmez, Patriot Act Extension passes House, one week after unexpected
defeat, WASH. POST (Feb. 14, 2011, 7:17 PM ET),
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2011/02/patriot-act-extension-passes-h.html ("The
House approved Monday a measure that would extend key provisions of the Patriot Act
through December... One of the provisions authorized the FBI to continue using roving
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would we know? Many confidentiality statutes and rules acknowledge that
the privilege is subject to review under other laws and rules. The USA
PATRIOT Act is certainly one such law.
C. Mediators'Duty to Explain Confidentiality Prior to Mediation
Informing parties of confidentiality limitations under constitutional and
statutory laws and court rules58 8 is essential to the exercise of self-
determination. 589 Self-determination rests in several choices the parties must
make: whether to participate in mediation, what model is best for them,590
and whether to maintain or waive confidentiality. Regardless of mediation
model,59 1 all mediators practice norm-advocating 592 mediation while
explaining the agreement to mediate, especially regarding confidentiality
decisions. Mediators may be reluctant to address the complexities
surrounding confidentiality, yet in doing so can lay the groundwork for the
negotiation of the substantive issues to follow. Parties negotiating
wiretaps on surveillance targets; the second allows the government to access 'any
tangible items,' such as library records, in the course of surveillance; and the third is a
'lone wolf provision that allows for the surveillance of targets who are not connected to
an identified terrorist group.").
588 See Johnson, supra note 446, at 490 ("Most participants in mediation, including
the mediator, are unaware of their duty to testify despite the fact that they have signed
confidentiality agreements ... . In the interest of fairness, parties should know beforehand
what will be disclosed and what will remain confidential; notice allows parties to behave
accordingly.").
589 See Weckstein, supra note 528, at 557 ("[A] key professional role of the
mediator is to maximize self-determination based upon informed consent, exercised
within the confines of the societal purpose of the dispute resolution context.").
590 Dorothy Della Noce, What Is a Model for Mediation Practice? A Critical Review
of Family Mediation: Contemporary Issues, 15 MED. Q. 135, 136 (Winter 1997) ("The
term model is used loosely in the mediation field, often interchangeably with style,
approach and orientation. Yet model implies something more substantial than a
practitioner's preference or idiosyncratic style. It suggests an example of practice that is
capable and worthy of imitation, a clear and detailed exemplar to which a practitioner can
refer for guidance.").
591 See Oberman, supra note 11, at 813-15.
592 Ellen Waldman, The Challenge of Certification: How To Ensure Mediator
Competence While Preserving Diversity, 30 U. S.F. L. REV. 735 (Spring 1996) (A norm-
advocating mediator "relays information to the parties about relevant social norms, not
simply to augment the parties ability to make informed decisions, but to ensure that their
agreement concords with these norms.").
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confidentiality before the mediation begins gives the mediator an opportunity
to establish trust in the process and demonstrate possibility of consensus.
Knowing the legal context in which mediation functions is critical to
uphold the standard of self-determination.593 Informed decision-making 594 is
the basis for self-determination 595 and consent.596 Mediators should learn the
rights they offer to protect when they promise confidentiality. The purpose of
confidentiality in mediation is to preserve individual privacy rights,597 given
the vast majority of states that have sought to protect it through legislation
and court rules. 598 Mediators are responsible for clarifying both the
protections and the limitations of confidentiality in their respective states. 599
593 See Welsh, supra note 491, at 8 ("The vision of self-determination that inspired
the contemporary mediation movement placed the disputants themselves at the center of
the mediation process... It was assumed that the parties would actively and directly
participate in the communication and negotiation that occurs during mediation, would
choose and control the substantive norms to guide their decision-making, would create
the options for settlement of their dispute, and ultimately would control the final decision
regarding whether or not to settle their dispute in mediation.").
594 See Engler, supra note 113, at 2025 ("As in the medical context, the issue of how
much information must be disclosed to ensure informed consent is an enormous one. Yet
the central concept remains valid: for a decision to be informed, the litigant must have
had the 'opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the options available and the risks
attendant upon each."'). ,
595 See Weckstein, supra note 528, at 503 ("The key to self-determination is
informed consent. A disputant who is unaware of relevant facts or law that if known,
would influence that party's decision cannot engage in meaningful self-determination.").
596 See Nolan-Haley, supra note 8, at 778 ("Informed consent prepares the way for a
party to participate voluntarily and intelligently in the mediation process and to accept the
outcome... informed consent matters because the potential for coercion, incapacity and
ignorance can impede the consensual underpinnings of the mediation process.").
597 See Fried, supra note 144, at 478 ("The view of morality upon which my
conception of privacy rests is one which recognizes basic rights in persons, rights to
which all are entitled equally, by virtue of their status as persons.").
598 See supra note 36.
599 Most courts have created ethical standards for mediators that include explaining
confidentiality as one of the mediator's responsibilities.
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V. CONCLUSION
The mediation process occurs at a junction of public and private life.600
Mediation within families, schools, corporations, community groups, and
neighborhoods, operates on a slippery slope, promising confidentiality on
one hand, and requiring mediators and parties to be vigilant in assessing what
is confidential and what must be reported on another. Mediators are among
those considered to represent a stewardship role to protect those who cannot
protect themselves. 601 Statutes and court rules defining what is and what is
not confidential acknowledge the duty of the mediator to report under some
circumstances (intent to commit a crime, harm one's self or another, abuse a
child or incapacitated adult, etc.).
As we have tried to show, finding the line between public and private is
elusive.602 Community mediation-which claims to provide community
justice603-places the focus.on individuals, thereby transforming community
issues into personal ones.604 Critics argue that, rather than supporting justice
and the protection of the law, mediation eliminates history and context.605
600 See Reuben, supra note 15, at 589 ("While conventional wisdom holds that ADR
and public litigation operate as independent 'public' and 'private' spheres.. .they really
represent two different spheres within the single galaxy of public dispute resolution.").
601 See Gibson, supra note 4, at 53 n.148 ("[T]he affirmative force that creates a
duty to report derives from the fact that the individual is unable to mitigate th[e] suffering
himself or herself. In effect the law adopts a stewardship role for those who lack the
ability to assert their own rights.").
602 Joseph B. Stulberg, Questions, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsp. RESOL. 537, 538 (2002)
("[W]hat, in fact, occurs in mediated conversations is uncharted territory rich with
potential for providing us insights into how legal obligations and non-legal normative
values interface in shaping the conduct of parties to a mediation. We might discover,
importantly, that the presumed dichotomy between the two is not as pronounced as some
might believe, thereby demolishing the perception that private and public 'justice' norms
are operating at cross-purposes.").
603 Christine B. Harrington and & Sally Engle Merry, Ideological Production: The
Making of Community Mediation, 22 LAw & Soc. REv. 717 (1988) ("Community justice
associates mediation with democratic values, such as community participation and
neighborhood self-governance, and it evokes the sense of a cohesive community.").
604 Sara Cobb, Einsteinian Practice and Newtonian Discourse: An Ethical Crisis in
Mediation, 7 NEG. J. 9 (January, 1991) ("[B]y focusing on psychological phenomena
such as attitudes, feelings, perceptions, needs, interests ... we unwittingly maintain the
focus on individuals rather than on relational systems.").
605 See Grillo, supra note 278, at 1564 ("[W]hile one of the principal justifications
for introducing mediation into the divorce process is that context will be substituted to
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While contending that the process is voluntary606 and belongs to the parties,
mediation advocates find it necessary to assuage fears of ever-increasing
pressure through the courts to direct parties into mediation.607 Thus, dealing
with confidentiality within the framework of the legal system is fraught with
contradictions 608 and questions. Is confidentiality always beneficial to all
parties? How can parties determine what is best for them? How does a
mediator ensure that parties are exercising informed consent?
These questions need to be raised, and though they remain unanswered,
confidentiality continues to be one of the major selling points of mediation.
The decision to maintain or waive the right to keep information from being
disclosed in court and to the public is a direct exercise of the right to
privacy.609 Presenting information about confidentiality is a key point at
which the mediator represents the court and the law.610 Over-simplification
of the protection of confidentiality is not in compliance with self-
determination, 611 as it would fail to provide parties with all relevant
information. 612 In many states, the rules and laws governing mediation
indicate that confidentiality is subject to other laws that can override it.
abstract principles, in fact, by eliminating discussion of the past, context-in the sense of
the relationship's history-is removed. The result is that we are left with neither
principles nor context as a basis for decisionmaking.").
606 See Hedeen, supra note 35.
607 See Phillips, supra note 34.
608 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Many Ways of Mediation: The Transformation of
Traditions, Ideologies, Paradigms, and Practices, 11 NEGOTIATION. J. 227 (July 1995),
("[M]ediation, as a more open process, can attempt to take account of legal, economic,
and social rights and entitlements while also being sensitive to individual and community
needs and interests.").
609 See Rosenberg, supra note 1, at 181 ("The mediation privilege involves matters
of substantive policy. The courts should recognize that, implicit in the assertion of a
privilege, is an important issue of what constitutes fair treatment of the individual and her
right of privacy, particularly in civil litigation.").
610 See Reuben, supra note 15, at 629 ("[T]he mandatory statutory schemes that
allocate the roles of the private ADR providers and the public courts toward the single
end of state-enforced dispute resolution can establish an inseverable and indispensable
nexus between the seemingly private actors and their governmental partners. ").
611 See Nolan-Haley, supra note 32, at 87 ("Even mediation's most favored virtue,
self-determination, may be of limited value as an indicator of the justice of court
mediation. Without knowledge of their legal rights, the exercise of self-determination is
simply a feel good process.").
612 See Hughes, supra note 10, at 72 ("[A] party is not exercising self-determination
if they do not have complete information or at least the pertinent information in question.
Any decision arising from this situation is neither voluntary or informed.").
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Regardless of the ongoing debate about evaluative vs. facilitative "styles" 613
that addresses the role of the mediator in giving information about the
substance of a dispute, 614 all mediators are responsible for informing parties
of the legal parameters surrounding the mediation process. Mediation
training615 and course work 616 should include the specifics of confidentiality
613 See Oberman, supra note 12, at 30 ("[S~tyle as a formulation for recognizing
differences continies to obscure them, and makes it impossible for consumers to know
what process they will encounter. Current descriptions of mediator styles do not provide
accurate distinctions among mediator practices.").
614 See generally James J. Alfini, Moderator, Evaluative Versus Facilitative
Mediation: A Discussion 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 919 (1997); Richard Birke, Evaluation
and Facilitation: Moving Past either/Or, 2000 J. DisP. RESOL. 309 (2000); Kimberlee K.
Kovach & Lela P. Love, Mapping Mediation: The Risks of Riskin's Grid, 3 HARv.
NEGOT. L. REv. 71 (1998); Lela P. Love, The Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should
Not Evaluate, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 937 (1997); Lela P. Love & Kimberlee K. Kovach,
ADR: An Eclectic Array of Processes, Rather Than One Eclectic Process, 2000 J. DISP.
RES. 295 (2000); Randolph L. Lowry, To Evaluate or Nor That Is Not the Question, 38
FAM. & CON. CTS. REv. 48 (2000); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Many Ways of
Mediation: The Transformation of Traditions, Ideologies, Paradigms, and Practices 11
NEGOT. JOuRN. 217 (1995). Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When Dispute Resolution Begets
Disputes of Its Own: Conflicts Among Dispute Professionals, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1871
(1997); Leonard Riskin, Decision-Making in Mediation: The New Old Grid and the New
New Grid System, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1 (2003); Leonard Riskin, Understanding
Mediators' Orientations, Strategies and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, I HARV.
NEGOT. L. REv. 8 (1996); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Identifying Real Dichotomies Underlying
the False Dichotomy: Twenty-First Century Mediation in an Eclectic Regime, 2000 J.
Disp. 371 (2000); Joseph B. Stulberg, Facilitative Versus Evaluative Mediator
Orientation: Piercing the 'Grid' Lock, 24 FL. ST. U. L. REv. 985 (1997); Ellen A.
Waldman, The Evaluative-Facilitative Debate in Mediation: Applying the Lens of
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 82 MARQ. L. REv. 155 (1998); Weckstein, supra note 531.
615 Diane J. Levin, Mediation Credentialing: What About Mediation Trainers?
MEDIATE.COM (June, 2009),
http://www.mediate.com/articles/LevinDbl20090629.cfm#top ("[M]ediation trainers and
training programs that prepare mediators for private practice are unregulated. Just as
anyone can hold themselves out as a mediator in private practice, so, too, can anyone
hold themselves out as a trainer of mediators. Quality of programs vary widely; some
programs are good and some are not. Even if a mediator has 30 or 40 or 400 hours of
training, where's the assurance that any of that training was conducted by competent,
knowledgeable instructors?").
616 Lela Porter Love, Twenty-Five Years Later with Promises To Keep: Legal
Education in Dispute Resolution and Training of Mediators, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP.
RESOL. 597, 598 (2002) ("In many law schools ADR has been incorporated into the
curriculum by integrating dispute resolution into standard courses, expanding ADR
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in the particular state, 617 including its limitations,618 and the historical
context in which confidentiality has found its place. If courts may override
confidentiality agreements using the "compelling interests of the state"
test, 619 then mediators as state actors are giving information to participants
that has significant legal consequences. 620
This article contends that mediators oversee constitutional and statutory
protections when presenting parties with the choice to maintain or waive
confidentiality. Despite claims that mediation is a process that gives parties
the authority to make decisions based on their own values and sense of
fairness,621 mediation is, in reality, regulated by statutes and court rules in
forty-nine states and the District of Columbia. Though some argue the
mediator role does not include giving legal information 622 while others claim
it is essential,623 the dominant rhetoric of the ADR community is about party
initiatives in an incremental fashion, and, as almost every law school has done, adding
ADR courses to the curriculum.").
617 Charles Pou Jr., Enough Rules Already! DISP. RESOL. MAG. 20 (Winter 2004),
(stating that: "Basic and advanced mediation training programs should place systematic
exploration of applicable codes much closer to the core of their curricula.").
618 See Note, supra note 327, at 452 ("Any protection of mediation must recognize
the limits imposed on confidentiality by the nature of a negotiation process itself.").
619 See Baker, supra note 50, at 1171 ("If the Court does find that a claimed right is
entitled to protection as a fundamental privacy right, a law infringing it must satisfy the
compelling state interest test. A critical question then becomes the types of state interests
that can justify such infringement.").
620 See Thompson, supra note 31, at 515 ("[T]he penchant for confidentiality and
secrecy, resulting in overlapping privilege rules, makes it difficult for parties to litigate
claims of unfairness in the mediation process.. .Legitimate concerns about confidentiality
or other bright-line rules should not totally deprive participants the opportunity to raise
basic claims of unfair treatment.").
621 See Nolan-Haley, supra note 32, at 56 ("Instead of law, free-standing normative
standards govern in mediation, and parties actually affected by a dispute decide what
factors should influence the efforts to resolve that dispute. Thus, The the moral reference
point in mediation is the self, and individualized notions of fairness, justice, morality,
ethics, and culture may trump the values associated with any objective framework
provided by law.").
622 See Waldman, The Challenge of Certification, supra note 592, at 733 ("Attention
to social or legal norms is thought to constrict the parties' consideration of issues and
limit the scope of reviewable options.")
623 See id. at 734 ("[A] mediator following the norm-educating model believes the
parties should receive information about legal entitlements and relevant financial,
technical, or psychological data before making irrevocable decisions.").
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empowerment. 624 Yet power imbalances in the society are reproduced in the
relationship between parties in mediation6 25 and in selection of mediators. 626
In litigation the court must balance individual rights with state/public
interests.627 In mediation, a sphere of privacy-the right to autonomy-is
protected, 62 8 allowing parties to decide to whom they disclose information
about themselves, and what actions they wish to take.629 Choosing
mediation, while important and often valuable, should not require parties to
abdicate other "inalienable" rights. 630 Recognizing mediation's place within
the realm of the court63 1 provides a reference point,632 not just to
confidentiality and privacy, but to due process and justice.63 3
624 Sara Cobb, Empowerment and Mediation: A Narrative Perspective, 9 NEG. J.
245 (July 1993) ("Despite the vagueness of existing definitions of empowerment and the
relative absence of theory or research on the subject, there seems to be considerable
consensus about its worth. Empowerment sells. The promise of empowerment, rooted in
the discourse about democracy, affirms and even helps to construct out faith in the
American way, our belief in the politics of participation.").
625 See Harrington & Merry, supra note 603, at 720 ("Voluntary participation in
mediation is viewed as enhancing the development of an individual's capacity to take
responsibility for his or her problems and work out consensual agreements with others ...
. This ideological project does not promise that mediation will change power relations or
transform communities, it only attempts to make people happier where they are.").
626 See id. at 730 ("Despite the efforts of local programs to have a variety of
mediators from all ethnic, class, and educational backgrounds, the demand for neutral
mediators and the detached stance tends to favor people with professional
backgrounds.").
627 See Stulberg, supra note 602, at 536 ("We celebrate the rule of law in part
because it reflects the uniform application of public rules to every citizen irrespective of
her wealth, social standing, race, ethnicity, or political power.").
628 See id. ("[W]e cherish autonomy and freedom because it encourages each of us
to fashion plans and decisions in a way that reflects our most fundamental beliefs.").
629 See Baker, supra note 50, at 1163.
630 See Nolan-Haley, supra note 8, at 821 ("By agreeing to attempt to resolve
disputes through the mediation process, parties may, in effect, be waiving their right to
seek redress through the formal legal system and the right to receive the benefits of that
system.").
631 Wayne Brazil, Court ADR 25 Years After Pound: Have We Found a Better Way?
18 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 97 (2002) ("Because the public's trust and confidence in
the courts is their most precious and essential asset, courts that sponsor ADR programs
must promise the public that those programs will do nothing to diminish or undermine
that trust and confidence, but, instead, will enhance it.").
632 See Hyman & Love, supra note 140, at 162 ("To a significant degree, the public
law provides the norms that guide most private dispute resolution. Parties often settle
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disputes by keeping in mind and balancing the entitlements the litigation system
promises.")
633 See Nolan-Haley, supra note 32, at 49 n.6 ('Justice through law,' the type of
justice which litigants expect to receive in the court system, has both procedural and
substantive components. Procedurally, it means a fair process-the opportunity to be
heard; substantively, it is based on the application of objective legal norms.").
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